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Resumo
As redes de distribuic¸a˜o de eletricidade sa˜o infraestruturas crı´ticas que, em casos
de incapacitac¸a˜o ou destruic¸a˜o, provocariam um efeito debilitante na economia e na
seguranc¸a pu´blica. Estas redes sa˜o cada vez mais suportadas por sistemas complexos
e redes de comunicac¸o˜es, ganhando desta forma alguma inteligeˆncia e autonomia. A
informac¸a˜o que estes sistemas geram e as deciso˜es e ac¸o˜es que tomam sa˜o limitadas pela
informac¸a˜o que teˆm. Em casos nos quais na˜o tenham, por desenho, toda a informac¸a˜o
relevante para o seu contexto de atuac¸a˜o, podem enganar os operadores e tomar ac¸o˜es
prejudiciais. A dependeˆncia dos sistemas e comunicac¸o˜es levanta tambe´m preocupac¸o˜es
sobre o desempenho, privacidade, seguranc¸a e confiabilidade, que se estendem ale´m de
possı´veis faltas na rede ele´trica. Neste sentido, existem soluc¸o˜es dedicadas ao tratamento
automa´tico de faltas na rede ele´trica, existindo tambe´m soluc¸o˜es dedicadas ao tratamento
de faltas nos sistemas e comunicac¸o˜es, fazendo-o separadamente. No entanto, como de-
monstrado pelos incidentes na Ucraˆnia, no final de 2015, faltas e falhas em diferentes
camadas da rede inteligente podem estar relacionadas. Adicionalmente, embora exista
alguma preocupac¸a˜o com a seguranc¸a e a confiabilidade das soluc¸o˜es de tratamento au-
toma´tico de faltas na rede ele´trica no aˆmbito de alguns projetos europeus, os projetos
piloto focam-se maioritariamente nos aspetos funcionais destas soluc¸o˜es, o que podera´
comprometer a seguranc¸a de futuras instalac¸o˜es.
Em resposta aos problemas acima descritos, nesta tese utiliza-se uma abordagem com
base em conhecimento e seguranc¸a para desenhar e propor um sistema de tratamento
automa´tico de faltas na rede inteligente, que explora as ligac¸o˜es atra´s mencionadas. Inici-
almente, sa˜o definidos requisitos de alto nı´vel para as componentes funcional, seguranc¸a
e confiabilidade, desempenho, operac¸a˜o e manutenc¸a˜o. Estes requisitos sa˜o desagregados
em requisitos de baixo nı´vel para os quais e´ proposta uma arquitetura de sistema com
mo´dulos funcionais e na˜o funcionais. No caso especı´fico dos requisitos de seguranc¸a e
confiabilidade, foi realizado um levantamento das ameac¸as e vulnerabilidades a` compo-
nente aplicacional do sistema, com o objetivo de identificar os controlos necessa´rios e
propor um conjunto de componentes que, sendo eles pro´prios conformes, garantem con-
formidade com os controlos identificados. A ana´lise inicia-se com a identificac¸a˜o dos
ativos relevantes, a que se segue a identificac¸a˜o das ameac¸as e vulnerabilidades corres-
pondentes, com maior foco nas ameac¸as para a aplicac¸a˜o e na ameac¸a que esta, se e
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quando comprometida, pode constituir para a rede inteligente. Dos controlos identifica-
dos, sa˜o apenas incluı´dos no desenho aqueles que teˆm de ser implementados atrave´s de
componentes aplicacionais ou para os quais a aplicac¸a˜o tem de dar algum tipo de suporte.
Os controlos externos na˜o sa˜o cobertos por esta investigac¸a˜o.
Ainda sobre o desenho funcional, e´ feito um modelo da rede inteligente, incluindo
os sistemas e componentes das suas va´rias camadas, com o objetivo de identificar as
configurac¸o˜es que cada um suporta e as ligac¸o˜es entre eles. Sa˜o tambe´m modelados,
com o objetivo de identificar ligac¸o˜es e dependeˆncias: o processo de operac¸a˜o da rede
ele´trica, um processo gene´rico representativo dos processos e servic¸os dependentes do
estado operacional da rede ele´trica e o processo de tratamento automa´tico. Estes modelos
sa˜o utilizados na fase de implementac¸a˜o.
A arquitetura resultante e´ a de um sistema multi-agente com agentes geograficamente
distribuı´dos e replicados, designados por entidades especialistas em tratamento de faltas.
Cada entidade e´ responsa´vel por um domı´nio de tratamento limitado, correspondendo a
um conjunto de sistemas, componentes e servic¸os da rede inteligente que fazem parte
do seu aˆmbito de supervisa˜o. Raciocina sobre conhecimento assente em factos e regras.
Supervisiona o seu domı´nio, diagnosticando faltas, criando planos de recuperac¸a˜o e re-
configurando a rede inteligente com base nesses planos. Coopera com outras entidades.
Aprende com os resultados e consequeˆncias da sua atuac¸a˜o. Integra componentes de
seguranc¸a e confiabilidade para prevenir e tolerar faltas e intruso˜es nos seus pro´prios
componentes.
O sistema e´ implementado parcialmente para prova do conceito. A implementac¸a˜o
inclui a definic¸a˜o de um domı´nio de tratamento, da ontologia correspondente, do mo-
delo de conhecimento com factos e regras, dos objetivos de tratamento e de um con-
junto de queries aplica´veis ao modelo. O domı´nio de tratamento inclui componentes da
rede ele´trica, equipamentos de rede, computadores e um sistema de controlo de acessos
fı´sicos, cobrindo desta forma diferentes camadas da rede inteligente. Para validac¸a˜o da
implementac¸a˜o, os objetivos e queries sa˜o submetidos a um motor de infereˆncia, no qual
o modelo de conhecimento e´ previamente carregado, simulando o comportamento de uma
re´plica nos diferentes estados do processo de tratamento. O processo e´ repetido para qua-
tro cena´rios de faltas e falhas de complexidade crescente, incluindo um cena´rio de falta de
conhecimento em que o resultado da infereˆncia, demonstrando a necessidade de manter
as bases de conhecimento atualizadas.
A implementac¸a˜o dos restantes mo´dulos e integrac¸a˜o do mo´dulo de conhecimento
e´ deixada para trabalho futuro, o que limita a validac¸a˜o da seguranc¸a da soluc¸a˜o. Por
definic¸a˜o, os controlos incluı´dos na arquitetura proposta respondem aos requisitos do sis-
tema, dado que o desenho da soluc¸a˜o utiliza mo´dulos de seguranc¸a e confiabilidade iden-
tificados atrave´s de uma ana´lise de ameac¸as e vulnerabilidades. No entanto, a verificac¸a˜o
de que estes controlos sa˜o corretamente implementados e a validac¸a˜o da robustez dessa
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implementac¸a˜o esta´ dependente da implementac¸a˜o dos mo´dulos e, por esta raza˜o, e´ dei-
xada tambe´m para trabalho futuro.
Validamos tambe´m a robustez do desenho proposto em termos de liveness e safety.
Neste sentido, apresentamos uma definic¸a˜o para cada uma destas propriedades no con-
texto da soluc¸a˜o proposta, apresentamos um conjunto de cena´rios em que as mesmas
sa˜o comprometidas e justificamos o porqueˆ de esses cena´rios na˜o serem possı´veis. No
caso da liveness, o sistema deve executar continuamente desde a sua instalac¸a˜o ate´ ao
fim do seu ciclo de vida, entre eventuais interrupc¸o˜es programadas. Para a sua validac¸a˜o
focamo-nos nas interac¸o˜es entre os va´rios mo´dulos, com os sistemas e componentes da
rede inteligente e entre entidades. No caso da safety, as ac¸o˜es do sistema devem basear-se
apenas em informac¸a˜o atualizada, recolhida dos sistemas e componentes da rede inteli-
gente. Neste caso, o foco e´ no conteu´do do modelo de conhecimento, na coordenac¸a˜o
entre re´plicas e a execuc¸a˜o de comandos nos sistemas e componentes da rede inteligente.
Por u´ltimo, discutimos um conjunto de to´picos de desenho e implementac¸a˜o que,
sendo crı´ticos para a seguranc¸a e robustez do sistema proposto, dependem do contexto
especı´fico da cada rede inteligente e fornecemos recomendac¸o˜es e orientac¸o˜es para os
mesmos. Assumindo a existeˆncia de outros sistemas instalados na rede inteligente com
atuac¸a˜o possivelmente concorrente com a aqui considerada, e´ necessa´rio definir qual e´
o aˆmbito de cada um esse havera´ ou na˜o interac¸a˜o entre o sistema aqui proposto e es-
ses sistemas. O sistema aqui proposto podera´ utilizar os sensores, atuadores e redes de
comunicac¸o˜es ja´ existentes, dependendo de garantias funcionais, desempenho, capaci-
dade e seguranc¸a dados pelos mesmos, para adquirir a informac¸a˜o necessa´ria e controlar
os sistemas e componentes da rede inteligente, sendo necessa´rio identificar as necessi-
dades de implementac¸a˜o associadas. A alternativa e´ construir completa ou parcialmente
uma infraestrutura dedicada. Este sistema podera´ ser criado de raiz ou a partir de ou-
tros sistemas ja´ existentes e que contenham mo´dulos com funcionalidades semelhantes a`s
identificadas no desenho da soluc¸a˜o. E´ necessa´rio instalar, operar e manter o sistema com
o conhecimento necessa´rio a` tomada de decisa˜o. Se tal na˜o for feito, o sistema podera´ to-
mar deciso˜es prejudiciais. A distribuic¸a˜o do sistema, em termos de nu´mero de domı´nios,
e a sua replicac¸a˜o, em termos de nu´mero de re´plicas, tendo previsivelmente um impacto
elevado nos custos da soluc¸a˜o, devera˜o ter em conta ana´lises de risco e de custo-benefı´cio.
Uma distribuic¸a˜o com granularidade apropriada e um nu´mero suficiente de re´plicas com
distribuic¸a˜o adequada permitem que o sistema funcione corretamente tambe´m em casos
de partic¸a˜o de comunicac¸o˜es e/ou conectividade. As deciso˜es tomadas, relacionadas com
estes to´picos, teˆm impacto direto no desempenho, seguranc¸a e confiabilidade da soluc¸a˜o.
Para trabalho futuro, a nı´vel de desenho, e´ proposto: a evoluc¸a˜o de alguns mo´dulos ja´
incluı´dos no desenho da soluc¸a˜o e o desenvolvimento de novos mo´dulos, a modelac¸a˜o de
mais sistemas, componentes e servic¸os e a atualizac¸a˜o e extensa˜o da ana´lise de ameac¸as e
vulnerabilidades. A nı´vel de implementac¸a˜o, e´ proposto: a formalizac¸a˜o e manutenc¸a˜o de
vii
uma ontologia de suporte a` descric¸a˜o dos sistemas, componentes e servic¸os, a atualizac¸a˜o
dos factos, com base na ontologia, e a melhoria das regras, aproximando-as incremental-
mente da realidade, o desenvolvimento do co´digo de software associado a cada mo´dulo
e a extensa˜o das recomendac¸o˜es e orientac¸o˜es apresentadas na discussa˜o para incluı´rem
exemplos pra´ticos.
Palavras-chave: redes inteligentes, tratamento automa´tico de faltas, sistemas
inteligentes, seguranc¸a, confiabilidade
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Abstract
The increasing complexity of the smart grid raises concerns with performance, pri-
vacy, security and dependability that go further beyond electrical network faults. In this
regard, electrical network self-healing and commercially available security solutions are
capable of handling a set of electrical network, systems and communications faults auto-
matically, but separately. However, as shown by the Ukrainian incidents, in 2015, there
can be cause-effect connections between faults and failures in different smart grid lay-
ers. Additionally, although a set of European projects is addressing the security and de-
pendability of self-healing use cases, the pilot projects focus mainly on functional issues,
possibly compromising the security of future roll-outs.
We use a knowledge-based and security-by-design approach to design and propose a
secure and dependable Self-Healing System (SHS) with awareness of the aforementioned
connections. It is a Multi Agent System (MAS) with replicated Self-Healing Expert En-
tity (SHEE) agents. Each SHEE is responsible for the self-healing process in a limited
domain, corresponding to a set of systems, components and processes assigned to its
scope of supervision. It reasons with knowledge based on facts and rules. It monitors the
domain, diagnoses eventual faults, creates recovery plans and reconfigures the smart grid
based on these plans. It cooperates with other SHEEs. It learns from the results and conse-
quences of its actions. It comprises a set of security and dependability features to prevent
and tolerate faults and intrusions, resulting from a threat and vulnerability assessment.
We perform a partial implementation of our system, consisting in the definition of
a self-healing domain, the corresponding ontology, the knowledge model with facts and
reasoning rules and a set of goals and queries. We successfully validate the SHS con-
cept as a solution to the described problems. The goals and queries are submitted to a
standalone inference engine, which is previously loaded with the knowledge model, sim-
ulating the behavior of a SHEE replica through the different states of the self-healing
process. The process is repeated for four different complexity increasing fault and failure
scenarios. We discuss and provide guidance for a set of design and implementation issues
that, being critical to the security and robustness of the SHS, depend on each smart grid
specific context.
Keywords: smart grids, self-healing, expert systems, security, dependability
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Stories are told in books and films about how, thousands of years ago, we learned to
control fire, a process through which the burning matter releases energy that we can use
for cooking food, heating our homes, protection against predators and lighting the way.
Since then, we have learned how to generate electrical energy from many different en-
ergy sources such as coal, natural gas, water, wind or solar radiation. We found ways
to transport and distribute this energy across countries, down from where it is generated,
and supply it to where it is consumed. The electrical network grew, reaching further and
farther into our homes, work and public places and creating an increasing dependence as
increasingly more activities and services deeply rely on it. Currently, this network is a
critical infrastructure that, in case of incapacitation or destruction, would have a debili-
tating effect on the economy and public safety. It is supervised by operators with support
from complex systems and communication networks, which, together with the electrical
network, comprise a smart grid.
1.1 Problem
These smart grid systems are becoming increasingly intelligent and autonomous. Never-
theless, the information they generate, the decisions they make and the actions they take
are restricted by the information they have, which can make them deceive the operators
and take harmful actions. Additionally, they are still vulnerable to security threats, which
might make them behave erroneously or maliciously, with possible harmful consequences
to the smart grid and everything and everyone who relies on it.
1.2 Hypothesis
It is possible to make a knowledge-based, secure and dependable system that, by leverag-
ing from various kinds of information for decision making, can contribute to improve the
overall healing abilities of the smart grid.
1
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1.3 Scope of work
We address the problem and research hypothesis for the case of smart grid electricity dis-
tribution grids and, more specifically, the Self-Healing Systems (SHSs) solution. Smart
grid self-healing, security and dependability, together or separately, are the focus of sev-
eral current European projects and initiatives, being main concerns for the future smart
grid. Self-healing was chosen, among other smart grid advanced functionalities, due to
the requirement of horizontal communications between devices and automatic reconfigu-
rations, raising a distinct set of functional, security and dependability concerns. Addition-
ally, as new and advanced self-healing solutions are still being researched and developed,
we are still within the optimum time frame to propose improvements regarding the afore-
mentioned concerns.
1.4 Objectives and Contributions
The objective and contribution of this thesis is to design and prove the concept of a
knowledge-based, secure and dependable SHS, in compliance with the hypothesis in Sec-
tion 1.2. The results can be used to implement the SHS and/or to improve the func-
tionalities, security and/or dependability of current and new smart grid intelligent and
autonomous systems.
1.5 Work Overview
1.5.1 Context
The electricity distribution network is an electrical infrastructure that takes the electricity
produced in centralized generation (e.g., dams and gas power plants), distributed genera-
tion (e.g., wind farms) and Micro-Generation (MG) (e.g., rooftop solar panels) and brings
it to our homes and to many other society infrastructures that we depend on every day. Its
incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on the economy and public
safety, which has earned it the critical infrastructure classification.
Through the years, the increasing needs for electrification and power made it grow
to a country-wide size. In its evolution, the integration of new types of generation and
loads and the increasingly strict efficiency and Quality of Service (QoS) regulations made
the electrical infrastructure change from a locally and manually controlled electrical net-
work, which was completely isolated, to an automated and remotely controlled, highly
connected smart grid. Local and central control systems and a country-wide communica-
tions network were layered on top and connected to the electrical network to support core
functionalities, such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and substa-
tion automation, and advanced functionalities, such as Distribution Automation (DA) and
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Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI).
Performance, privacy, security and dependability are key smart grid concerns, which
are related with the handling of real-time data and sensitive information. In addition, it
is a proven fact that the smart grid is exposed and vulnerable to different threats, ranging
from the ”traditional” electrical faults to malicious attacks in the systems and communica-
tions. Substation automation and DA have the capability to handle faults occurring in the
electrical network, automating incident response to distinct lengths of the Fault Location,
Isolation and Restoration (FLIR) sequence for different voltage sections. This self-healing
behavior is the current scope of a set of world-wide deployments and Research and De-
velopment (R&D) initiatives, mainly focusing in its functional aspects. Security related
faults in systems and communications are handled with the support of a set of commer-
cially available solutions, such as firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), antivirus
and Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems, which need to comply
with the smart grid performance requirements. These solutions are usually based on a
predefined group of rules, signatures or use cases, which automate intrusion prevention
and detection for a set of specific cases.
1.5.2 Design
The electrical network self-healing and security automation solutions are restricted in the
decisions they make and in the actions they take, since they operate based on information
about a specific smart grid technical layer, disregarding related information from the other
layers. In this respect, we propose a SHS that acquires and reasons with knowledge from
the several smart grid layers to create more efficient, accurate and robust failure preven-
tion and recovery plans, while minimizing their impact in the smart grid performance. The
plans can be automatically executed, by sending commands to the corresponding smart
grid systems and components, or they can be proposed to the smart grid operators. Intelli-
gent supervision system components are used to provide monitoring, diagnosis, recovery
and learning capabilities. Expert system components provide knowledge management
and reasoning abilities. Ontologies provide knowledge modeling capabilities. We model
the systems and components in the several smart grid layers, focusing on their connec-
tions, functionalities and emphasizing the relationships between the layers. We model the
smart grid and its dependent processes as state machines that change state with fault and
failure events and also with their reconfiguration in response to these events.
The self-healing pilot projects are mainly focused on functional issues, which might
make them disregard security-by-design benefits, compromising the overall security of
eventual future roll-outs. In this regard, we employ a security-by-design approach to
identify and propose the security and dependability requirements that provide the re-
quired protection, intrusion and fault tolerance capabilities to the SHS, which is motivated
by the access to confidential information and the capability of automatically control the
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smart grid. We perform a threat and vulnerability assessment to the SHS, focusing on
the self-healing application as a target and as a possible threat to the smart grid, behaving
erroneously or maliciously. The corresponding controls are identified and a subset com-
prised of those that need to be technically addressed by the SHS is proposed in the form
of requirements to the security and dependability components.
A Multi Agent System (MAS) architecture with hybrid vertical ”two-pass control”
layered and cooperating agents provides distributed self-healing capabilities. In partition-
ing scenarios, the agents are capable of supervising the smart grid systems and compo-
nents that remain within the same partition. The assignment of each agent to a self-healing
domain provides role segregation within the MAS. A set of security features, including
cryptography, user management, event logging, backup and configuration modules, pro-
vide secure access, input/output (I/O), communications, storage, event logging, backup
and configuration capabilities. Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) State Machine Replica-
tion (SMR), proactive and reactive recovery of replicas provide tolerance against faults
and intrusions. One of the possible protocols is MinBFT [1], requiring at least 2f + 1
replicas to tolerate f faults.
The proposed functional, security and dependability components are materialized in
the Self-Healing Expert Entity (SHEE) architecture and corresponding modules. A SHEE
is a replicated, intelligent, autonomous and cooperating agent of the multi-agent SHS. It
is responsible for an assigned self-healing domain, which consists of a set of the smart
grid systems, components and processes that are in its scope of supervision. Figure 1.1
depicts a set of SHEEs with different self-healing domains and the expected connections
between one-another and with the supervised systems and components. There is a repli-
cated SHEE in each primary and secondary substation. The SHEEs at primary substations
1 and 2 supervise not only the primary substation but also the Medium Voltage (MV)
electrical network and corresponding DA devices. The green lines represent the expected
connections between the SHEEs having service related self-healing domains and with the
supervised systems and components.
A SHEE reasons with knowledge based on facts and rules. It monitors the self-healing
domain, detecting eventual faults and failures. It diagnoses eventual faults to determine
the cause and impact of occurred failures and to find possible causes for future failures. It
creates recovery plans, consisting in an ordered sequence of fault removal and/or isolation
actions, to recover the smart grid from the observed failures and to prevent future failures.
It reconfigures the smart grid based on the aforementioned plans. It learns from the past
decisions and from the results and consequences of its actions. It communicates with other
SHEEs in the MAS by using standard-based protocols and a standard-based language. It
comprises a set of security and dependability features to prevent and tolerate faults and
intrusions. It has a hybrid vertical ”two-pass control” layered architecture, comprising
several modules, such as the knowledge, monitoring, diagnosis and recovery modules.
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Figure 1.1: Self-healing System.
1.5.3 Implementation
A SHEE is defined by the assigned self-healing domain, the monitoring capabilities, the
knowledge, the goals and queries and the control capabilities. In this regard, the Proof of
Concept (POC) implementation includes the following steps:
1. The selection of the self-healing domain, which comprises a set of primary substa-
tion components from the electrical, the control, the communications, the physical
security and the cyber security layers, which support the electricity distribution pro-
cess and the local and remote operation of the substation. This set was chosen for
its diversity in terms of included smart grid processes and architecture layers, which
lets us focus on a well-delimited test case, while allowing to draw conclusions that
expectedly apply also to other domains that contain the same set or a subset of
similar processes and layers.
2. The components are mapped to classes, properties and individuals of an ontology,
from which we extract knowledge facts to create the knowledge model. The facts
reflect the existing relations between the ontology individuals (i.e., the domain com-
ponents) from the moment when they are asserted to the knowledge model until the
moment when they are removed.
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3. The SHEE attempts to solve a connectivity problem, attending to the cyber-physical
connectivity that enables the availability of the electricity distribution process and
of the local and remote operation of the substation. For this purpose, we define and
assert reasoning rules that enables iterations over the domain components to verify
the existence of connectivity enabling operational conditions, while modeling their
behavior.
4. We define the goals and queries which are used by the monitoring, diagnosis, recov-
ery, reconfiguration, cooperation and learning agent behaviors to query the knowl-
edge model.
We successfully validate the SHS concept. For this purpose, we make three slightly
modified versions of the developed knowledge model, corresponding to different fault and
failure scenarios. The models are loaded into a standalone Prolog inference engine - SWI
Prolog - to which the goals and queries are submitted in an ordered sequence, simulating
the behavior of a SHEE replica through the different states of the self-healing process, for
each scenario. In this regard, only the knowledge model code was implemented in the
scope of the POC. The software code for the knowledge module and remaining modules
is proposed for future work. The robustness of the proposed solution is validated by
explaining how it prevents a set of liveness and safety compromising scenarios.
Still within the scope of the current work, there is a set of design and implementation
issues that, being critical to the security and robustness of the SHS, depend on each smart
grid specific context. In this regard, we provide guidance for the following:
• The SHS must be separated or integrated with existing electrical network self-
healing and security automation solutions, avoiding concurrency situations and fos-
tering synergies that are only possible through their integration.
• It can take advantage of the existing smart grid infrastructure, namely, of the ex-
isting communications infrastructure, information repositories and smart grid con-
trollers, avoiding the deployment of a self-healing specific communications infras-
tructure and the direct connection with the sensors and actuators, which might re-
quire the implementation of certain safety measures.
• It might be possible to implement a SHEE starting from the existing electrical net-
work self-healing and security automation solutions, which demonstrate some of
the supervision behaviors required by the SHEE modules and are already capable
of collecting the required information and controlling certain smart grid compo-
nents.
• It is limited in its decisions and actions by the available resources, which include
the monitoring and control capabilities, the knowledge and the goals and queries.
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Therefore, the design and implementation of the required collectors and controllers,
the use of secure and dependable communication channels and the definition of an
enabling knowledge representation, populated with the required facts, rules and
queries, are essential to a successful execution of the self-healing process.
• Its correct execution depends on its distribution granularity, on an adequate number
of replicas per SHEE and on a proper replica distribution. Therefore, these steps
should ensure an acceptable risk to the smart grid network locations, regarding
partitioning, and to the unique points of failure between SHEE replicas.
The proper design and implementation decisions contribute to a successful and correct
execution of the self-healing process by the SHS. They also provide relevant information
regarding the cause and impact of failures that might be used to reduce incident response
times and to prevent incident recurrences.
1.6 Document Structure
This document is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 - Describes the supporting concepts of the work, with the purpose of
providing context for the solutions that are presented, analyzed and discussed in
following chapters;
• Chapter 3 - Proposes a knowledge-based, secure and dependable SHS architecture
for smart grids;
• Chapter 4 - Describes a POC implementation, including its validation and a discus-
sion of the overall solution;
• Chapter 5 - Presents the final results and lists a set of remaining issues to be handled
in future work.
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Chapter 2
Context
This chapter describes the supporting concepts of the work, with the purpose of providing
context for the solutions that are presented, analyzed and discussed in following chapters.
This chapter is organized in the following way:
• The Electric System Value Chain - Presents the main roles in the electric system
value chain;
• Classic and New Challenges for DSOs - Explains how the electric system value
chain is changing, focusing on the challenges to the Distribution System Operator
(DSO);
• Smart Distribution Grids - Presents the smart distribution grid as an answer to the
changing context, including its core functionalities and components;
• Smart Grid Concerns - Discusses the performance, privacy, security and depend-
ability concerns raised by the integration of computer systems and communications
with the electrical network;
• Automation and Self-Healing Approaches - Presents the different types of automa-
tion and self-healing approaches that are currently used to handle electrical faults;
• Cyber Security and Dependability Controls - Presents the cyber security and de-
pendability controls that are currently used in smart grids and relevant new solutions
that are being proposed by R&D works.
2.1 Chapter Overview
The electricity distribution network is an electrical infrastructure that takes the electricity
produced in centralized generation (e.g., dams and gas power plants), distributed gener-
ation (e.g., wind farms) and MG (e.g., rooftop solar panels) and brings it to our homes,
9
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schools, hospitals, factories, ports, airports, communications, finance, water and wastew-
ater systems and to many other society infrastructures which depend on it every day. Its
incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on the economy and public
safety, which has earned it the critical infrastructure classification. Through the years, the
increasing needs for electrification and power made it grow to a country-wide size, while
the integration of new types of generation and loads and the increasingly strict efficiency
and QoS regulations made it change from a locally and manually controlled electrical
network, which was completely isolated from any kind of computers or communications
network, to an automated and remotely controlled, highly connected smart grid. Local
and central control systems and a country-wide communications network were layered
on top and connected to the electrical network to support core functionalities, such as
SCADA and substation automation, and advanced functionalities, such as DA and AMI.
Performance, privacy, security and dependability are key smart grid concerns, which are
related with the handling of real-time information and sensitive information and with the
proven fact that it is exposed and vulnerable to different threats, ranging from the ”tradi-
tional” electrical faults to non-malicious faults in the systems and communications and to
the more recent cyber attacks. Substation automation and DA have the capability to han-
dle faults occurring in the electrical network, automating incident response to different
lengths of the FLIR sequence for different voltage sections. This self-healing behavior
is the current scope of a set of world-wide real-world deployments and R&D initiatives,
mainly focusing in its functional aspects. The faults in systems and communications are
handled with the support of a set of commercially available security solutions, such as fire-
walls, IDS, antivirus and SIEM, which need to comply with the smart grid performance
requirements. These solutions are usually based on a predefined set of rules, signatures or
use cases, which automate intrusion detection and prevention for a set of specific cases.
A set of European Projects and published works are researching and developing security
and dependability solutions for the future smart grid systems and communications, also
considering a set of electrical self-healing use cases.
2.2 The Electricity System Value Chain
In Europe, the electricity system value chain is comprised by the activities: generation,
transmission, distribution and supply of electricity, as depicted in Figure 2.1 [2]. A con-
textual description for each function is provided beneath, with its focus being placed on
how each function relates with electricity distribution, which is the the main scope of this
dissertation (see Section 1.3).
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Figure 2.1: Electric System.
2.2.1 Generation
Generation is the activity in which electricity is generated with the use of a diverse set of
technologies from different primary energy sources.
Renewable and Non-renewable Energy Sources
Energy sources that cannot be replenished sufficiently fast to allow a sustainable explo-
ration within acceptable human time-frames are called non-renewable energy sources;
e.g., fossil fuels, such as coal and natural gas, and uranium fit in this category (BP has
published a statistical review of existing reserves and production of non-renewable energy
sources, including reserves versus production ratios that indicate how long these reserves
will last [3]). On the other hand, energy sources that are constantly being replenished are
called Renewable Energy Sources (RES); e.g., water, wind, solar radiation, biomass and
biogas fit in this category. If we are able to respect and take care of planet Earth, RES will
continue to exist until long after fossil fuels’ reserves are depleted.
Renewable and non-renewable energy sources have different impacts in electricity
distribution. The exploration of non-renewable sources allows the creation of reserves,
which are constantly being used and refilled. If the reserves are adequate to a specific
generation process and associated risks, there should be uninterrupted availability, which
translates to a constant electricity flow from the power plant to the consumers, according
to plan. RES are not always available; e.g., there might not be enough water after a
drought year, wind might stop blowing during the day and there is no sun during the night
or, even during the day, as clouds can block most of the solar radiation. Therefore, RES
related electricity flows are more difficult to forecast and manage.
Centralized Generation and Distributed Generation
Centralized generation is used when the energy source exists or is made available only at
a specific set of geographic locations; e.g., it is the case of non-renewable energy sources,
which requires the transport and distribution of electricity between the geographic loca-
tions of generation and supply, as far away from each other as it takes to go from one
country to the another in some situations. On the other hand, when the energy source is
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geographically distributed, such as RES, and depending on the availability of adequate
technologies, Distributed Generation (DG) can be used either for local consumption or to
supply electricity to the power grid at transport or distribution levels.
Centralized generation and DG also have different impacts in electricity distribution.
In the case of centralized generation, the construction of a new power plant typically
includes a long-framed structuring project; e.g., as it happens with thermal coal and gas,
and big hydroelectric power plants, which occur less frequently than DG. Wind farms
and MG with photo-voltaic panels are common examples of DG. While wind farms can
be seen as a middle step between a big power plant and MG, given the afore mentioned
context, it is the last that causes the most impact, as it is explained bellow.
Consumers are able to turn into prosumers by installing MG solutions at their homes.
The generated electricity can be consumed at the home where it is produced or, if it is
not needed there, it can be supplied to the electrical network. In the latter case, if a lot
of electricity is generated at locations where it is not needed, it has to be distributed to
the locations where it is needed, which can be, for instance, next door or in the next city.
If the electrical network is not prepared, such events may induce excess currents in the
distribution lines, which can cause the lines to overheat and degrade more rapidly. Their
life expectancy is, therefore, reduced.
2.2.2 Transmission
The electricity generated in power plants is transported to the supply locations through the
transmission network, which is performed in Very High Voltage (VHV) to minimize or
reduce energy losses. The actors that are responsible for this activity are the Transmission
System Operators (TSOs).
It is common for TSOs and DSOs to exchange information related with power grid
state about the areas where the transmission delivers electricity to the distribution grid.
This information is used by both sides as an extra valuable input for planning operation
and management of the power grid.
In cases where this information is exchanged through communication links between
the systems of both actors, the link must be seen as a potential source of failures and,
therefore, it should be included in the risk analysis of the corresponding organizations.
2.2.3 Distribution
The electricity delivered by the transmission grid is distributed through the electricity
distribution grid - primary substations, secondary substations and lines - to consumers.
In this process, electricity is transformed to lower voltage levels in substations to High
Voltage (HV), MV and Low Voltage (LV). The distribution grid also distributes the elec-
tricity generated at DG power plants and MG installations, which are integrated in the
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distribution grid. The actors that are responsible for this activity are the DSOs.
2.2.4 Supply
Electricity suppliers are responsible for billing the electricity to end customers, to whom
they may also offer energy services. To perform these activities, they require electricity
consumption data from customers, which can be acquired through the traditional way or
through smart metering. The traditional way consists of periodically sending people to
each consumption location to collect the corresponding meter readings. Smart metering
allows the remote collection of meter readings on a given schedule together with a whole
set of new functionalities and use cases, which are further explained in Section 2.4.7.
The handling of smart metering data, together with other smart grid data, is currently
the focus of an ongoing work at European Commission (EC) level. This work, which is
further explained in Section 2.3.4, circles around which entities should collect, process,
communicate and store the data and how they should interact with each other. An option
would be for the DSO to collect this data and to supply it to the electricity suppliers. In
Portugal, for example, it is in the responsibilities of the DSO to deploy and maintain the
smart metering infrastructure and to collect the smart metering data.
2.3 Classic and New Challenges for DSOs
During a time when Europe was seeing a continuous growth in electricity consumption,
the main challenge for DSOs was the expansion of the electricity distribution power grid
in a sustainable manner. SCADA systems were then used by DSOs to enable monitoring
and control of the rapidly growing number of power equipment as a means to supply
customers with high QoS and achieving operational efficiency.
Times have changed with the coming of a new financial crisis that led to less electricity
consumption, with negative impact in already existing businesses, some of which stopped
growing, became smaller or closed doors, and the survival of new businesses. For all
the electricity system value chain actors and activities, this translates to less energy being
supplied, distributed, transported and generated (in the specific case of electricity supply,
see [4], which shows the electricity supply evolution in European Union (EU) Member
States from 2000 to 2014). In the case of DSOs, the effort is being directed to optimizing
the distribution grid, with new substations and lines are still being constructed as a means
to reinforce or provide redundancy to needing geographical location. In this new con-
text, rising the QoS and maximizing operational efficiency are still up-to-date challenges.
Nevertheless, DSO are facing new challenges in the areas of energy efficiency and new
business models, integration of RES, DG and Electric Vehicles (EVs).
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2.3.1 Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency is a EC policy area within the EU’s Energy Union Strategy for its En-
ergy Union and Climate priority [5]. Its goal is to consume ”less energy in order to reduce
pollution and preserve domestic energy sources”, which will ”reduce the EU’s need for
energy imports” [6]. To promote energy efficiency, the EC has included it in its targets
for 2020 and 2030. According to the 2020 Energy Strategy, energy efficiency should be
improved by at least 20%. Also, EU countries have agreed to increase energy efficiency
by at least 27% by 2030 [7, 8].
All the activities of the electricity system value chain have a role to play on the road
to energy efficiency, from the decarbonization of the Generation, through the reduction
of losses in the Transmission and Distribution and to the reduction of demand and its
redistribution over time. Regarding the last, Demand Side Management (DSM) programs
are used to attain long-term reductions in demand by encouraging the consumers to use
electricity in a more efficient manner, while Demand Response (DR) programs are used to
encourage the consumers to make short-term reductions in electricity demand in response
to a price signal from the electricity hourly market or a trigger initiated by the electricity
grid operator. Smart metering infrastructures, which are further detailed in Section 2.4.7,
play a role in this programs by giving the necessary technology support and enabling
electricity consumers to have a better understanding of their consumption habits and being
able to change them.
2.3.2 Renewable Energy Sources
The development of RES is also included in EC’s key policy areas for its Energy Strategy.
The 2020 Energy Strategy set as target to ”increase the share of renewable energy in the
EU’s energy mix to at least 20% of consumption”. Also, EU countries have agreed to
”a binding target of at least 27% of renewable energy in the EU” [7, 8]. In the Energy
Roadmap 2050 it is stated that ”renewables will move to the center of the energy mix in
Europe, from technology development to mass production and deployment, from small-
scale to larger-scale, integrating local and more remote sources”. In the same report, it
is also stated that ”storage technologies remain critical” to enable the switching to RES
[9]. Within European legislation, Directive 2009/28/EC states that ”Member States shall
take the appropriate steps to develop transmission and distribution grid infrastructure,
intelligent networks, storage facilities and the electricity system, in order to allow the
secure operation of the electricity system as it accommodates the further development of
electricity production from renewable energy sources, including interconnection between
Member States and between Member States and third countries” [10].
RES-related DG and MG brings challenges to electricity distribution operation and
management due to the inconsistency of generated electricity flows, as it was explained
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in Section 2.2.1.
2.3.3 Electric Vehicles
The Energy Roadmap 2050 states that ”another area of special importance is the shift
towards alternative fuels, including electric vehicles <. . .>batteries, fuel cells and hy-
drogen, which together with smart grids can multiply the benefits of electro-mobility both
for decarbonization of transport and development of renewable energy” [9]. Directive
2014/94/EU states that ”electricity has the potential to increase the energy efficiency of
road vehicles and contribute to a CO2 reduction in transport”. The Directive also charges
Member States for ensuring that a publicly accessible EVs supply infrastructure is put in
place, including a number of recharging points that is adequate to the number of expected
registered EVs by 2020 and that can be normal or high power. Recharging can make
use of intelligent metering systems to enable functionalities such as off-peak charging
or vehicle-to-grid electricity flows during high electricity demand periods. These func-
tionalities optimize recharging, benefit the costumer and ensure the stability of the grid
[11].
Today, the ratio of autonomy and charging times over vehicle and battery costs is still
too low to allow a general purpose large-scale adoption of electric vehicles. Nevertheless,
Joint Research Centre (JRC) reports in 2015 say that the number of electrical vehicles’
sales is increasing by year. Statistics show that the number of sold cars rose from 760 in
2010 to 70.000 in 2014 and that the choice of models increased from three to 30 in the
same period [12]. This is due to the fact that the mentioned ratio is increasing for specific
use cases such as in-city transportation.
The integration of EVs in the power grid requires changes to the power infrastructure
and also to the networks and systems that are responsible for handling smart grid data.
2.3.4 New Business Models
A smart grid enables the collection of information about the state of the electrical in-
frastructure that was the power grid and electricity costumers, which was previously too
costly or, in some cases, impossible to obtain. This information has different value for
different electricity system players. For instance, electricity suppliers require clients’ con-
sumption data to bill and to offer energy services to the end customers. In 2013, the Smart
Grid Task Force (SGTF) Expert Group 3 (EG3) published a report about the options on
handling smart grids data. In this report, EG3 included the following three different case
models [13].
• DSO as market facilitator - The DSO provides the operational data and market
facilitating data (e.g., data about customers, their technical possibilities and their
Chapter 2. Context 16
consumption or production) to the remaining players through a data hub that is
within its ownership and control;
• Third party market facilitator - Independent Central Data Hub (CDH) - The data is
available to the authorized players through an independent central communication
platform based on one or several data hubs;
• Data Access-Point Manager (DAM) - A certified company provides access to the
data and functionalities of the field devices to any certified player and/or con-
sumer/prosumer, using an implemented communications network.
In the three cases, there are differences on who processes, communicates and stores
the data and also on the connections between the different electricity system players.
Depending on which is their specific case and especially on the first case, DSOs must
apply adequate security controls to protect the information and their costumers.
2.4 Smart Distribution Grids
”A smart grid is an electricity network that can cost efficiently integrate the behavior
and actions of all users connected to it - generators, consumers and those that do both - in
order to ensure economically efficient, sustainable power system with low losses and high
levels of quality and security of supply and safety”[14]. It is envisioned by the EC and the
electricity system players as the answer to the new challenges presented in Section 2.3.
The smart grid is the current evolutionary step from the traditional power grid, mean-
ing a change from a locally and manually controlled electrical network, which was com-
pletely isolated from any kind of computers or communications network, to a remotely
controlled and automated cyber-physical infrastructure. It is a highly complex infrastruc-
ture with many different systems, components and connections between them and even
to external infrastructures. New smart grid functionalities and use cases are still being
developed, which call for constant R&D of new systems and technologies.
There are some systems, components, functionalities and use cases that could be con-
sidered core elements of the smart grid concept. A description of the most relevant as-
pects, in regard to our work, is given below.
2.4.1 Facilities and Cabinets
A smart grid’s assets are distributed through a wide geographical area, which can often
reach a country-wide dimension. They are commonly hosted inside facilities and cabinets,
which provide access to essential utility services, such as electricity and communications
supply, and physical protection from a variety of natural and human-origin risks.
Chapter 2. Context 17
• Control room - The physical location from where the DSO’s teams manage, op-
erate and monitor the electrical network, communications network and systems in
a resourceful and controlled environment. The electrical network control room or
command center may be separated from the remaining functions. There are usually
redundant and fallback facilities. All control rooms are redundantly connected to
the data centers.
• Data center - The physical location where the central systems are hosted with the
necessary physical security, utility and climatization services. There are usually
redundant facilities.
• Primary Substation - A facility that hosts one or more HV to MV transformers
together with the necessary electrical equipment and local systems. A primary sub-
station count can reach the hundreds.
• Secondary Substation - A facility that hosts one or more MV to LV transformers
together with the necessary electrical equipment and local systems. A secondary
substation count can reach the tens of thousands.
• Automation cabinet - The local systems of pole-mounted secondary substations and
DA devices are hosted in cabinets. A DA device count can reach the thousands.
• Consumer/prosumer house - Although they do not count as smart grid assets, the
consumer/prosumer houses host the smart meters and MG equipment. Their num-
ber can reach the millions.
2.4.2 Electrical Network
The primary substations connect electrically to the transmission network, to the DG, to
the secondary substations and to a subset of other primary substations for redundancy
purposes. The secondary substations and the DA devices are installed along the primary
substation’s MV feeders. The secondary substations connect to the primary substations, to
the consumers/prosumers and to each other, also for redundancy purposes. Typical elec-
trical network components include transformers, lines, busbars and switchgear. Auxiliary
power systems and power factor correction batteries can also be present.
• Transformer - Transforms a higher voltage to a lower voltage (i.e., HV to MV or
MV to LV) or vice-versa, depending on the current flow.
• Switchgear - Enable the electrical isolation and/or protection and/or operation of
the electrical network and loads, such as motors, heaters, lighting and capacitors.
Disconnect switches, circuit breakers1 and fuses are examples of switchgear.
1As defined in the IEC 60947-2 standard, a circuit breaker ”is capable of making, carrying and breaking
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• Line - Allows the flow of current between the loads that are electrically connected
in both of its ends.
• Busbar - Allows the flow of current between the lines that are connected to it.
2.4.3 Sensors and Actuators
Sensors and actuators are the interface from and to the electrical reality, respectively.
• Sensors - Detect and make measurements, such as electrical quantities (e.g., cur-
rents and voltages) and temperatures. The power grid is comprised of many differ-
ent equipment and components that are exposed to many different physical threats;
e.g., climatic conditions and deterioration from use. There are many different types
of sensors (and others are being developed) to prevent and detect power grid faults
and failures. Example applications include detection of hot spots in power equip-
ment, open door, flood and fire. These sensors are intelligent, which means that
they are able to monitor a given equipment but they also monitor themselves to
send alarms about their own health and performance. This enables operators to
distinguish between situations when the monitored equipment is fine and situations
when the sensor is damaged. Some information is valuable to the grid operation
and it can be integrated in the SCADA system. The other can be valuable to man-
agement or maintenance and can be integrated in business analytics or monitoring
systems. Instrument transformers and protection relays are examples of sensors.
• Actuators - Interact with the electrical reality upon request or as automatic response
to predefined events. Disconnect switches and circuit breakers are examples of
actuators.
2.4.4 SCADA and DMS
The SCADA system and the Distribution Management System (DMS) are the interface
between the command center and the local systems. They are central systems located at
the DSO’s data center, where they are typically connected with other central systems such
as the Outage Management System (OMS)2, the Geographic Information System (GIS)3
and the Historical Information Manager (HIM)4.
currents under normal circuit conditions and also making, carrying for a specified time and breaking currents
under specified abnormal circuit conditions such as those of short-circuit” [15].
2The OMS maps certain SCADA events to power outages and provides a graphical environment for the
grid operators to manage power outage incidents.
3The GIS contains and provides information about the electrical network assets, including what and
where they are.
4The HIM stores electrical network information older than a given age for consultation
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• SCADA servers - Retrieves telemetry and sends operators’ commands to field equip-
ment, such as primary substations, secondary substations, sectionalizers and re-
closers.
• DMS servers - Maps the information collected by the SCADA with the geographic
information of the GIS and provides advanced functionalities to support operators’
decisions, such as fault location and power flow calculation.
• Workstation - Provides a visual environment (i.e., a Graphical User Interface (GUI))
for the grid operators to manage and control the electrical network.
Local systems provide monitoring and control of sensors and actuators in primary
substations, secondary substations and feeder automation devices, handling internal and
external communications, local and remote access and automation functionalities. They
consist of one to several devices, depending on the specific solution.
The SCADA systems connect also to Network Time Protocol (NTP) servers (e.g.,
Global Positioning System (GPS)), centrally and locally, to register the correct timing of
events, which is critical to a proper analysis.
2.4.5 Substation Automation
Substation automation consists of automating a given set primary substation behaviors
to safeguard the costumers, their infrastructures, the DSO’s workers and the power grid.
Examples of automation use cases are voltage or frequency shedding and feeder recon-
nections after fault occurrences. Inside the substation, there is typically a local SCADA
system with the following components:
• Central Unit (CU) or Substation Controller (SC) - Connects through the internal Lo-
cal Area Network (LAN) to a set of Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), to which
it sends commands and from which it receives telemetry information and events.
These commands can be either dispatch and control center SCADA commands that
it forwards from the external primary substations’ Wide Area Network (WAN) or
automation commands that it generates based on its internal processes. Alternative
primary substation internal network solutions include physical connection of the
IEDs directly to the SC, without an internal LAN.
• IED - Monitors the sensors and controls the actuators, such as the electrical pro-
tections, based on the commands received from the SC or locally given through
an integrated user interface. They communicate with each other for providing ad-
vanced functions such as protections coordination.
• Human-Machine Interface (HMI) - Connects to the SC to provide a visual environ-
ment (i.e., a GUI) for the local control of the electrical network.
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2.4.6 Distribution Automation
DA is automation of the smart grid at the MV level, including secondary substations
and feeder automation devices. The Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) is typically the main
component in secondary substations and feeder automation devices.
• RTU - Provides SCADA communications and automation functionalities.
Developments in this area are quite recent, when compared with substation automation,
and examples of use cases are self-healing, load balancing and Volt/VAR control. It is dif-
ferent from what existed before by introducing communications between field equipment
at different facilities; for example, in self-healing (see Section 2.6), the RTUs’s might
communicate between themselves and/or with the primary substation’s SC.
2.4.7 Advanced Metering Infrastructure
When looking into the history of AMIs, we find that first there were Advanced Meter
Readings (AMR) infrastructures, serving the purpose of remotely collecting meter read-
ings at will or by schedule, from a given set of meters. Then, smart metering emerged
with remote meter readings as its core functionality and a whole set of new functionali-
ties and use cases, such as registering electricity consumption data up to every, e.g., 15
minutes and enabling access to this information to the costumer. The costumer can have
a better understanding of its own consumption habits and is able to change them [14].
If a secondary substation is integrated in a smart metering solution, there is also a Data
Concentrator (DC) handling communications between the central systems and the smart
meters at costumers houses.
• Smart meter - Installed at the costumers’ house, it registers the consumption read-
ings, at a configurable frequency, and sends them upstream to the DC. Some smart
meters can connect with other devices in a Home Area Network (HAN), providing
an HMI that can be used by costumers to see their data. They can also have circuit
breaker capability to isolate the house from the electrical network, which can be
activated at central systems command.
• DC - Installed at the secondary substation, it transmits the consumption readings to
the central systems. EDP Distribuic¸a˜o5 uses its own unique solution. It uses only
one device - the Distribution Transformer Controller (DTC) - that combines DA
and smart metering capabilities. This approach gives the capability to correlate DA
and smart metering information locally, therefore potentiating future smart grid use
cases.
5EDP Distribuic¸a˜o is the largest Portuguese DSO with little under six million customers. It is a regulated
company belonging to the EDP Group.
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In EC Member States where the DSO manages the smart metering infrastructure, the
data is then transmitted to the corresponding Suppliers. An AMI also enables the man-
agement of meters and concentrators.
2.4.8 External Connections
The Industrial Control Systems (ICS) network, containing the smart grid’s systems and
communications, is segmented and segregated from external networks, such as the DSO’s
business network or the Internet, which is not a complete isolation due to the fact that
some smart grid’s systems and functionalities may require the processing of external
information, external maintenance and updates. Therefore, there may be external con-
nections and communications to, for example, the TSO, DG companies, external service
providers and manufacturers’ update services.
2.4.9 Communications
Smart grid communications use a wide range of different technologies, means and proto-
cols. Here we describe a few demonstrative but non-extensive examples.
• Central systems - Typically use IP-based protocols in 100 Mbps, 1 Gbps and 10
Gbps ethernet networks.
• Central systems and primary substations - Use a mix of legacy proprietary and
standard-based protocols and technologies, such as IEC 60870-5-101 and IEC 60870-
5-104, in Plesiochronous Digital Hierarchy (PDH), Synchronous Digital Hierarchy
(SDH), Internet Protocol (IP)/Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) and General
Packet Radio Service (GPRS) networks, through optical fibers, microwave radio
links and mobile technologies.
• Primary substation LAN - Uses proprietary and standard-based protocols, such as
IEC 61850, through ethernet and optical fiber networks.
• Central systems and secondary substations - Typically use standard-based proto-
cols, such as IEC 60870-5-101 and IEC 60870-5-104, in GPRS and Global System
for Mobile Communications (GSM) networks, through mobile technologies. Sec-
ondary substations connecting to priority costumers or with a high number of trans-
formers (and the corresponding local systems) can be connected through optical
fibers.
• Secondary substations and smart meters - Use standard-based protocols, such as
Device Language Message Specification (DLMS)/Companion Specification for En-
ergy Metering (COSEM) through Power Line Communication (PLC). Some smart
meters can connect directly to the central systems through GPRS mobile networks.
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2.4.10 Microgrids
A microgrid is a local electrical network that comprises enough energy resources (e.g.,
generation, storage, distribution and supply capabilities) to operate without being electri-
cally connected to the main electrical network. Its mode of operation can also be called
island mode. The possible connection to the main grid is regarded as a contingency solu-
tion.
2.5 Smart Grid Concerns
The increasing number of highly connected smart grid systems and components, of new
types and with increasing relevance, complexity and dependence on external services and
information, expands and amplifies the smart grid’s surface of exposure to new types of
threats and vulnerabilities. For example, the electrical network is exposed to ”traditional”
threats, such as: collision of tree branches, thunder storms, rain, strong winds, fires,
animals, construction work-related accidents, programmed interventions and vandalism,
which are common causes for electricity outages [16] and that are also threats to the com-
munications network. The systems and communications are exposed to non-malicious
faults (e.g., software faults), and to malicious faults (e.g., cyber attacks). Threats such
as hacktivism have now turned their attention to energy infrastructures; reports such as
ICS-CERT Monitor show an increasing trend in the number of security incidents reported
by the energy sector [17, 18]. In addition, cyber security incidents such as Stuxnet reveal
that the complexity of attacks is increasing [19, 20].
In the second half of 2015, three Ukrainian electricity distribution companies were tar-
geted by successful cyber attacks to their business and ICS networks, including unautho-
rized access to the operation workstations and to substation equipment. It is also relevant
to note that the attacks to the ICS network used information - user credentials - obtained
through attacks to the business network, exploiting the existing connections and depen-
dencies between the two networks. These attacks exploited vulnerabilities related with
security design, monitoring and awareness, resulting in several electricity outages that af-
fected 225.000 costumers across several areas and lasted for several hours on December
23, 2015. They gain further relevance due to the fact that they ”are the first publicly ac-
knowledged incidents to result in power outages” [21]. Non-malicious faults or successful
attacks may have consequences in the performance, privacy, security and dependability
of the smart grid infrastructure and/or information and to those who depend on them,
including consequences to persons’ lives.
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2.5.1 Performance
Smart grid functionalities support different DSO processes, which have different perfor-
mance requirements. Distribution system operation and maintenance requires real-time
information about the electrical network state, including electrical measurements and the
state of protection devices. Network and asset management require historical information
about the grid operation and device behaviors for network planning and fault prevention.
There are also different requirements to real-time communications. For instance, the sit-
uation when an operator sends a command to a protection device inside a substation and
waits for a confirmation is different from the situation when a maintenance worker ac-
cidentally touches an exposed electrified line, triggering a protection device. Therefore,
substation automation protocols (e.g., IEC 61850 GOOSE) are designed to be faster than
SCADA protocols (e.g., IEC 60870-5-101 or IEC 60870-5-104).
2.5.2 Privacy
The smart grid handles sensitive information of different nature, which is relevant, for
example, to its management, operation and maintenance, to the market processes and to
the costumers. This information must be identified and classified in compliance with the
DSO’s information classification policy and it must be protected in compliance with the
DSO’s information security policy and applicable legislation and regulations. Personal
data, which is ”any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”,
as defined in the new European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [22], has
been a particular focus of concern in regard to smart metering. A main issue is that
the collected electricity consumption data might expose the costumers’ life behavior, en-
dangering his/hers security. The Opinion 12/2011 on smart metering of the Article 29
Data Protection Working Party demonstrates that ”personal data is being processed by
the meters, so data protection laws apply” [23]. Between 2012 and 2014, the SGTF Ex-
pert Group 2 (EG2) developed a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) template
for smart grid and smart metering systems to guide the ”organizations who initiate or al-
ready manage smart grid deployments as well as those introducing changes to existing
smart grid architecture platforms in identifying and assessing the privacy risks of these
initiatives” [24].
2.5.3 Security
Smart grid information goes beyond the aforementioned electrical network telemetry data
and the electricity consumption data, including also: historian data, GIS data, network
topology information, the organization’s policies, procedures and low-level instructions,
manual and automated logs, reports, change management information, equipment con-
figurations, backups, working files and user credentials, among others. This information
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must be available when required, without illegitimate and/or undetected modifications, to
those who need it and that are authorized to access it. The same applies to other smart
grid assets, besides information, such as facilities, systems and components, services and
people. If there is a confidentiality breach and confidential information falls in malicious
hands, it might further compromise the smart grid infrastructure, the organization and
the costumers’ privacy. If the information was illegitimately modified and that goes un-
detected, the control center may take wrong decisions that might further compromise the
smart grid infrastructure and the supported processes. If a smart grid component is behav-
ing erroneously or maliciously, the control centers’ commands or the automation actions
might have different results from what was expected. If at least one smart grid asset is
unavailable when required, there might be an electricity outage and/or the control center
may not have the resources that it requires to detect and handle faults and attacks. Other
possible consequences related with the loss of confidentiality, integrity and/or availability
are loss of reputation and financial loss. Regarding the reputation loss, an organization
might be regarded as one which did not take the appropriate care of the infrastructure or
of its costumers data, being untrustworthy and/or unreliable.
2.5.4 Dependability
The smart grid provides internal services that support the internal DSO’s processes, such
as the monitor and control of the electrical network. As smart grid functionalities become
increasingly more integrated in the DSO’s processes, the control center becomes more
dependent on its systems and communications. The SCADA system has become ”their
eyes and hands” to the field. The smart grid provides also external services that support
its business processes, such as the distribution of electricity and the provision of data to
the market. The power grid is a critical infrastructure that, in case of incapacitation or
destruction, would have a debilitating effect on the economy and public safety [25, 26].
This is due to the fact that many things in our world depend on electricity to operate,
including other critical infrastructures, such as hospitals, ports, airports, communications,
finance, water and wastewater systems. It is in fact a two-way relationship, given that
the smart grid may rely on external infrastructures with regard to its communications.
Moreover, the existing connectivity between the critical infrastructures and corresponding
ICS networks might be exploited by the adversary to attack a critical infrastructure with
another critical infrastructure; e.g., causing electricity outages to the health, transport or
communications sectors or compromising the smart grid communications from within an
external communications network. This ”opens the doors” for the use of the smart grid as
a weapon in wars and similar conflicts.
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2.6 Automation and Self-healing Approaches
Substation automation and DA have the capability to handle faults occurring in the elec-
trical network, automating incident response to different lengths of the FLIR sequence
for different voltage sections. This self-healing behavior is the current scope of a set of
world-wide real-world deployments and R&D initiatives, mainly focusing in its functional
aspects.
Self-healing is an emergent behavior that results from the network having intelligence
to prevent, detect, locate, isolate and recover from electrical faults by itself or, as an
alternative, to propose to the operators the recovery plan - a sequence of maneuvers that
can be validated by the dispatch and command centers and then executed by them or by the
grid itself. Its purpose is to enable a faster and more effective response to power outages,
thereby reducing the number of costumers affected by a fault, the number of unenergized
costumers after fault isolation and recovery, the outage time for affected costumers and
the impact of isolation and recovery maneuvers in the network.
There are distinct self-healing approaches in also different maturity states, ranging
from real-world deployments to R&D. There is a trend towards intelligent communicating
self-healing solutions that use local controllers at primary and/or secondary substations.
However, non-communicating solutions such as time-based coordination and selective
coordination are already deployed or being deployed in large geographical areas and, de-
pending on the specific type of employed equipment, they provide a self-healing solution
with a performance comparable to that provided by intelligent solutions, although not as
flexible as the previous. Both solutions coexist at the present moment and will continue
to do so in the future. Moreover, the decentralization of the decisions and control from
the command center to the local controllers increases the resilience of the solutions to
network partitions that isolate a substation, a group of substations or the central systems.
The following reference examples aim at providing an overview at the different types
of approaches to provide a better understanding of the use case.
2.6.1 The EDP Distribuic¸a˜o Case
EDP Distribuic¸a˜o is currently following five different automation and self-healing ap-
proaches, at different life-cycle states.
1. A first approach is based on substation automation capabilities. It is comprised only
of the protection device that is installed at a primary substation. When there is a
fault in a MV feeder line, the protection opens, which is followed by a given number
of reconnections to get past any fugitive faults; e.g., a tree branch that touches the
overhead distribution lines for an instant, causing a short-circuit fault that triggers
the electrical protections. If the fault is fugitive, then the network is healed and the
electricity flow is consequently restored. Otherwise, all the costumers supplied by
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the faulty line stay unenergized until the dispatch and command centers remotely
reconfigure the network, which is only possible in mesh or ring networks, or until
there is a local intervention.
2. A second approach comprises the installation of sectionalizers with voltage pres-
ence detection and fault current detection capabilities in overhead MV feeder lines.
These sectionalizers can be remotely controlled to disconnect the feeder where they
are installed. They also have an automatism that makes them open when voltage
absence is detected, close when voltage is detected and lock themselves open after
a given number of reconnection cycles. In an automated feeder, there is at least
one sectionalizer installed downstream from the protection device that is at the pri-
mary substation. When there is more than one sectionalizer, their parametrization
must be coordinated so that, when there is a fault, the only sectionalizer that locks
open is the one immediately before the location where the fault occurred. All the
other sectionalizers stay closed, therefore isolating the fault and assuring electricity
supply in the sections of the feeder that are healthy. This coordination is accom-
plished at electrical level and by configuring adequate opening, closing, maneuver
and locking times at each sectionalizer. More than one reconnection cycle may oc-
cur during a reconnection process, which are visible to the costumers that are being
supplied by the faulty feeder; e.g., lights may flicker during a couple of seconds
until they finally stay on or off. Therefore, this approach increases the number of
energized costumers after a fault. However, the number of reconnection maneuvers
can be significant and noticeable by the customers. The sectionalizer is also capa-
ble of sending alarms to the SCADA systems when a fault current is detected. This
approach is already in a roll-out state.
3. A third approach comprises the deployment of reclosers with protection capabilities
in overhead MV lines. These devices act similarly to the protections that were
described in the first approach but they are installed along the feeder lines like in
the second approach. Moreover, when in a normally open configuration, they can
detect the absence of voltage downstream and close automatically to energize the
unenergized section. If there is a fault in that section, the protection trips and the
recloser returns to its previous open state. Therefore, this approach increases the
number of energized costumers after a fault, when compared with the first approach,
while reducing the number of maneuvers and visibility to the costumer of the second
approach. This approach has been tested with good results [27].
4. A fourth approach comprises a DMS fault location functionality. It uses measured
fault information from a primary substation and GIS information to calculate the
possible location of an electrical fault and the affected MV and HV sections of the
electrical network. The result is provided to the electrical network operators, allow-
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ing them to position repair teams on the field with increased efficiency, decreasing
fault repair times and outage times. When a fault occurs in the MV network and
it triggers a primary substation protection device (see the Approach 1), the central
unit reports the measured fault resistance and reactance to the central systems. A
DMS process uses these values, together with a user configurable calculation error,
to calculate the fault impedance and the maximum and minimum distances between
the triggered protection device and the probable fault location. The algorithm as-
sumes the fault impedance to be the same as the network impedance associated
with the lines between the device and the real location, minus the error. Therefore,
it uses the network topology to identify all line sections ahead of the device that
are located within the distance interval as possible fault locations. The considered
topology must reflect the stable network state before the fault occurrence. To find
the right moment from when to extract the topology, the algorithm assumes the tran-
sitory states to have occurred within a limited time frame around the instant when
the fault measurements were received, the length of which is user configurable. In
the future, information from fault detectors and other devices (see the Approach 2)
located in the calculated sections or in contiguous sections will be used to further
narrow the possibilities. The reliability of the results depends on the correct charac-
terization of the electrical network equipment. If the line impedances are incorrect,
the algorithm might provide bad results that might delay, instead of accelerating,
the work of the operators and repair teams [28].
5. A fifth approach comprises the use of distribution intelligence at the primary sub-
stations together with the sectionalizers that are used in the second approach. The
sectionalizers send fault alarms to a Smart Substation Controller (SSC) at a given
primary substation when a fault occurs. Based on the received information, the SSC
has the capability to determine which devices must stay open or closed to isolate
the faulty feeder section and energize the sections of the feeder that are healthy.
This approach uses a RF Mesh communications solution for the communications
between the sectionalizers and the SSC. If, for some reason, the primary substation
is not accessible through RF Mesh, communications can go through a second pri-
mary substation that acts as a communications network redundancy and routes the
information to the first primary substation. The recovery plan is presented to the
dispatch and command centers for validation and approval. If it is approved, the
SSC executes the plan by sending commands to the sectionalizers. This solution
allows the reduction of the number of maneuvers in the second approach type of
sectionalizers. It is being tested at the Portuguese city of Batalha [29, 30].
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2.6.2 The Stedin Case
Stedin6 operates an underground network that does not allow the installation and operation
of automatic reclosers. Therefore, their self-healing solutions are based on primary and
secondary substations only.
1. A fully decentralized approach is deployed in the city center of Rotterdam [31, 32].
In this approach, intelligence is distributed between a primary substation and the
secondary substations that are connected to two of its MV feeders, which are part
of a ring with a normally open point. The primary substation is equipped with
protection relays, a SCADA RTU and a self-healing RTU. The secondary substa-
tions are equipped with RTUs, Fault Passage Indicators (FPIs) and voltage presence
detection capability. In the case of a fault occurrence, each RTU executes a soft-
ware restoration routine that handles the communications with the previous and the
next secondary substations RTUs to execute FLIR steps automatically. The RTUs
pass messages between them, according to their order in the feeder relative to the
primary substation protection that tripped until the faulty section of the feeder or
secondary substation has been isolated and the remaining sections have been en-
ergized. A telecom provider’s GPRS private APN is used for the communications
between the RTUs.
2. A second self-healing project in the Rotterdam harbor district comprises the instal-
lation of a regional controller in a primary substation and local control units in each
downstream secondary substation. The regional controller ensures automatic FLIR,
interface to Stedin’s control center and hosts the regional, centralized self-healing
applications [33, 34].
2.6.3 The SEGRID Project Case
The fifth use case of the SEGRID European Project is Automatic reconfiguration of the
power grid, which has as goal the location and isolation of a fault through network re-
configuration, while minimizing the number of affected costumers and power parameters
[35]. The use case description refers to three different scenarios.
1. In the first scenario, isolation and restoration of faults in the MV network is decided
centrally. A RTU at a primary substation collects information about the electrical
network topology and equipment parameters from the central systems. In the case
of a fault occurrence, it uses the afore mentioned information, together with infor-
mation that it collects from the downstream secondary substations and automatic
reclosers, to locate the fault. The isolation may be controlled by the primary RTU
itself, by sending commands to the secondary substations and reclosers, or by the
6Stedin is one of the largest Dutch DSOs with more than two million customers.
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grid dispatch center. The recovery is controlled by the RTU itself, while assur-
ing that the reconnected load stays within the capability of the newly reconfigured
network.
2. In the second scenario, isolation and restoration of faults in the MV network is
distributed by secondary substation’s RTUs, which communicate with each other
through peer-to-peer communications to decide the topology of the MV network.
Any topology change requires an update to the secondary RTUs topology models.
Isolation is performed by the secondary RTUs themselves. For restoration, it is
also necessary to assure that the reconnected load stays within the capability of the
newly reconfigured network.
3. A third scenario refers to the minimization of losses in the MV network using
switching. The goal is to optimize the network to prevent faults from happening. As
in the first scenario, here the primary RTU also collects information about network
topology and equipment parameters from the central systems. This information is
used together with information collected from the electrical network, such as elec-
trical measurements and the state of devices, to forecast also short term future needs
and to calculate an optimal network configuration. This configuration can either be
proposed to the dispatch center or executed automatically.
2.6.4 The e-balance Project Case
The e-balance European Project refers to five fault detection, location, isolation and
restoration use cases, one of which includes a fault forecasting capability that is not men-
tioned in any of the above [36, 37, 38, 39].
1. The use case numbered 22 is fault detection and location in LV networks. A grid
management unit is installed in the secondary substations, which combines network
topology information with fault related information that is retrieved/received from
downstream devices. Sensors at LV distribution cabinets send alarms when con-
figured current or voltage thresholds are reached. They can also be polled by the
management unit to confirm persistent faults. RF MESH smart meters send ”last
gasp” messages upon severe fault occurrences. PLC PRIME meters can be polled
by the management unit, to which they will only respond if they are placed in a
healthy feeder. Communications between the sensors/smart meters and the man-
agement unit use the DLMS protocol. The management unit identifies the faulty
phase and feeder segment and communicates this information to the MV grid man-
agement unit at the upstream primary substation.
2. The use case numbered 23 is fault and fused luminaries detection and location in
public lighting. The LV grid management unit uses topology information, namely
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the number of luminaries and impedance of each, together with current and volt-
age measurements, which are retrieved from sensors deployed at each phase along
the public lighting feeders. When a feeder section is healthy, its current and volt-
age measurements are used to calculate the reference impedance of that section.
Changes in the calculated impedance of a feeder section may imply a faulty line or
fused luminary. The topology information is used to forecast the number of faulty
luminary in each faulty segment. Communications between the sensors and the
management unit use the DLMS protocol.
3. The use case numbered 24 is fault prevention in LV networks. The LV grid manage-
ment unit prevents the network from reaching limit operation conditions, namely,
it prevents voltage limit violations, caused by micro producers, and thermal limit
violations, in secondary substations and distribution cabinets’ protective fuses. LV
sensors send alarms to the management unit when a current, voltage or thermal
threshold is surpassed. They can also be configured to send measurements on a
given schedule or be polled by the management unit. Smart meters at costumers’
houses can be polled by the management unit to send voltage measurements. They
also act as a gateway for communications between the LV grid management unit
and a Distributed Energy Resource (DER) grid management unit, which is itself
an interface for communications with the MG Photovoltaic (PV) inverter. By cor-
relating received and retrieved information, the LV grid management unit detects
effective and imminent voltage violations and calculates control set-points that are
sent as commands to the DER grid management unit to control the PV inverter,
thereby controlling the power injection. The DER grid management unit can also
calculate provisional set-points, upon detecting voltage violations. When the LV
grid management unit detects current or thermal violations, it sends load curtail-
ment commands to the smart meters of non-priority costumers. The LV grid man-
agement unit reports the afore mentioned occurrences to the MV grid management
unit. Communications between the smart meters and the LV grid management unit
use the DLMS protocol. Communications between the LV grid management unit
and the DER grid management unit use the MODBUS protocol.
4. The use case numbered 29 is fault detection and location in MV networks. As al-
ready mentioned, the MV grid management unit is installed in the primary sub-
stations. It combines network topology information with fault information that
is requested/received from downstream devices such as MV fault sensors at sec-
ondary substations, automatic reclosers and primary substations’ protections. After
a fault occurrence, the management unit waits for the passing of a configurable
timeout, during which the network is trying to heal itself following an approach
that is similar to EDP Distribuic¸a˜o’s second or third approaches. If it is a persis-
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tent fault, then the management unit will calculate the location of the faulty feeder
segment or equipment. It then sends this information to a top level grid manage-
ment unit. Downstream devices communicate with the MV grid management unit
through standard IEC protocols.
5. The use case numbered 30 is automatic grid service restoration - self-healing - in
MV networks. After the fault has been detected and located (see e-balance’s use
case 29 description), the MV grid management unit will use the this information
together with network topology information to plan a set of reconfiguration actions
to isolate the fault and restore electricity to a maximum of affected costumers. This
is achieved by transferring loads between MV feeders, without reaching network
limit operation conditions (see e-balance’s use case 24 description). Similarly to
EDP Distribuic¸a˜o’s fourth approach, the plan is presented to the electrical network
operators for validation. If it is accepted, the MV grid management unit will send
commands to reconfigure the network. This use case can also be executed in auto-
matic mode, through which the human validation step is not performed.
2.7 Cyber Security and Dependability Controls
The faults in systems and communications are handled with the support of commercially
available solutions, which provide perimeter and in-depth protection capabilities. The
majority are Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions that were designed for general
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) use and not specifically for Oper-
ation Technology. As mentioned in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, the smart grid has specific
equipment and requirements that impose restrictions to the solutions that can be used in
the ICS network. Moreover, in the central systems and from one substation to the other
we may find different generation deployments (e.g., legacy equipment, different network
topologies and/or lesser communication capabilities), which prevents the use of ”one size
fits all” solutions. These solutions are often based on a predefined set of rules, signa-
tures or use cases, which automate fault handling for a set of specific cases. Section 2.7.2
presents a set of relevant R&D works that focus on smart grid specific solutions. Report
[40] goes further to identify a set of gaps in the current solutions and discuss how R&D
is trying to fill the identified gaps. An organization should select and setup the secu-
rity solutions that best apply to its specific context at a given moment but also thinking
about the future. For instance, it should also setup the process and reserve the necessary
Human Resources (HR), including knowledge and experience, to operate them correctly.
Also, security solutions should be integrated in a security platform in such a way that any
given one complements the others and all of them together protect the organization and
its processes from the threats.
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2.7.1 Currently Used Solutions
The following are examples of security and dependability solutions that are currently used
in smart grids. For detailed explanations on the workings of the mentioned technologies,
refer to [41], [42], [43], [44], [45] and [46].
Physical Security and Safety
Most smart grid assets exist in the physical space or have some sort of support, including
people, systems and information, which must be protected from physical threats, such as
extreme weather, fire and intrusions. Physical barriers (e.g., walls, doors and windows),
human guards, master key, card or electronic key-based access control, Closed-Circuit
Television (CCTV), fire detection and prevention and climatization systems are examples
of common controls that can be found in the smart grid facilities.
Perimeter Protection
Perimeter protection can be seen as the first layer of an organization’s cyber security
platform. It isolates the organization’s network from the outside and provides protection
against external threats. Network and host-based firewalls are a basic building block of
perimeter protection solutions in smart grids, allowing or blocking communications based
on a set of configured rules.
Network Segmentation and Segregation
An entity ”having access to the network” should be a relative concept. The network must
be segmented and segregated so that, e.g., the access to one host at the data center does
not mean also access to the substations. It must take into account the roles of the network
devices and hosts and the roles of the users. Role-based access control (RBAC), firewalls,
Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs) and Virtual Routing and Forwarding (VRFs) are
examples of used controls.
Virtualization
Virtual Machines (VMs) can be used to partition a physical machine’s resources by several
guest Operating Systems (OSs) and the corresponding applications, while providing fault
and security isolation at the hardware level [47]. The decision to virtualize a machine
must take into account the type of resources required by the installed applications (e.g.,
I/O requirements) and how these are used.
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Hardening
Systems and devices can be hardened through disabling unessential applications, pro-
cesses, services, ports and enabling security enhancing configurations.
User and Access Management
The smart grid users can be grouped and assigned access profiles according to their
roles in the management, operation, maintenance and support of the different systems
and components in the different smart grid layers. There is centralized management for
the computers and devices that support it, which should be a basic requirement for new
acquisitions. There are emergency local users for when the centralized authentication
and authorization service is unavailable. Emergency local users, centralized directory,
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA), Privileged Access Management
(PAM) and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) are examples of used controls.
Secure Communications
The use of secure protocols (e.g., Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) and
Secure Shell (SSH)) is preferred over any other alternative, if the computers and devices
support it, which should be a basic requirement in the specifications for new acquisitions.
The external access to the ICS network uses a Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), which is
used for remote interventions and by external service providers. Secure protocols, VPNs
and cryptography management are examples of common controls in smart grids.
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Network and host-based IDS and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) can be used to de-
tect and prevent suspicious communications in the smart grid. They can employ a set of
predefined signatures or they can make comparisons with a predetermined usage pattern.
Nevertheless, due to the false positives that are typically associated with these solutions,
the prevention capability should be used with extra caution if it is applied to communica-
tions related with the critical processes.
Anti-malware Protection
Firewalls, IDS, whitelisting and antivirus are examples of controls that are used to protect
the smart grid from malware. The host-based solutions require deep knowledge about the
applications, processes and services that are executing at each machine. New rules and
signatures must be tested for their impact in the performance of a representative set of
hosts before they are accepted into production. This requires the commitment of the DSO
and the solution support providers to work closely together during the testing and also
to decide how to proceed if the new rules or signatures have a negative impact (e.g., an
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exception may be added or the application may be changed). They also require knowledge
about the hardware capabilities of each machine, as legacy equipment may support only
a combination of the aforementioned solutions by specification or due to their impact in
performance. If used incorrectly, malware protection may degrade or even stop critical
processes.
Dependability Techniques
Redundancy is the most common dependability technique used in smart grids to protect
against non-malicious crash faults. It comes from a time when the architecture and sys-
tems were simpler, the ICS network was more isolated from any external communication
networks and the cyber attacks to electrical infrastructures were not the concern they are
today. There are usually redundant servers, workstations, communication channels and
electricity supplies to distinct levels in the different ICS network segments and smart grid
facilities. Diversity appears as a consequence of the technological renewal and evolution
of the smart grid, which becomes more evident in Operation Technology technology and
especially in the substations, as they have longer life cycles.
Security Information and Event Management
In the smart grid, systems and network devices generate log files such as syslog [48]
where they register security related events such as user logins and logouts. SIEM systems
can be used to collect the logs, correlate the security events and send alarming messages,
based on a set of configured use cases.
System and Network Management
It is common for systems and network devices to be able to report on their performance
and health state through Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) traps. The most
current version of this protocol is SNMPv3 [49]. This information can be consolidated
and managed in a central management system, such as a Network Management System
(NMS), which can send alarming messages, based on a set of configured policies.
Backup Management
Configuration and data backups for smart grid assets are performed locally or remotely
to on-site and/or off-site locations. The data retention periods comply with the functional
requirements, organizations policies and procedures and applicable regulations and legis-
lation.
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Security Update Management
As with IDS and antivirus updates, other security patches and updates, such as those
applied to the OS, are also tested for compatibility with the critical applications before
they are accepted into production. They also require the DSO and the solution support
providers to work closely together during the testing and to decide how to proceed if the
changes have a negative impact. Solutions that are close to the end of support or End-of-
life (EOL) should be replaced by solutions with the required level of support.
Guides, Standards and Certification
There are guides and standards that can be used by the DSO to identify the assets that
require protection, to perform threat, vulnerability and risk assessments and to identify the
necessary security and dependability controls. The DPIA template mentioned in Section
2.5.2, the ISO/IEC 27000 standard series - Information security - and ISO/IEC 31000
- Risk management are examples of such documents. The DSO may go even further to
certify one or more of its core processes. In this regard, the ISO/IEC 27001:2013 provides
requirements for the implementation of a certifiable Information Security Management
System (ISMS).
Audits and Penetration Testing
It is important for the DSO to perform regular internal and/or external audits to review the
security and dependability implementation in comparison with any adopted standard and
the company’s policies and requirements. Complementing the documentation analysis,
the audits should also include penetration tests to the robustness of the implementation.
Penetration testing can also be used to identify security vulnerabilities in the deployed
smart grid infrastructure and in systems and components before they are accepted into
production.
Training and Exercises
User training and awareness and incident response exercises are essential to the correct
operation and maintenance of the smart grid infrastructure on a daily basis and in response
to unexpected events and incidents.
2.7.2 Relevant Research and Development
Smart grid cyber security has been gradually gaining interest for R&D work in Europe,
being a current and recurring topic in European projects and initiatives, conferences and
publications. The JRC publishes an outlook report on European smart grid projects since
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2011, with Smart Grid Projects Outlook 2014 being the most recent report [50]. The ma-
jority of the reported projects focus mainly on the challenges of Section 2.3 and related
issues, namely, smart network management, integration of DER, integration of large scale
RES, aggregation, smart customer & smart home, electric vehicles and smart metering,
with some mentioning privacy and/or cyber security as requirements of the proposed so-
lutions. More recently, the European projects SEGRID and SPARKS compiled a list of
privacy, security and dependability focused European projects, such as themselves, which
focus on the R&D of policy recommendations, new tools and technologies and improve-
ment of existing ones in the aforementioned areas [40, 51]. The following are relevant
examples to our work.
e-balance
The e-balance project ”aims at integrating the energy customers into the future smart-grids
in order to address future environmental problems with holistic technical solutions based
on ICT, new business models and citizens’ behavior under real world conditions” [52].
It follows a security-by-design approach in the development of the proposed solutions,
which are focused on a set of use cases that include FLIR and self-healing.
HEAT
The HEAT project ”will examine new design and implementation techniques for homo-
morphic cryptography, as well as a thorough security analysis” [53]. One of its objectives
to demonstrate the applicability of Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) to smart
grids, which has application in the processing of privacy sensitive smart metering data by
the DSOs for smart grid management and operation functionalities.
LV-Pri20
The LV-Pri20 project will develop an automatic verification software for the formal and
automatic analysis of privacy-preservation in ICT [54]. Its use cases include smart grid
applications included, such as the Open Smart Grid Protocol [55].
SEGRID
The SEGRID project main objective is ”to enhance the protection of smart grids against
cyber attacks” [56], by focusing on an in-project defined smart grid reference model and
a set of future smart grid use cases, which are based on previous EC published work. A
risk analysis is conducted on the use cases to identify security requirements and gaps in
current security and dependability technologies, standards and regulation; the project will
research and develop solutions that can be used to fill these gaps, which will be tested in
an in-project built security integration test environment.
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SPARKS
The SPARKS project will ”promote awareness of existing and emerging smart grid cyber
security risks” [57]. It will develop procedural and technical countermeasures against
these risks, such as cyber attack-resilient control systems, real-time network monitoring
of SCADA-based control systems and novel hardware security technologies for smart
metering applications. It will also provide guidance on privacy related issues, considering
existing legislation.
SCISSOR
The SCISSOR project proposes ”a new generation SCADA security monitoring frame-
work”, comprising four layers: i) a monitoring layer supporting traffic probes providing
programmable traffic analyses up to layer 7, new ultra low cost/energy pervasive sensing
technologies, system and software integrity verification, and smart camera surveillance
solutions for automatic detection and object classification; ii) a control and coordination
layer adaptively orchestrating remote probes/sensors, providing a uniform representation
of monitoring data gathered from heterogeneous sources, and enforcing cryptographic
data protection, including certificate-less identity/attribute-based encryption schemes; iii)
a decision and analysis layer in the form of an innovative SIEM fed by both highly hetero-
geneous monitoring events as well as the native control processes’ signals, and supporting
advanced correlation and detection methodologies; iv) a human-machine layer devised to
present in real time the system behavior to the human end user in a simple and usable
manner” [58]. The proposed framework will be designed for resilience and reliability. Its
results will be assessed in a real smart grid.
Assessing the Physical Impact of Cyber Threats
[59] proposes ”an online framework for assessing the operational reliability impacts due
to threats to the cyber infrastructure”. Cyber attacks are modeled in attack trees, which
represent the different paths that the attacker may follow from the first successfully ex-
ploited vulnerability to the compromise of a physical asset; e.g., from compromising the
communications network to causing a power outage. A different probability and impact
is associated with each path, which can be updated online with operational data. This
framework helps to understand what cyber assets are more likely to be attacked and how
these attacks may affect the physical infrastructure.
[60] proposes ”an integrated cyber-power modeling and simulation testbed” for ana-
lyzing the impact of cyber events on the power grid. Similar to the afore mentioned work,
its goal is also to help understand the relationship between power systems and cyber sys-
tems in a power grid.
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Dependable Smart Grid Systems
[61] assesses a set of EDP Distribuic¸a˜o’s smart grid systems performance and depend-
ability requirements, compares a set of intrusion tolerant protocols to each other and to
the assessed requirements and proposes a cost-benefit efficient solution for the replication
and redundancy of these systems, including the SCADA, DMS and SC components.
Chapter 3
Design
This chapter proposes a knowledge-based, secure and dependable SHS architecture for
smart grids. It starts with the definition of the research problem, the high level require-
ments, assumptions, constraints and hypotheses. Then, it breaks down the functional re-
quirements and proposes a set of compliance providing solutions, setting the grounds for
the proof of the research hypotheses. It extends the functional design is extended by pre-
senting a smart grid model from the DSO perspective, including all smart grid technical
layers. In addition to this, it presents process models for the smart grid and its dependent
processes. It breaks down the security and dependability requirements by performing a
threat and vulnerability assessment to the self-healing application and process, propos-
ing a set of controls and corresponding solutions. Finally, it proposes a SHS and SHEE
architecture, combining the aforementioned set of functional, security and dependability
solutions.
3.1 Chapter Overview
The electrical network self-healing and security automation solutions presented in Sec-
tions 2.6 and 2.7 are restricted in the decisions they make and in the actions they take by
resorting to information about a specific smart grid technical layer, disregarding related
information from the other layers. In this regard, we propose a SHS that acquires and rea-
sons with knowledge from the several smart grid layers to create more efficient, accurate
and robust failure prevention and recovery plans, while minimizing their impact in the
smart grid performance. The plans can be automatically executed, by sending commands
to the corresponding smart grid systems and components, or they can be proposed to the
smart grid operators. Intelligent supervision system components are used to provide mon-
itoring, diagnosis, recovery and learning capabilities. Expert system components provide
knowledge management and reasoning capabilities. Ontologies provide knowledge mod-
eling capabilities. We model the systems and components in the several smart grid layers,
focusing on their connections, functionalities and emphasizing the relationships between
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the layers. We model the smart grid and its dependent processes as state machines that
change state with fault and failure events and also with their reconfiguration in response
to these events.
The self-healing pilot projects described in Section 2.6 are mainly focused on func-
tional issues, which might make them disregard security-by-design benefits, compromis-
ing the overall security of eventual future roll-outs. In this regard, we employ a security-
by-design approach to identify and propose the security and dependability requirements
that provide it with the required protection, intrusion and fault tolerance capabilities,
which is motivated by the SHS having access to confidential information and being ca-
pable to automatically control the smart grid. We perform a threat and vulnerability as-
sessment to the SHS, focusing on the self-healing application as a target and as a possible
threat to the smart grid, behaving erroneously or maliciously. The corresponding con-
trols are identified and a subset comprised of those that need to be technically addressed
by the SHS is proposed in the form of requirements to the security and dependability
components. A MAS architecture with hybrid vertical ”two-pass control” layered and co-
operating agents provides distributed self-healing capabilities. In partitioning scenarios,
the agents are capable of supervising the smart grid systems and components that remain
within the same partition. The assignment of each agent to a self-healing domain provides
role segregation within the MAS. A set of security features, including the cryptography,
user management, event logging, backup and configuration modules, provide secure ac-
cess, I/O, communications, storage, event logging, backup and configuration capabilities.
BFT SMR, proactive and reactive recovery of replicas provide tolerance against faults and
intrusions.
The proposed functional, security and dependability components are materialized in
the SHEE architecture and corresponding modules. A SHEE is a replicated, intelligent,
autonomous and cooperating agent of the multi-agent SHS. It is responsible for an as-
signed self-healing domain, which consists of a set of the smart grid systems, components
and processes that are in its scope of supervision. It reasons with knowledge based on facts
and rules. It monitors the self-healing domain, detecting faults and failures. It diagnoses
faults to determine the cause and impact of occurred failures and to find possible causes
for future failures. It creates recovery plans, consisting in an ordered sequence of fault re-
moval and/or isolation actions, to recover from the observed failures and to prevent future
failures. It reconfigures the smart grid based on the aforementioned plans. It learns from
the past decisions and from the results and consequences of its actions. It communicates
with other SHEEs in the MAS by using standard-based protocols and a standard-based
language. It comprises a set of security and dependability features to prevent and toler-
ate faults and intrusions. It has a hybrid vertical ”two-pass control” layered architecture,
comprising the collectors, knowledge, monitoring, diagnosis, recovery, reconfiguration,
controllers, learning, cooperation, user interface, SMR, user management, cryptography,
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backup, configuration and logging modules, which are described with further detail in the
remaining of this chapter.
3.2 Problem Definition
The European electricity sector is changing at several levels, as presented in Section 2.3,
requiring the DSO to adapt its processes and technological infrastructure - the smart grid
- to new challenges. As a result, the smart grid is becoming increasingly more complex
with more and new types of systems and internal and external connectivities (see Section
2.4). In this new context, concerns with performance, privacy, security and dependability
go further beyond electrical network faults, as explained in Section 2.5. Solutions such
as those presented in Sections 2.6 and 2.7 are used to detect, locate, remove and/or iso-
late faults and prevent and recover from failures in specific smart grid domains, such as
the electrical network and the communications. However, to our understanding, there are
some development and operation issues that introduce limitations to a secure and depend-
able self-healing grid, which we present below.
1. The described self-healing pilot projects and research use cases employ only elec-
trical network information for the monitoring and creation of recovery plans. Simi-
larly, the cyber security and dependability solutions are based on a very specific set
of computing or communications information to monitor, and they act by allowing
or denying a given process or communication. Both are focused on very specific
domains, disregarding information from other domains. However, as the Ukrainian
incidents show [21], there can be cause-effect connections between failures in dif-
ferent smart grid layers. The knowledge and analysis of these connections could
potentially be used to validate and improve the preventive and recovery actions.
In this regard, we propose a SHS that is able to perform the required information
acquisition and analysis.
2. The described self-healing pilot projects are mainly focused on functional issues,
which might make them disregard security-by-design benefits, compromising the
overall security of eventual future roll-outs. The presented European projects are
assessing the security control requirements for several smart grid related use cases,
in which self-healing is included. e-balance is developing its solutions in com-
pliance with these requirements. SEGRID is also analyzing gaps in the available
security technologies and will propose new solutions to fill certain gaps. Our solu-
tion introduces changes to the explained self-healing use cases. In this regard, we
propose to perform an assessment of our SHS to identify and propose the necessary
security and dependability controls.
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3.2.1 Requirements
In response to the issues identified in Section 3.2, the proposed SHS must comply with
the following high level requirements:
1. Automatically prevent and recover from failures, through fault detection, location,
removal and/or isolation in all smart grid technical layers;
2. Prevent its own erroneous and malicious behavior, through security fault prevention
and tolerance in its internal components;
3. Minimize its impact in the performance of other smart grid systems;
4. Operate in different user selectable modes;
5. Be flexible1 and agile2.
By complying with the requirements above, the proposed SHS should provide a more
efficient, secure and dependable self-healing capability.
3.2.2 Assumptions and Constraints
The following assumptions and constraints must be considered in the design:
• In regard to the Requirement 1:
1. The scope is the faults which are reflected in the smart grid systems and com-
ponents configurations;
2. Failures are caused by one or more faulty configurations;
3. The current configurations can be retrieved from the systems and components;
4. Configuration changes generate events that are sent to a collector or registered
in a retrievable log;
5. Failures generate events that are sent to the SHS;
6. Events and retrieved configurations have two timestamps: one assigned when
the event was created or the configuration was applied and a second assigned
by the SHS when they are received;
7. There is a time window within which a set of failure related events is received
or retrieved by the SHS and that is sufficient to detect and locate the corre-
sponding faults;
1Flexibility is the ”capability to adapt to new, different and changing requirements” [62], enabling the
handling of predictable changes.
2Agility is the ability to thrive and prosper in an environment of constant and unpredictable change [63],
enabling the handling of uncertain and uncontrollable changes.
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8. The actuators are capable to apply a set of requested configurations in the
order by which they are produced.
• In regard to the Requirement 2:
1. The faults and intrusions affecting the SHS can be determined by performing
a generic threat and vulnerability assessment;
2. The risk assessment of the smart grid systems and components that are used
as information sources and controllers within the SHS is handled outside of
the current scope of work;
3. The low level security and dependability requirements are the controls re-
quired to deal with the identified threats and vulnerabilities;
4. The external controls are to be handled outside of the current scope of work;
5. It is possible to change the information sources and controllers to support
the SHS security and dependability controls, which is handled outside of the
current scope of work.
3.2.3 Hypothesis Refinement
The design should support the following hypothesis:
• If the SHS is operating correctly and with the right knowledge about the smart grid
systems and components, faulty configurations can be detected, located, removed
and/or isolated by comparing the expected configuration with the current configu-
ration and by comparing the expected behavior with the failure behavior.
3.3 Functional Design
The main SHS component is a software application. Its main building blocks are identified
through the breakdown and analysis of the high level requirements. Requirement 2 is
excluded from the following analysis, as it will be properly addressed in Section 3.6.
3.3.1 Requirements Breakdown
The high level requirements identified in Section 3.2.1 can be broke down in the following
low level requirements:
1. Automatically prevent and recover from failures, by detecting, locating, removing
and/or isolating faults in all smart grid technical layers;
(a) Collect real-time health, performance and security related events from all the
smart grid technical layers;
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(b) Recognize the collected events as configuration, fault or failure related;
(c) Discover the cause-effect chain between events;
(d) Identify the best sequence3 of fault removal and/or isolation maneuvers - the
recovery plan - in response to failure events;
(e) Consider the predictable consequences of the possible actions;
(f) Consider the previous success/failures of applying a given action;
(g) Dispatch the recovery plan in an iterative and controlled manner;
3. Minimize the impact of the SHS in the performance of other smart grid systems;
(a) Minimize the network and the processing time utilization in other smart grid
systems, by decreasing the number of information and control requests to
other systems;
4. Operate in different user selectable modes;
(a) Automatic mode, where the SHS creates and applies the recovery plan;
(b) Support a proposal-only mode, where the recovery plan is suggested but not
applied;
(c) Give priority to the operators’ actions, where commands issued by the opera-
tor take precedence over the actions of the proposed recovery plan;
(d) Support a safe shut down;
5. Be flexible and agile;
(a) Support the deployed types of systems, components, communication proto-
cols and events;
(b) Adapt to new types of systems, components, communication protocols and
events;
(c) Adapt to unexpected event sequences.
3.3.2 Intelligent Supervision System Components
Intelligent supervision system components, namely the dispatch, monitoring, diagnosis,
recovery and learning modules, give partial compliance with the Requirements 1a to 1g,
which is complemented by the remaining proposals. Intelligent supervision systems can
be used to timely handle different asynchronous events in real-time systems. It is com-
prised of four core modules, as depicted in Figure 3.1, which are described below.
3The best sequence minimizes the visibility and impact of the smart grid reconfigurations to the cos-
tumers and users and to the network, respectively.
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Supervision
module Dispatch Monitoring Diagnosis Recovery
Actuators and sensors
Planning module
Figure 3.1: Information flow in a supervision architecture.
• Dispatch - Executes a plan given by the planning module, by sending commands to
the device controllers;
• Monitoring - Monitors a process, based on the information retrieved from sensors,
in search of deviations from the plan objectives, problems or abnormalities;
• Diagnosis - Analysis the identified issues and identifies their cause;
• Recovery - Tries to recover from the issue by generating a recovery plan.
An intelligent supervision system may further include the following functionalities.
• Prognosis - Analyses the temporal evolution of a set of state variables and tries to
anticipate faults and consequent failures;
• Preventive maintenance - Generates preventive maintenance plans;
• Learning - Improves the performance of the previous functionalities through the
acquisition of knowledge to be used in future events.
3.3.3 Expert System Components
Expert system components, namely a knowledge base and an inference engine, add com-
pliance with the Requirements 1b to 1e and 5c. An expert system is ”a computer program
that behaves like a human expert in some useful ways” [64]. Artificial intelligence tech-
niques are used to create an expert system, such as the modeling of knowledge through a
set of logical propositions and the capability to reason with that knowledge through the
use of rules. The core architecture is comprised of:
• Knowledge base - Contains the modeled knowledge;
• Inference engine - Reasons with the modeled knowledge;
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These are complemented by:
• User interface - Interacts with the user;
• Data base - Stores relevant data.
A real-time expert system is an expert system that has the capability to deal with real-time
information.
3.3.4 Knowledge Modeling
An extensive and deep understanding of the supervised systems, components and pro-
cesses and the selection of an extensible knowledge representation adds compliance with
the Requirements 5a and 5b. In this regard, Sections 3.4 and 3.5 present simplified mod-
els of the different smart grid layers and processes, which can be used as a base for the
specification of a smart grid self-healing ontology. An ontology is a formal specification
of a set of terms used to describe and represent an area of knowledge, being widely used
in knowledge engineering, artificial intelligence and computer applications that involve
knowledge management and information management [65].
Ontologies have been used in smart grid security related work. For example, in the
SPARKS project, ontologies are used twofold. In Deliverable 2.2, an ontology is used to
represent semantic threat graphs, describing the relationships between incident scenarios
and security requirements and controls. Through reasoning, it is possible to select the
most adequate countermeasures for each specific incident scenario [66]. Deliverable 2.3
proposes an ontology for describing the Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM)4. On-
tology reasoning is used to automatically identify threats, analyze vulnerabilities, support
likelihood assessment and, as a result, automatically generate attack trees [68].
Two main ontology language specifications were developed by the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C): Resource Description Framework (RDF) and Web Ontology Lan-
guage (OWL).
• RDF - It is a standard for data interchange in which information is encoded through
the construction of triple structures with resources, properties and literals/values,
identified by Uniform Resource Identifier (URIs), resulting in a directed labeled
graph where the nodes are resources and the edges are the properties [69].
• OWL - It is used in information processing applications, having the capability to
describe classes, properties and values of concepts and the relationship between
them. Restrictions can be defined for classes. Characteristics and constraints can be
4The SGAM is part of the Smart Grid Reference Architecture presented by the Smart Grid Coordination
Group (SGCG). It describes the smart grid as a three dimensional infrastructure, consisting of different
domains, zones and layers [67].
Chapter 3. Design 47
defined for properties. A knowledge base of a given knowledge domain is populated
with individuals created through the instantiation of the classes and properties of the
corresponding ontology. Classes, properties, values and individuals are identified
by the corresponding URIs [70].
3.3.5 Information Collection and Control
The possibility to add and remove information collectors and controllers from the SHS
gives compliance to the Requirements 1a and 1g. The collectors and controllers must im-
plement the different communication languages and protocols used by the various smart
grid systems and components. The use of collectors is a common approach, for example,
in the case of the SCADA system where the frontends obtain and consolidate data gath-
ered from distinct parts of the infrastructure, and the SIEM system with the connectors.
In both cases, the collectors are used to gather information from the sources and translate
it to their internal models.
In the smart grid environment and as explained in Sections 2.4 and 2.7, the information
is commonly concentrated in several servers for centralized processing. This happens, for
example, in the RTUs, SCs, SCADA servers and SIEM. Regarding the control capability,
although the RTUs and IEDs can be directly controlled, the most secure and safe way to
proceed is to use the SCs for local control and the DMS and SCADAs servers for remote
control. Giving preference to these data sources and controllers for information collection
and control adds compliance with the Requirement 3a.
3.3.6 User Interaction
A user interface for local and remote management, operation and maintenance support,
with the possibility of selecting several optional supervision modes, adds compliance with
the Requirements 4a to 4d. The options to set the SHS to proposal-only mode or to give
priority to user commands, passing over its own, are relevant for building the operators’
trust in an early operation stage. The option to partially or completely switch off an
erroneous or malicious SHS is essential for the safety of the smart grid.
3.4 Smart Grid Model
The smart grid is comprised of different infrastructural layers, which connect the electrical
equipment to the control systems, to enable the automation and the remote control of the
electrical network. Figures 3.2 to 3.4 present in more detail a view of the connections
among the different layers.
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3.4.1 Electrical Network
A simplified model of the electrical system is depicted in the Figure 3.2, focusing on the
electrical connections and electrical switching capabilities of the electrical network, ob-
served from the perspective of the DSO. In this regard, the electricity distribution network
is depicted with a higher detail than that of the remaining components, here represented
for two primary substations, three secondary substations and four DA devices, and its
connection with the transmission network. The figure contains representations of power
transformers, lines, busbars and switchgear.
• Transformer - The purpose of a transformer is to convert a higher voltage to a lower
voltage (i.e., HV to MV or MV to LV) or vice-versa, depending on the current flow.
Some transformers have a tap changing mechanism, which enables the regulation
of the output voltage through the selection of different winding taps. The taps are
connection points located along a transformer’s winding that account for a certain
number of turns and, consequently, different conversion ratios. The transformers
are labeled in the figure with ”TRx”.
• Switchgear - An electrical switch is a mechanical switching device that enables
the electrical isolation and/or protection and/or operation of the electrical network
and loads, such as motors, heaters, lighting and capacitors. A switch has typically
two configurations: opened and closed, meaning disconnected or connected, re-
spectively. Both configurations require the internal mechanism to be in a specific
physical position. The switch is malfunctioning when the mechanism is not being
actuated and it is not in one of the two aforementioned positions. The electrical
switches are labeled in the figure with ”ESx”.
• Line - A line allows the flow of current between the loads that are electrically con-
nected in both of its ends. They are represented by the mainly horizontal lines that
connect the other representations. The dashed lines mean that in the real world
there would be other components in the middle, which were not drawn due to their
similarity to the represented components. The lines are not labeled in the figure.
• Busbar - A busbar allows the flow of current between the lines that are connected to
it. They are represented by the vertical lines that connect sets of lines. The busbars
are not labeled in the figure.
3.4.2 Communications Network
A simplified communications network model is depicted in Figure 3.3, further narrowing
the focus to the connections between substations and DA. The figure contains representa-
tions of switches, routers, firewalls and physical connections.
Chapter 3. Design 49
H
ou
se
P
S1
SS
1
SS
2
SS
3
LN
1
LN
2
LN
3
TR
1
TR
2
ES
1
ES
2
ES
3
ES
4
ES
6
ES
7
ES
9
ES
8
ES
 
11 E
S 
12 E
S 
13 E
S
14 E
S 
15 E
S 
16
ES
 
10
E
S5
TR
1
TR
2
ES
1
ES
2
ES
3
ES
4
ES
6
ES
7
ES
9
ES
8
ES
 
11 E
S 
12 E
S 
13 E
S 
14 E
S 
15 E
S 
16
ES
 
10
E
S5
TR
1
E
S1
ES
2
TR
1
ES
1
ES
2
E
S1
ES
2
ES
1
ES
2
ES
3
TR
1
ES
1
ES
2
E
S1
ES
2
ES
1
ES
2
ES
3
ES
1
ES
1
ES
1
E
S1
LN
4
P
S2
SM
1
C
R
1
ES
1
ES
2
ES
3
ES
1
ES
2
TR
1
TR
2
D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
D
C
1
ES
1
ES
2
ES
3
ES
4
Tr
an
sm
is
si
on
G
e
n
e
ra
ti
o
n
Su
p
p
ly
C
on
su
m
er
s
M
ic
ro
ge
n
er
at
io
n
C
og
en
er
at
io
n
Th
er
m
al
B
io
m
as
s
H
yd
ro
W
in
d
E
V
So
la
r 
M
G
Li
gh
ti
n
g
Le
ge
n
d
SC
 |
 S
ub
st
at
io
n
 C
o
nt
ro
lle
r
H
M
I |
 L
o
ca
l H
u
m
an
 M
ac
hi
n
e 
In
te
rf
ac
e
R
T
U
 |
 R
em
ot
e 
Te
rm
in
al
 U
n
it
SW
 |
 S
w
it
ch
R
T
 |
 R
o
u
te
r
SH
E
E 
| 
Se
lf
 H
ea
lin
g 
Ex
pe
rt
 E
n
ti
ty
D
CO
 |
 D
at
a 
Co
n
ce
n
tr
at
o
r
SM
 |
 S
m
ar
t 
M
e
te
r
P
S 
| 
P
ri
m
ar
y 
Su
b
st
at
io
n
SS
 |
 S
ec
o
n
da
ry
 S
u
b
st
at
io
n
LN
 |
 P
ow
e
r 
Li
n
e
D
C 
| 
D
at
a 
Ce
n
te
r
C
R
 |
 C
o
nt
ro
l R
o
o
m
IE
D
In
te
lig
e
nt
 E
le
ct
ro
n
ic
 D
ev
ic
e
ES
El
ec
tr
ic
al
 S
w
it
ch
TR
Tr
an
sf
o
rm
er
FW
 |
 F
ir
e
w
al
l
W
S 
| 
SC
A
D
A
 W
or
ks
ta
ti
o
n
R
A
 |
 R
em
ot
e 
A
cc
es
s 
C
o
m
p
ut
er
SC
A
D
A
 |
 S
up
er
vi
so
ry
 C
o
nt
ro
l a
n
d
 D
at
a 
A
cq
ui
si
ti
o
n 
Sy
st
e
m
D
is
tr
ib
u
te
d
 
G
en
er
at
io
n
LA
 |
 L
o
ca
l A
cc
es
s 
C
o
m
p
u
te
r
D
O
 |
 D
o
o
r 
w
it
h 
A
u
th
en
ti
ca
ti
o
n
Figure 3.2: Electrical network model.
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Figure 3.3: Communications network model.
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• Switch - A switch is used to expand a network, enabling communications between
the network devices that are connected to its network interfaces. They may support
the configuration of VLANs, which allow network segregation through the separa-
tion of the physical network interfaces by different logical networks. Switches are
labeled in the figure with ”SWx”.
• Router - A router is used to create a network and/or to enable the communication
between the networks that are connected to its network interfaces. They support
the configuration of static IP routes and dynamic routing, which allow them to de-
cide which IP communications should be sent through which IP network interfaces.
Routers are labeled in the figure with ”RTx”.
• Firewall - A firewall is used to allow/prevent the network devices from sending/re-
ceiving any or a set of IP communications to/from other network devices through
its network interfaces. They support the configuration of rules for each interface,
which can be based on the IP, protocol and content of the communications. Fire-
walls are labeled in the figure with ”FWx”.
• Physical connections - Regarding the physical connections, the figure contains rep-
resentations of landlines, wireless and PLC. The landlines cross the boundaries of
the facilities, connecting them to each other. The dashed lines represent the wire-
less connections. The PLC is represented by the electrical network components
that connect the secondary substation SS1 to the house in the upper-right corner
of the figure. It works in each electrical phase, between the transformer and the
smart meter. Inside each facility, the connections between the network devices are
represented by simple lines. The physical connections are not labeled in the figure.
3.4.3 SCADA and Automation
The SCADA and automation components and a simplified service model are depicted
in Figure 3.4, with the connections between the components drawn in blue. The SCADA
system collects, processes, stores and displays the data from the electrical network. It also
enables the operators to consult and analyze the data and to give commands to the elec-
trical network. Automation devices have the capability to automatically process the data,
to coordinate between themselves and to autonomously execute predetermined actions on
the electrical network.
• IED and RTU - The intelligence of the smart grid begins at the IEDs in the primary
substations and the RTUs in the secondary substations and MV distribution lines.
They collect the data directly from its source, they process the data and they execute
a predetermined action, which may simply be the sending of the data and/or any
additional information that was generated from the data processing to the central
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Figure 3.4: SCADA and automation.
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systems, or it may be the sending of a command to an actuator. They provide also
an integrated user interface for manual control of the electrical network. If they are
configured to local mode, they accept only commands given through this interface.
If they are configured to remote mode, they accept commands given by the SC.
IEDs and RTUs are labeled in the figure with ”IEDx” and ”RTUx”, respectively.
• SC and HMI - In a primary substation, the data sent by the IEDs is collected by the
SC, providing a local view of the electrical network within the facility. This data is
sent by the SC to the SCADA servers but it can also be monitored locally through
the HMI. It is also possible to set the substation to local or remote operation modes
through the HMI interface. The SCs and the HMIs are labeled in the figure with
”SCx” and ”HMIx”, respectively.
• SCADA (and DMS) servers - At the data center, the SCADA servers receive the
telemetry data from the substations and from the DA devices, which they process,
store and make available to the operation workstations for consultation. They also
receive, validate, translate and forward the operators’ commands from the worksta-
tions to the substations and DA devices.
• SCADA workstations - In the control room, the operators have access to the work-
stations, which connect with the SCADA servers to display the smart grid informa-
tion and to send commands to the substations and DA devices. The workstations
are labeled in the figure with ”WSx”.
In regard to security, we consider that the aforementioned components support addi-
tion and removal of users and roles, whitelisting, firewall rules and antivirus signatures.
3.4.4 Further Considerations
For design purposes, it is considered that the following systems and components are also
present in the smart grid, although some are not represented in the aforementioned Fig-
ures:
• Electricity supply to electronic equipment (inside the DSO’s facilities) - The dif-
ferent facilities provide, with different redundancy levels, the LV electricity supply
required by the hosted systems and components. For instance, PS1 might have
MV to LV auxiliary transformers and it might also have electrical connections to
other substations, together with the corresponding SCADA components. There are
also local and central systems that allow to monitor and control of these electrical
network components.
• Security and dependability controls - There are other security and dependability
controls are in place, supporting the configuration of rules, signatures, policies and
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use cases, in addition to those that were already mentioned. For example, network
segmentation and segregation, hardening and intrusion detection and prevention
systems and redundant components and communication channels.
• Sensors - There are several sensors spread through the smart grid infrastructure.
• Supported services - The smart grid provides other services beyond SCADA, such
as: local and remote engineering (through the engineering computers LA1 and
RA1, respectively), energy quality control (not represented) and smart metering
(through the data concentrator DCO1 and smart meter SM1).
3.5 Processes Model
The DSO manages a set of processes that support and enable its role in the electricity
distribution activity and which depend on the smart grid systems and components to ex-
ecute correctly. To further clarify the existing dependencies, the smart grid and a generic
smart grid dependent process were modeled as state machines, which are depicted in the
Figures 3.5 and 3.6.
3.5.1 Smart Grid
By increasing the abstraction level on the work presented in Section 3.4, it is possible to
represent the smart grid as a sequence of states and transitions, as depicted in the Fig-
ure 3.5. The smart grid state at any given moment is the combination of the states of its
components. The state of a smart grid component is determined by comparing its health
(i.e., operational or not operational), configuration and performance (e.g., current, volt-
age, temperature, used memory, used storage and used processing resources) with the
planned configuration and with the rated performance values (e.g., rated current, rated
voltage rated temperature, memory capacity, storage capacity and processing capacity).
Regarding the planned configuration and using the electrical network as a first example,
the command center (in the control room) determines which is the optimal network con-
figuration for a certain period, given a set of conditions (e.g., the expected transmission
delivery, the expected distributed generation, the expected MG, the expected distribution
supply, the programmed network interventions, the critical consumers and the regulation).
As a second example, the routers, switches and firewalls are installed and setup with a set
of routes (or a dynamic routing protocol), VLANs and rules, respectively, in compliance
to their use case and to the organization’s policies.
• Planned configuration - When all the components are in a planned configuration
and there are no programmed or fault-imposed restrictions to the performance of
their functions;
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Figure 3.5: Smart grid operation model.
– If there is a planned intervention in which at least one component is recon-
figured to an alternative configuration, then the smart grid will change to the
”reconfiguring” state;
– If a fault affects at least one component in a way that it is still able to perform
its basic functions, then the smart grid will change to the ”degraded” state;
– If a fault affects a set of components in a way that they are not able to perform
their basic functions, leaving a part or the total smart grid inoperative, then the
smart grid will change to the ”not operational” state.
• Reconfiguring - When the smart grid is operating in an alternative configuration
because it is being intervened (e.g., a set of clients that are being supplied through
an alternative substation, or the routing of the communications through an alternate
path);
– When the intervention ends, the smart grid will return to the ”planned config-
uration” state.
• Degraded - When fault-imposed restrictions prevent the smart grid from returning
to the planned configuration (e.g., an overheating electrical line, a ”slow” SCADA
server or an isolated fault);
– The smart grid will change to the ”reconfiguring” state when the fault is iso-
lated and/or removed, which may require several steps within this state.
• Not operational - The smart grid is not operational and in no condition to support
the dependent processes (e.g., a broken electrical line, or a damaged firewall);
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– The smart grid will change to the ”reconfiguring” state when the fault is cor-
rectly isolated and/or removed, which may require several steps within this
state;
– As the smart grid is unable to support any process execution, it is a priority to
put it into operation. Therefore, the smart grid will change to the ”degraded”
state right after the fault isolation, if possible.
3.5.2 Smart Grid Dependent Processes
A DSO managed process depends on the smart grid systems and components if there are
smart grid states and transitions that have a disruptive/healing impact in its execution.
For instance, the electricity distribution core business process depends on the state of the
electrical network layer and on the state of the electrical network control process. The
electrical network control process depends on the state of the communications network
layer and on the state of the SCADA systems, components and service. Figure 3.6 depicts
the states and transitions of a generic smart grid dependent process in relation to the smart
grid states. The application of this model to the analysis of a specific process should
consider only the smart grid systems and components that support the analyzed process’s
execution.
Degraded
execution
Normal
execution
Disruptive
reconfiguration
or degradation
Severe
degradation
or inoperation
No
executionSufficient healing
reconfiguration
Sufficient healing
reconfiguration
Non-disruptive
reconfiguration 
Insufficient healing
reconfiguration
Initial state
Figure 3.6: Generic smart grid dependent process model.
• Normal execution - When the process is executing without restrictions;
– If the smart grid changes to the ”reconfiguring” state but the reconfiguration
is non-disruptive to the process, then the latter will remain in the ”normal
execution” state;
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– If the aforementioned reconfiguration is disruptive to the process, or if the
smart grid changes to the ”degraded” state but it can still support the process
with limitations, then the process changes to the ”degraded execution” state;
– If the smart grid changes to the ”degraded state” and it is unable to support
the process, or if the smart grid changes to the ”not operational” state, than the
process changes to the ”no execution” state.
• Degraded execution - When the process is executing with restrictions (e.g., when a
primary substation cannot be remotely controlled and, consequently, the local HMI
must be used);
– If the smart grid is reconfigured in such way that it can support the process
without restrictions, the latter changes to the ”normal execution” state.
• No execution - When the process is not executing;
– If the smart grid is reconfigured in such way that it can support the process
without restrictions, the latter changes to the ”normal execution” state;
– If the smart grid is reconfigured in such way that it can support the process
with restrictions, the latter changes to the ”degraded execution” state.
3.6 Security and Dependability Design
The security and dependability building blocks are identified through the breakdown and
analysis of the high level Requirement 2 - Prevent the erroneous and malicious behavior
of the SHS, through security fault prevention and tolerance in its internal components. In
this regard, a generic threat and vulnerability assessment of the Self-Healing Application
(SHA) was performed to identify the required security and dependability controls and to
propose a set of compliant and compliance gaining components. In regard to the proposed
components, these focus only on the controls that have to be implemented through SHA
components or to which it must provide support. Other external controls are not covered
by this investigation.
3.6.1 Threat and Vulnerability Assessment
The assessment starts with the identification of the relevant SHS assets, to which follows
the identification of the relevant threats and vulnerabilities. It is assumed that the existing
smart grid assets have already been subject to a similar assessment. Therefore, we focus
our efforts on the threats to the SHA and also on the threat that a breached, erroneous,
leaking or malicious SHS might mean to the smart grid.
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Assets
Table 3.1 contains a list of the SHS relevant assets, including a small description of the
reason why they are considered important. The list includes several types of assets, in-
cluding the SHA, people, hardware, third-party software, information, services and facil-
ities.
Table 3.1: Assets table.
ID Asset Description
01 Facility The facility where the self-healing application is hosted
02 Hardware The hardware that supports the self-healing application (e.g.,
rack and computer hardware)
03 Hypervisor The hypervisor that supports the self-healing application
04 OS The OS that supports the self-healing application
05 Application The self-healing application
06 Information The information that is handled by the self-healing applica-
tion
07 Communications The communications between the application and the data
sources/controllers
08 Data Sources and
Control Devices
The smart grid sensors, data concentrators, actuators and
control systems
09 Users The self-healing management and maintenance teams
10 Processes The self-healing management, operation and maintenance
processes
Threats and Vulnerabilities
Table A.1, in Appendix A, contains an extensive list of the threats and corresponding vul-
nerabilities that might target the SHA and the smart grid, through it. The aforementioned
list was compiled by combining our expertise on the matter with available lists of com-
mon threats and vulnerabilities, such as [71]. It is not final due to the fact that new threats
may arise and new vulnerabilities may be discovered that target the smart grid and the
SHA in specific. Also, different SHS deployments in different smart grid contexts might
expose the SHA to specific threats unknown to us at the current time.
The threat-vulnerability pairs can be divided in two main groups, regarding their con-
sequences to the SHA and to the smart grid. Line IDs with letters A and B present the
threats and vulnerabilities with immediate consequences to the SHA. If the correspond-
ing incident is not contained, the smart grid might also be affected. Line IDs with letters
C and D present the threats and vulnerabilities that immediately affect the SHA and the
smart grid. They are mainly related with the erroneous or malicious behavior of the SHA
and the compromising of the handled smart grid information.
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3.6.2 Controls
In Table A.1, in Appendix A, we propose controls for all the identified threat-vulnerability
pairs, without exclusions. These controls were compiled by combining our expertise on
the matter with available lists of security and dependability controls, such as the ISO/IEC
27002:2013 standard5. The DSOs or SHS manufacturers are encouraged to complete
the risk assessment, beyond the threat and vulnerability assessment, to select which of
the identified controls are applicable to their smart grid context. If necessary, the pro-
posed controls might be replaced by equivalents. The controls can be divided in two main
groups, separating the SHA internal controls from the external controls.
Internal to the SHS
Line IDs with letters A and C present the controls that have to be implemented through
SHA components or which it must support. They include the following:
1. Distributed application architecture;
2. Access:
• Local user accounts;
• Centralized personal user accounts with fallback to the local user accounts;
• Fine-grained RBAC;
• Enforce compliance with strong password policy requirements, such as: reuse
of old passwords, maximum and minimum age, minimum length and com-
plexity;
• Automatic idle user logout;
3. I/O:
• Automatic input and workflow restriction, validation and confirmation;
• Regular proactive data collection and update;
• Redundant data sources and control devices;
• Data comparison between redundant data sources;
• Command success confirmation;
4. Communications:
• Error detection and correction mechanisms;
5The ISO/IEC 27002:2013 standard contains a list of mandatory controls for an ISMS implementation,
as defined in the ISO/IEC 27001:2013 [72, 73].
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• Secure hashing algorithms and hash comparison;
• Secure authentication protocols;
• Secure key exchange protocols;
• Application level communications encryption;
• Secure message flow validation;
5. Storage:
• Application or OS level storage encryption and integrity protection;
• Cryptographic key vault;
6. Security event logging and monitoring;
7. Automatic and on-request backups and backup storage protection;
8. Secure remote configurations and updates;
9. Secure coding practices;
10. Active replication in different VMs, physical hosts or physical geographies;
11. Proactive and reactive system recovery.
External to the SHS
Line IDs with letters B and D present the controls that have to be implemented externally
to the SHA, which does not decrease their relevance. They include the following:
1. People:
• Regular HR capacity review;
• HR recruitment and selection criteria;
• User training;
• Security awareness training;
2. Processes:
• Regular user management policy review;
• Regular user account and permission review;
• Regular capacity management policy review;
• Regular change management policy review;
• Equipment disposal procedures;
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• Regular configuration procedures review;
• Regular update procedures review;
• Regular incident response policy review;
• Regular business continuity plan review;
• Regular information classification policy review;
3. Technology:
• Physical security logging and monitoring;
• Health and performance monitoring systems;
• Whitelisting, antivirus, host and network-based firewall, intrusion detection
and prevention;
• Physical , VPN, VLAN and VRF configurations;
• Data Loss Prevention (DLP) systems;
• Redundant power and communications supply;
• Redundant secure communications channels;
• Data store redundancy;
4. Services:
• Robustness testing and evaluation;
• Regular penetration testing and vulnerability management;
• Health and performance monitoring;
• Manufacturer and/or vendor contractual support;
3.6.3 Distributed Application
A MASs architecture provides compliance with Control 1, while being compliant with
High Level Requirements 1 and 5. In [74], an agent is defined as ”a computer system
that is situated in some environment, and that is capable of autonomous action in this
environment in order to meet its delegated objectives”. Its behavior depends on how
it perceives the environment, based on an internal representation, on the decisions it is
prepared to make and on the actions it is programmed to take. In this regard, an agent can
be classified as deliberative, reactive or hybrid.
• Deliberative - An agent that behaves pro-actively towards the achievement of a pre-
determined goal. It maintains a representation of the world and, through reasoning,
it is capable of planning a course of action, which comprehends the generation of
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a correct and optimal sequence of actions that take him closer to its goal. It can be
achieved through a Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) architecture in which the reason-
ing process takes into consideration the following representations:
– Beliefs - Knowledge about the agent itself and its environment;
– Desires - Goals that the agent has to achieve, but it still does not know how;
– Intentions - Goals with which the agent is committed and that it knows how to
achieve.
• Reactive - An agent that responds with robust actions to changes in the environment,
as they happen. Unlike the deliberative agent, it does not have an internal knowl-
edge representation nor is it capable of anticipation. It assumes that intelligence is
in the world - not inside the agent - and that intelligent behavior ”emerges” from
the interaction between both. It can be achieved through a hierarchy of behaviors
architecture in which each behavior has a situation-action rule-like structure. In this
architecture, behaviors compete with each other, with lower-layer behaviors, which
represent more ”primitive” kinds of behavior, having precedence over higher-layer
behaviors.
• Hybrid - An agent that combines the characteristics of deliberative agents and reac-
tive agents. It can be achieved through a multi-layered architecture in which some
layers are deliberative and the others are reactive, being capable to provide optimal
action sequences and fast responses. It can assume two main configurations:
– Horizontal layering - The sensors and actuators are directly connected to the
different layers, which can result in different commands being given to the
same actuator, at the same time.
– Vertical layering - The sensors and actuators are connected in two main con-
figurations. In ”one pass control”, the sensors are connected to the bottom
layers, the actuators are connected to the top layer and the information flows
bottom-up. In ”two pass control”, the sensors and actuators are connected
to the bottom layer and the information flows up and then down through the
layers. In both, only one layer controls the actuators, preventing concurrency
between the layers. However, one failed layer stops the whole process.
In a MAS, the agents interact with each other, requiring the capability to:
• Coordinate - To access non-sharable resources;
• Cooperate - To achieve a common goal by working together;
• Negotiate - To reach agreements on common interest matters.
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These capabilities are also essential for the participation of the agents in coalitions. A
coalition is a structure that results from the association of at least two cooperating agents.
Negotiation between the agents is required for autonomously forming the coalition. Co-
ordination of one-another actions is required for performing a joint activity. The agents
communicate through Agent Communication Languages (ACLs) and agent communica-
tion protocols.
• ACLs - They are used to provide message exchange formats. The main ACLs
are Knowledge Query Manipulation Language (KQML), developed in the ARPA
knowledge sharing initiative, and Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA)-
ACL, developed by FIPA. They have a similar message structure, containing a per-
formative6, a content and a set of control parameters [75]. KQML includes the
Knowledge Interchange Format (KIF) language to express message contents.
• Agent communication protocols - They define an ordered sequence of messages
that the agents exchange when communicating with one-another. In this regard,
FIPA has defined a set of protocols, including the request, contract net and sub-
scribe interaction protocols [76, 77, 78]. The message performatives are assigned
depending on the used protocol and its execution state.
In the light of the above, we propose to populate the self-healing MAS with hybrid
behavior, vertical ”two-pass control” layered and cooperating agents. The hybrid behav-
ior enables a self-healing agent to follow its supervision goals and also react to smart
grid events and requests from the other agents. The vertical ”two-pass control” layering
enables a feedback loop in the flow of information that is closed internally, by the pre-
viously presented learning functionality, and externally, through the interaction with the
smart grid systems and components.
3.6.4 Self-healing Domains
The definition of self-healing domains and their assignment to different agents provides
role segregation within the MAS. A self-healing domain is a set of systems, components
and services of the same or different smart grid technical layers, which is assigned to an
agent when it starts executing and which defines the scope for its knowledge and super-
vision activities. Examples of potential self-healing domains are: a component, a system,
the components within a facility, an electrical network section, a set of network equip-
ment, a microgrid or the smart grid as a whole.
6Examples of FIPA-ACL performatives include: request, agree, refuse, inform, failure, Call for Propos-
als (CFP), propose, accept-proposal, reject-proposal and subscribe.
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3.6.5 Security Features
The SHA components must implement or support the controls listed in Control Groups 2
to 8 of Section 3.6.2, providing secure access, I/O, communications, storage, event log-
ging, backup and configuration. Additionally, we propose a set of components to provide
the necessary functions and automatic behaviors, namely, cryptography, user manage-
ment, event logging, backup and configuration modules.
To provide compliance with Control 9, we will refer to secure coding guides, such as
the OWASP Secure Coding Practice Quick Reference Guide [79], for any developed code
during the implementation. Any new components or other future additions to the SHA
must follow a similar approach.
3.6.6 Dependability Techniques
The replication of each agent, through the use of a BFT SMR library, provides compliance
with the Control 10. It provides tolerance against faults and intrusions, which are listed as
threats to the SHA. The replicas can be placed in different VMs, physical hosts or physical
geographies, which must be defined by the DSO or manufacturer in each specific smart
grid context. This decision must consider the physical location of the proposed self-
healing domain assets, the reliability of the communication channels to the previous and
the existing common threats between the self-healing domain assets and the SHA.
The redundancy and SMR of smart grid systems has been addressed in several works.
However, we focus our attention on [61], which handles this issue in the context of a real
deployment. It assesses the performance and dependability of a set of EDP Distribuic¸a˜o’s
smart grid systems. It compares a set of intrusion tolerant protocols to each other and to
the assessed requirements. It proposes a cost-benefit efficient solution for the redundancy
and SMR of these systems, including the SCADA system, DMS and primary substation
RTUs. It assumes that the workstations and RTU, acting as clients, are modified to provide
the necessary support.
The SHS and the SCADA system have similarities that allow us to propose BFT SMR
for the agents. The SHS, like the SCADA system, has the capability to monitor and
control the electrical network. It can also perform these actions automatically, while
the SCADA system requires several human operators. The more advanced self-healing
approaches are still in active development, being used for simpler scopes (i.e., FLIR in
MV feeders). They are expected to increase in scope and complexity, as shown in the
European projects’ use cases, getting the operators to rely more on them, as it happened
with the SCADA systems in the past. Therefore, in the future, they might match or even
surpass the SCADA systems in criticality.
In regard to the above, each agent must be comprised of 3f + 1 replicas to provide
tolerance against f faults or intrusions, where f is the output of a cost-benefit analysis
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to be performed by the DSO or manufacturer in their specific smart grid context. The
number of replicas can be higher to account for when a replica is being recovered in
compliance with the Control 11. In this regard, we assume that the rejuvenation of the
agent, including the cryptographic material, is performed together with the OS through
an external process. The monitoring of the replicas, through the analysis of their logs, is
essential to detect faulty behavior and initiate the recovery process. Nevertheless, replicas
should be regularly rejuvenated to account for false negatives in the monitoring process.
BFT SMR requires all the agents to start in the same state and to execute the same se-
quence of input commands, in the same order, to follow the same sequence of states/out-
puts, with determinism being mandatory. To comply with these requirements, all the
replicas start with the same knowledge, which is comprised of an ordered set of facts and
rules about the corresponding self-healing domain. It is an input from the user, which
must be given to all replicas. The BFT SMR protocol total orders the information from
the sensors, handling also any checkpoints and state transfers as required. The reason-
ing is performed deterministically through the processing of the rules in the given order,
producing the same sequence of commands. Learning must also be achieved through de-
terministic algorithms. Therefore, approaches that rely on randomness, such as genetic
algorithms, require the use of the same seed for each cycle in all replicas.
3.7 A Self-healing Expert Entity
A SHEE is a replicated, intelligent, autonomous and cooperating agent of the SHS that
reasons with knowledge based on facts and rules. It is capable to monitor the smart
grid systems and components, to diagnose and recover from failures detected in the latter
and to learn from its actions and past decisions, within its given self-healing domain.
It communicates with other SHEEs in the MAS by using standard-based protocols and
a standard-based language. It comprises a set of security and dependability features to
prevent and tolerate faults and intrusions. Below, we present in more detail the SHEE,
including in its architecture the components proposed in the previous sections.
3.7.1 Architecture
We provide three perspectives of the architecture, starting with how the SHEEs connect
with the supervised smart grid data sources and controllers to form the SHS, following
to the internal architecture of a SHEE and finalizing with how the self-healing process
works and how it relates with the smart grid processes.
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Self-healing System
The SHEEs and their connections with the smart grid systems and components are de-
picted in Figure 3.7 with the label ”SHEEx” and with a green color, respectively. The
connections between SHEEs are represented with the same color. This representation
assumes a previous decision of placing one SHEE per substation and feeder automation
device. It is possible to observe differences between the SCADA and the SHS by compar-
ing the Figures 3.4 and 3.7. The main difference is the connectivity that occurs between
devices at the same hierarchical level in the SHS, which is not observed in the SCADA.
SHEE Architecture
The SHEE has a modular architecture, with the several modules corresponding to the
components proposed during the previous design stages. Two separate views are provided
to facilitate understanding of the proposed connections. In this regard, Figure 3.8a and
Figure 3.8b depict the functional perspective and the non-functional perspective, respec-
tively. Each box corresponds to a module, which might be an agent behavior or simply
a software library that provides functions to the other modules. The arrows represent the
connections between the modules, with the arrow direction indicating the main flow of
information. The dashed lines correspond to configurable communications. The modules
and connections are further described in Sections 3.7.2 and 3.7.3.
Self-healing Process
A simplified model of the self-healing process is presented in Figure 3.9, mapping the
Fault Detection, Location, Isolation and Restoration (FDLIR) activities to the SHEE su-
pervision activities and corresponding modules. In this model, self-healing is an ongoing
process, with a monitoring activity attempting to detect eventual faults and failures within
a given self-healing domain and triggering the following activities.
• Monitoring - Collects information from the smart grid sensors and analyses it to
detect eventual faults and failures.
– What is happening in the smart grid? - If a fault or failure is detected, then the
smart grid is either in a ”degraded” or ”not operational state”, depending on
the severity of the fault. Isolated faults can also be detected in the ”reconfig-
uring” state.
– What is happening with the smart grid dependent processes? - The processes
might be in ”normal execution”, ”no execution” or ”degraded execution”, de-
pending on the impact of the failure.
• Diagnosis - Performs fault location to determine the cause and impact of occurred
failures and to find possible causes for future failures.
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Figure 3.7: Self-healing multi-agent system.
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Figure 3.8: SHEE Architecture.
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Figure 3.9: Self-healing process model.
• Recovery - Creates a fault removal and/or isolation action sequence - the recovery
plan - to recover from occurred failures and to prevent future failures.
– Fault removal - In fault removal, a set of configurations is applied to the do-
main components, removing the cause of failure. It is possible only when the
required resources are available.
– Fault isolation - In fault isolation, a set of configurations is applied to the
domain components, containing the impact of the failure to the domain or to
a subset of its components. It might be employed as a preliminary action to
support removal or when it is not possible to completely remove the fault,
requiring human intervention.
• Reconfiguration - Smart grid configuration plans are executed by the command
center. Therefore, we decided to replace the typical Dispatch supervision module
by a Reconfiguration module, which executes only the sequence of actions proposed
in the self-healing recovery plan.
– What happens to the smart grid? - During the several steps of ”reconfigu-
ration”, the smart grid might go through the ”not operational”, ”degraded”,
”reconfiguring” and ”planned configuration” states.
– What happens to the smart grid dependent processes? - The processes might
go through the ”no execution”, ”degraded execution” and ”normal execution”
states.
Further information about the how the modules perform the aforementioned activities
is given in Section 3.7.2.
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3.7.2 Functional Description
The functional description sets its focus on the functional modules of the SHEE architec-
ture, including the following.
Collectors
There can be different numbers and types of collector modules for different devices and
types of devices, which receive and retrieve information from a set of sources and deliver
it to the BFT SMR module. The BFT SMR then ensures a total order update of the
state of the systems and components services. Regarding the source, the information
can be obtained through direct communications with the systems and components (e.g.,
sensors and actuators, SCADA control devices, network, hosting and security equipment),
or indirectly, through data and information concentrators (e.g., SCADA server, network,
systems and security monitors). The protocol must be secure. Some components might
be configured to send the necessary information on the given schedule, while others must
be requested to send this information.
Knowledge
Smart grid information about the systems and components in a given self-healing domain
is modeled into facts and rules, which are provided to the knowledge model. As depicted
in Figure 3.10, this information includes:
• Facts and rules loaded by the user;
– The ID of the SHEE;
– What are the systems and components;
– What services they offer;
– How they behave to offer those services;
– How they should be connected to one-another;
– How they connect to other self-healing domains (i.e., information about other
SHEE);
– How to update the state of those services;
• Facts and rules acquired by the SHEE:
– What is the state of those services (i.e., events and alarms), which is provided
by the collectors module;
– Reliabilities of configuration options, which is provided by the learning mod-
ule.
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Figure 3.10: SHEE knowledge and reasoning.
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The knowledge module updates this knowledge with the information batch received
from the BFT SMR module, triggering the creation of a static copy of the knowledge
model and a reaction from the monitoring module. Thereafter, the knowledge module
reasons with the copy, through an inference engine, based on goals and queries requested
by the other modules. The reasoning results are returned to the requesters, such as re-
covery plans requested by the recovery module. Each new batch triggers the creation
of a new copy and the corresponding reaction from the monitoring module. If the time
stamp of new information is older than that of the last information that was considered for
the corresponding facts, it is disregarded by the original model. In these situations, the
knowledge module creates a new version of the knowledge model copy where the delayed
information would have been inserted and includes it there.
The knowledge model is a limited representation of reality. Therefore, the closer it is
to the real world, the better and safer can be the self-healing results.
Monitoring
The monitoring module submits goals7 to the knowledge module to validate if the super-
vised self-healing domain’s systems and components are properly configured to provide
the supported services and enable the dependent processes. The detected faults and fail-
ures are subject to diagnosis. It also validates the information obtained by the collectors
through its comparison with redundant information from different sources. If an inconsis-
tency is detected, a warning is posted in the user interface and the inconsistent information
is not used in the self-healing process, until the inconsistency has been solved. It is possi-
ble to monitor also other aspects of its execution through the user interface.
Diagnosis
The diagnosis module submits queries to the knowledge module to determine the cause
and impact of observed failures and to find possible causes for future failures. The cause
is a set of faulty configurations in the smart grid systems or components. The impact
comprises to which extent one or more services were affected directly, indirectly and
the number of clients affected. If the affected service is related with other self-healing
domains, the corresponding SHEEs are asked to cooperate in the diagnosis. It is possible
to monitor its execution through the user interface.
Recovery
The recovery module submits queries to the knowledge model to create a smart grid re-
configuration plan to isolate and/or remove the fault and recover the affected services and,
7A goal is a proposition that the knowledge module classifies as being true or false.
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consequently, the affected smart grid dependent processes. If the affected service is re-
lated with other self-healing domains, the corresponding SHEEs are asked to cooperate
in the recovery. One of the possible outputs might be that nothing can be done by the
SHEE, depending on the available resources. In this situation, the operators may still use
the information provided by the diagnosis module. The recovery plan is delivered to the
reconfiguration and learning modules. It is possible to monitor its execution through the
user interface.
Reconfiguration
The reconfiguration module executes the recovery plan, one step at a time. The recon-
figuration messages are identified by a time stamp, a recovery plan identification number
and a sequence number that are validated by the controlled devices. If the communication
fails, it executes a user configurable number of retries. If none of the retries is successful,
it interrupts the reconfiguration and resumes to the other activities. Additionally, as the ap-
plicability of the recovery plan is limited by the representativity of the knowledge model,
the results of its execution may deviate to an undetermined extent from the expected re-
sults. In this context, as each step of the plan is executed, the systems and components
generate new events and alarms, as they would normally do, which are monitored and
used to update the knowledge model. If the smart grid assumes an unexpected configura-
tion between execution steps, the execution stops as the diagnosis activities are resumed.
It is possible to monitor its execution through the user interface. The following alternative
behaviors can be observed:
• Proposal-only mode - The recovery plan is presented in the user interface and the
reconfiguration terminates.
• Give priority to the operator’s actions - The recovery plan is presented in the user
interface and it waits for the operator’s validation. If there is new and related in-
formation during the waiting period, the proposal is withdrawn as the diagnosis
activities are resumed.
The reconfiguration steps must be logged, including which component, which configura-
tion, when and with which result, regarding the success or failure of the communication.
Controllers
There can be different numbers and types of controller modules for the various devices.
They send reconfiguration commands to the actuators within a self-healing domain, vali-
dating their reception within a user configurable time interval. The results are reported to
the reconfiguration module. They can send the commands through direct communications
with the systems and components (e.g., SCADA control devices, network, hosting and
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security equipment), or indirectly, through existing smart grid controllers (e.g., SCADA
server), in a similar manner to what was mentioned for the collectors. In both situations,
the controllers must use secure protocols.
Learning
The smart grid system or component’s configuration possibilities can be associated with a
calculated reliability value, which reflect the successes and failures of its use in recovery
plans. The learning module compares the expected results with the obtained results to
calculate and assign a new reliability value. All changes must be logged. The knowledge
model rules use this value to prioritize different reconfiguration sequences, when queried
by the recovery module.
Cooperation
A SHEE will contact or be contacted by other SHEEs in cases when the resources within
one’s self-healing domain, including the knowledge or control capabilities, are not suffi-
cient to perform or complete a thorough diagnosis, recovery planning and/or reconfigura-
tion. This situation occurs when a one or more related faults or the cause and/or impact
of a failure involves more than one self-healing domain or when a SHEE’s resources are
degraded or unavailable. For a better understanding, consider the following examples:
Example 1 Consider a SHEE that supervises the local systems in a primary substation
and another SHEE that controls that supervises the central systems perimeter secu-
rity. A malicious access from the central systems to the substation can be stopped
by adding rules to only one or to both firewalls. However, a reconfiguration on
only the substation firewall may leave other substations and automation cabinets
vulnerable, while the reconfiguration of the central firewall does not prevent the
malicious access to the substation if it instead comes from within the substation
WAN. Considering that the access is detected by the substation SHEE, it will con-
tact the second SHEE and they will cooperate to create and execute the optimal
recovery plan based on to their knowledge.
Example 2 Consider a third SHEE that supervises the local systems in another primary
substation, in addition to the SHEEs presented in Example 1. The malicious access
caused a fault in an IED in the first substation that resulted in an outage and in the
inoperability of the corresponding MV circuit breaker. Without the possibility to
recover the service by itself, the affected substation SHEE contacts the third SHEE,
which has also electrical connections to the affected electrical network sections
and sufficient electrical power to cover the corresponding electricity demand. They
cooperate to create and execute the optimal recovery plan based on their knowledge.
Chapter 3. Design 75
If there are several alternatives for cooperation, the SHEE will negotiate with the corre-
sponding SHEEs the creation and execution of the optimal recovery plan. There cannot
be common systems or components between any two self-healing domains to prevent
concurrency issues during reconfigurations. When a SHEE contacts another, each replica
sends to the second a set of fault and failure related facts. The second SHEE replicas
know which other SHEE replicas can request contact. Through a secure protocol, the
cooperation module at each second SHEE replica authenticates the requesters and waits
until a sufficient number of requests has been received. It also compares the requests with
one-another to check that they are the same and eventually disregard the requests that
act different from the majority. It submits queries to the knowledge module to assess the
available resources during negotiations. It delivers knowledge facts updates to the BFT
SMR module to reflect the received information in the knowledge module, triggering the
self-healing process internally.
Information Sources
The sources know which SHEE replicas require their information, how and on what
schedule. They connect to the SHEE replicas to send the required information, through
secure protocols. They handle information to the SHEE replicas only when it has been
requested by a sufficient number of authenticated replicas, also through secure protocols.
Controlled Devices
The controlled devices know which SHEE replicas require control over them. They ap-
ply the controls requested by the SHEE replicas only when it has been requested by a
sufficient number of authenticated replicas, through secure protocols. They validate the
command time stamp, recovery plan identification number and sequence number. The
received time stamps must be within a user configurable time interval, otherwise they
are discarded. They execute the messages corresponding to each plan sequentially and
in order. They execute the plans in order, discarding any non-executed messages from a
previous plan, upon the reception of commands from a new plan.
User Interface
The user interface module supports local and remote management, operation and mainte-
nance of a SHEE replica, enabling access and control over the knowledge, goals, queries,
users and related information, logs, cryptographic material and configurations, depend-
ing on the specific user access profile. It allows monitoring of the SHEE activities and
selection of the mode of operation.
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3.7.3 Non-functional Description
The non-functional description sets its focus on the functional modules of the non-functional
architecture, including the following.
SMR
The SMR module provides the BFT SMR service to the SHEE, by defining the ordered
batch of knowledge updates that are submitted to the knowledge module of each SHEE
replica at each time, based on the inputs provided by the collectors, cooperation and
learning modules.
Users
The users module enables addition, editing and removal of local users and directory ser-
vice profiles, providing local and enabling centralized authentication and authorization.
There is the possibility to enable fallback to the local credentials, when the directory ser-
vice is unavailable. The local users and directory service profiles can be associated with
different roles and resources.
Cryptography
The cryptography module provides cryptographic functions to other modules and han-
dles the corresponding cryptographic material, such as keys, communicating with specific
hardware when required. For example, the knowledge, goal and query and other SHEE
related information stored to disk is encrypted. The used secure protocols also encrypt
the communications with the information sources and controllers and between SHEE.
Backup
The backup module provides on-demand and scheduled backup of the knowledge, goals,
queries, users and related information, logs, cryptographic material and configurations of
the other modules.
Configuration
The configuration module allows the remote deployment of configurations and updates
to the other modules, including knowledge, goals, queries, backup schedules, addition,
editing and removal of users and related parameters, collectors, controllers, cryptographic
functions and material.
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Logging
The logging module logs the activities performed by the other modules, including changes
to the knowledge module, goals and queries, goal verification and query results, issued
commands, deployment of configurations, execution of backups and contacts by other
SHEE.
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Chapter 4
Implementation
This chapter describes a POC implementation of the knowledge related components of the
SHEE, including its validation and a discussion of the overall solution. It starts with the
selection of the self-healing domain, including its systems, components and services, cre-
ation of the corresponding knowledge model, from the ontology to the facts and rules, and
the definition of the monitoring, diagnosis and recovery goals and queries. Then, it sup-
ports the research hypothesis and validates the SHS concept as a solution to the research
problem, defining the validation methodology, the input knowledge for three complexity
increasing scenarios and presenting the corresponding results and analysis. It also val-
idates the solution robustness. Finally, it discusses a set of design and implementation
issues that, being critical to the security and robustness of the SHS, depend on each smart
grid specific context.
4.1 Chapter Overview
A SHEE is defined by the assigned self-healing domain, the monitoring capabilities, the
knowledge, the goals and queries and the control capabilities. In this regard, the POC
implementation includes the following steps:
1. The selection of the self-healing domain, which comprises a set of primary substa-
tion components from the electrical, the control, the communications, the physical
security and the cyber security layers, which support the electricity distribution pro-
cess and the local and remote operation of the substation. This set was chosen for its
diversity in terms of included smart grid processes and architecture layers, which
allows to focus our efforts on a well-delimited test case, while allowing to draw
conclusions that expectedly apply also to other domains that contain the same set
or a subset of the same processes and layers.
2. The components are mapped to classes, properties and individuals of an ontology,
from which we extract knowledge facts to create the knowledge model. The facts
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reflect the existing relations between the ontology individuals (i.e., the domain com-
ponents) from the moment when they are asserted to the knowledge model until the
moment when they are removed.
3. The SHEE attempts to solve a connectivity problem, attending to the cyber-physical
connectivity that enables the availability of the electricity distribution process and
of the local and remote operation of the substation. For this purpose, we define and
assert reasoning rules that enable iterations over the domain components to verify
the existence of connectivity enabling operational conditions, while modeling their
behavior.
4. We define the goals and queries which are used by the monitoring, diagnosis, recov-
ery, reconfiguration, cooperation and learning agent behaviors to query the knowl-
edge model.
In the following, we validate the implementation, giving evidence that the hypotheses
of Section 3.2.3 holds in practice and that the SHS concept is a solution to the research
problem. For this purpose, we make three slightly modified versions of the developed
knowledge model, corresponding to different fault and failure scenarios. The models are
loaded into a standalone Prolog inference engine - SWI-Prolog [80] - to which the goals
and queries are submitted in an ordered sequence, simulating the behavior of a SHEE
replica through the different states of the self-healing process for each scenario. In this
regard, only the knowledge model code was implemented in the scope of the POC. The
software code for the remaining modules is left for future work. The robustness of the
proposed solution is validated by explaining how it prevents a set of liveness and safety
compromising scenarios.
Still within the scope of the current work, there is a set of design and implementation
issues that, being critical to the security and robustness of the SHS, depend on each smart
grid specific context. In this regard, we provide guidance for the following:
• The SHS must be integrated with existing electrical network self-healing and secu-
rity automation solutions, avoiding concurrency situations and fostering synergies
that are only possible through their integration.
• It can take advantage of the existing smart grid infrastructure, namely, of the ex-
isting communications infrastructure, information repositories and smart grid con-
trollers, avoiding the deployment of a self-healing specific communications infras-
tructure and the direct connection with the sensors and actuators, which may require
the implementation of certain safety measures.
• It might be possible to implement a SHEE starting from the existing electrical net-
work self-healing and security automation solutions, which demonstrate some of
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the supervision behaviors required by the SHEE modules and are already capable
of collecting the required information and controlling certain smart grid compo-
nents.
• It is limited in its decisions and actions by the available resources, which include
the monitoring and control capabilities, the knowledge and the goals and queries.
Therefore, the design and implementation of the required collectors and controllers,
the use of secure and dependable communication channels and the definition of an
enabling knowledge representation, populated with the required facts, rules and
queries, are essential to a successful execution of the self-healing process.
• Its correct execution depends on its distribution granularity, on an adequate number
of replicas per SHEE and on a proper replica distribution. Therefore, these steps
should ensure an acceptable risk to the smart grid network locations, regarding
partitioning, and to the unique points of failure between SHEE replicas.
The proper design and implementation decisions contribute to a successful and correct
execution of the self-healing process by the SHS. They also provide relevant information
regarding the cause and impact of failures that might be used to reduce incident response
times and to prevent incident recurrences.
4.2 Proof of Concept
For proof of concept, we make an initial implementation of a SHEE - SHEE1 - focusing
mainly on its knowledge model and reasoning capabilities. It comprises the selection
of a representative self-healing domain, the modeling of the domain’s components and
their behavior, the definition of the corresponding facts and rules for the knowledge base
and the definition of the goals and queries for the monitoring, diagnosis and recovery
activities.
4.2.1 Self-healing Domain
The self-healing domain contains the systems, components and services of a primary sub-
station, as depicted in Figure 4.1. It is a subset of the smart grid components previously
depicted in Figure 3.3. In the current implementation, we will use: the electrical switch
(ES9), the corresponding IED (IED9), the substation controller (SC1), the HMI (HMI1),
two switches (SW1 and SW2), the firewall (FW1), the perimeter router with integrated
firewall (RT1), the physical access control system (DO1), the electricity distribution pro-
cess, the local and remote operation of the substation.
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Figure 4.1: Self-healing domain.
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4.2.2 Knowledge Modeling
SHEE1 supervises the physical and communications connectivity between the compo-
nents in its self-healing domain. In this regard, it assumes that this connectivity is re-
quired to ensure the availability of the SCADA service for the local operation and remote
operation of the substation. It supervises the electrical connectivity, which is required
for the electricity distribution process. It also supervises the compliance of the current
configurations with the planned configurations. For instance, when an electrical switch
is closed, it is allowing the passing of electricity through the circuit. Similarly, when a
firewall has an allow rule for any given source and target, it is allowing communication
between the two endpoints. Assuming that the switch is open and that the source of the
communication is Substation Controller 1 and the target is IED9. If the firewall rule is
illegitimately removed and assuming that the default is to deny all communications, it will
not be possible to control the IED to close the switch. The created recovery plans comply
with the planned configurations and contribute to the compliance of the components’ con-
figurations. Therefore, a fault in the firewall configurations caused a connectivity failure,
which caused a failure in the SCADA service with impact in the electricity distribution
process.
In this context, we define a set of knowledge facts that represent the domain compo-
nents’ information, including their configurations, connections and relations. We define a
set of rules that model the components’ behaviors and enable iterations over the compo-
nents’ information. We also define the goals and queries that use these rules to verify the
existence of connectivity enabling configurations, to diagnose configuration faults and
to create recovery plans. In the following sections, we use a few examples to further
explain the defined knowledge facts and rules. The Appendix B contains the complete
implemented knowledge base that we use in the functional validation.
Component Description
A detailed representation of the self-healing components is depicted in Figure 4.2, includ-
ing the modeled interfaces, internal and external connections. For example, the router
with firewall RT1 comprises the following interfaces and connections.
• Ethernet interface 2 (ETH2) - It is connected with the Core interface, supporting
communications from the outside to the router core. The enabled and allowed com-
munications depend on the configured routes and firewall rules, respectively. A
firewall rule must be configured in an interface and contain a source, a target and a
permission, the last being allowed or denied 1. A route must also be configured in
an interface and indicate that the source or target host is behind that interface. In
1It is assumed that RT1 implements a stateful firewall, allowing also the replies that match a correspond-
ing established session.
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Figure 4.2: Detailed self-healing domain components.
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this regard, it has one route and one firewall rule configured, enabling the commu-
nications back to SCADA1 and allowing communications between SCADA1 and
SC1.
• Core interface (CORE) - It represents the router core, being connected with the Eth-
ernet Interface 1 and supporting the communications between the several interfaces.
• Ethernet interface 1 (ETH1) - It enables and allows communications, depending on
the configured routes and firewall rules, respectively. In this regard, it has one route
and one firewall rule configured, enabling the communications forward to SC1 and
allowing communications between SCADA1 and SC1.
The firewall configurations, for example, are verified and validated according to the
following reasoning rules:
• Required configuration - To allow communications between a source and a target
hosts in a certain interface, it must be configured with a firewall rule that allows
communications between both.
• Monitoring - The communications are allowed if the current state reflects the re-
quired rule.
• Diagnosis - If there is a rule denying the required communications or if there are no
configured rules, then that is a faulty configuration that is contributing the commu-
nications failure.
• Recovery - If there is a rule with the wrong permission, then it must be changed. If
there are no configured rules, then a new rule must be configured to allow commu-
nications between the required source and target hosts.
SCADA1 is a special component in relation to the remaining (see bottom of Figure
4.2). It is not monitored by SHEE1 but the latter knows of its existence through SHEE2.
SCADA1 is contained in SHEE2’s self-healing domain or in a domain previous to that.
Therefore, there must be cooperation between at least the two aforementioned SHEEs
during the diagnosis and recovery activities.
In addition to firewall and routing, the implementation includes a set of controls re-
lated with switching, authentication, operating modes and electrical switch position. For
some components, such as SC1, HMI1, IED9, ES9 and DO1, we consider the existence
of planned configurations or policies for the aforementioned controls. For instance, the
planned configurations might require that a certain set of local users is configured in the
operating system or the application, which is the case of HMI1 and DO1. It might require
the setting of a certain operating mode, as in SC1 and IED9, where, in the latter case, it
is not controllable by the SHEE. It might also require the ES9 to be in a certain state. In
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this context, the authentication configurations are verified and validated according to the
following reasoning rules:
• Required configuration - To allow the access of a user to an interface. Then, that
user must be configured in that interface.
• Monitoring - The access is and should be allowed if the current state reflects the
required configuration and it complies with the planned configuration.
• Diagnosis - The current configurations are faulty in the following scenarios.
1. The current configurations reflect the required configuration. However, they
are not compliant with the planned configurations.
2. The current configurations do not reflect the required configuration which
complies with the planned configuration.
3. The current configurations comply with the planned configurations but neither
complies with the required configuration.
• Recovery - In scenario 1, the user must be removed from the interface configura-
tions. In scenario 2, it must be configured. In scenario 3, the user cannot be con-
figured because it does not comply with the planned configurations, which should
generate an alarm.
Facts
The set of facts corresponding to the RT1 description is depicted in Figure B.1, written
in the Prolog programming language [81]. A string with the structure < predicate > (<
atom1 >,< atom2 >,< atom3 >) is called a clause. A single clause is a fact. The first
fact says that RT1 is a component of the router type. The second to fourth facts say that
it has three interfaces. The first is of the core type, while the others are of the ethernet
type. The fifth to ninth facts refer to the connections between the interfaces. The tenth
and eleventh fact say that in a firewall rule deny and allow have opposing connotations.
These support the communications, depending on the firewall and routing configurations
at each interface. The last facts define the current state, including the configured routes
and firewall rules.
Rules
The set of rules corresponding to firewall and authentication are depicted in Figures
B.13 and B.14, also written in the Prolog programming language. There are monitor-
ing, diagnosis and recovery rules defined for each control. A string with the structure
< clause1 >: − < clause2 >,< clause3 >,< clausen > is a rule. For example,
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the second rule of the Figure B.13 defines that the firewall configuration is correct if the
monitored interface contains a rule with the right parameters in its current state. The cor-
responding rule in Figure B.14 defines that the user configuration is correct if the required
configuration (to allow a given user access) is allowed by the planned configuration, here
represented by the policy predicate, and that user is configured in the monitored interface.
The rules in Figures B.18 to B.24 allow recursive iterations over the previous facts
and rules, defining each self-healing activity’s work flow. For instance, in a similar way,
the monitoring and diagnosis recursive rules iterate over the monitoring and diagnosis
rules that are specific to each component, validating the configurations and, in the second
case, identifying faulty configurations. The diagnosis creates a diagnostic - a list of con-
figurations with indication of the reason why they did not pass the validation. This list is
submitted to the recovery, which iterates over the configurations and employs the com-
ponents specific recovery rules to assign reconfigurations. The result is a reconfiguration
plan that would be submitted to the reconfiguration module.
4.2.3 Goals and Queries
The knowledge facts and rules are loaded into an inference engine so that they can be
queried by a user or, in this case, by the SHEE modules. A query has the same structure
as a fact. However, the values of some atoms might not be defined, requiring the infer-
ence engine to deduce them. In the chosen self-healing domain, the SHEE supervises
the electrical connectivity between the electrical network components, the communica-
tions, the physical access to the substation and the SCADA service that supports the local
and remote operations. Its goals are to detect and heal faulty configurations, preventing
and recovering from service failures. Therefore, we define the following queries for the
monitoring, diagnosis and recovery activities:
• Monitoring:
– monitor(scada, scada1 : app1, es9 : el2, ). - Monitors the SCADA service,
focusing on communications originated at SCADA1 that have impact in the
electrical connectivity at ES9.
– monitor(scada, do1 : phy2, es9 : el2, ). - Monitors the SCADA service,
considering a physical access from the outside of DO1 with impact in the
electrical connectivity at ES9.
• Diagnosis:
– diagnose(scada, scada1 : app1, es9 : el2, , DiagnosisResult). - Diagnosis
the configurations required by the SCADA service, focusing on communica-
tions originated at SCADA1 that have impact in the electrical connectivity at
ES9.
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– diagnose(scada, do1 : phy2, es9 : el2, , DiagnosisResult). - Diagnosis the
configurations required by the SCADA service, considering a physical access
from the outside of DO1 with impact in the electrical connectivity at ES9.
• Recovery:
– recover(scada, scada1 : app1, es9 : el2, , RecoveryP lan). - Returns the
plan required to recover the SCADA service, focusing on communications
originated at SCADA1 that have impact in the electrical connectivity at ES9.
– recover(scada, do1 : phy2, es9 : el2, , RecoveryP lan). - Returns the plan
required to recover the SCADA service, considering a physical access from
the outside of DO1 with impact in the electrical connectivity at ES9.
It is also possible to query the communications, electrical and physical layers directly
by replacing the ”scada” atom with, for example, ”electrical”. Moreover, we use a ” ”
in the queries because we do not require the rules to consider a specific user. However,
if a specific user must be supervised, the corresponding atom can be replaced with, for
example, ”alice”.
4.3 Functional Validation
The functional validation targets the initial implementation of the knowledge base, the
goals and the queries.
4.3.1 Methodology
The facts and rules were loaded into a standalone Prolog inference engine - SWI Prolog -
to which a set of goals and queries were submitted in an ordered sequence, simulating the
behavior of the SHEE through the different stages of the self-healing process (see Figure
4.3), for three different fault and/or failure scenarios. Remembering the purpose of each
self-healing stage, after a knowledge update (see Figure 4.3a), the monitoring activity
will be triggered and the SHEE will validate the components’ configurations. In Figure
4.3b, it detects faulty configurations in ES9, which are causing a failure in the electricity
distribution process. In the diagnosis activity (see Figure 4.3c), it associates the fault with
an unknown user in HMI1. In the recovery activity (see Figure 4.3d), it creates a recovery
plan that includes the removal of the unknown user. Other plans could be possible, such
as to deny the communications from HMI1 or even SC1 in FW1. The results should
be equivalent to using a software agent implementation, which is due to the fact that, by
design, the intelligence of a SHEE is embedded in its knowledge model, goals and queries
- not in its software code.
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(a) Knowledge update.
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(b) Monitoring.
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(c) Diagnosis.
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(d) Recovery.
Figure 4.3: Self-healing cycle.
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4.3.2 Scenario 1:
A Firewall Reconfiguration
PS1 is a new substation that will be inaugurated in a few days by the Blue Planet 2 DSO.
However, they are having problems with the communications to SCADA1. SHEE1 was
just activated and it is supervising the corresponding self-healing domain.
Knowledge
The same as in Appendix B, with the following changes. In RT1, we remove the correct
rule (with the source scada1 : app1) and we add a faulty rule (with the source scaadaa1 :
app1). In SC1, we change the SC1 mode from local to remote in the current and planned
configurations.
• To the RT1 firewall rules:
– Remove currentState(rt1 : eth1, fwRule, (allow, scada1 : app1, sc1 :
app1)).
– Add currentState(rt1 : eth1, fwRule, (allow, scaadaa1 : app1, sc1 : app1)).
• To the SC1 mode:
– Remove policy(sc1 : app1, scmode, (local)).
– Remove currentState(sc1 : app1, scmode, (local)).
– Add policy(sc1 : app1, scmode, (remote)).
– Add currentState(sc1 : app1, scmode, (remote)).
Results
The results are depicted in Figure 4.4.
Analysis
The SHEE discovers that the current RT1 firewall configurations do not include a rule to
allow the traffic between SCADA1 and SC1 ((rt1:eth1, noFwRule, allow, scada1:app1,
sc1:app1)). Therefore, it creates a recovery plan, where the aforementioned rule is added
to the interface ETH1 ((rt1:eth1, addFwRule, allow, scada1:app1, sc1:app1)). Moreover,
as SCADA1 is associated with another SHEE - SHEE2 - it would ask for the coopera-
tion of this SHEE to supervise the path from SCADA1 that is outside of its self-healing
domain.
2Blue Planet, Alice, Albert and Bob are fictional entities invented and used for the sole purpose of this
work.
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Figure 4.4: Scenario 1 results.
4.3.3 Scenario 2:
The Consequences of an Incomplete Knowledge Base
The recovery plan created by SHEE1 was sufficient to recover the SCADA service. The
current scenario occurs immediately after these events. Alice, an installation team mem-
ber from the SCADA provider company, is attempting to login to HMI1. However, HMI1
is replying that Alice credentials are invalid.
Knowledge
The same as in Scenario 1, with the following changes. In HMI1, we remove the planned
configurations related to Alice’s user from the application (hmi1:app1) and from the oper-
ating system (hmi1:os1). In DO1, we do the same for the physical access control system
(do1:phy2).
• To the HMI1 users:
– Remove policy(hmi1 : os1, user, (alice)).
– Remove policy(hmi1 : app1, user, (alice)).
• To the DO1 users:
– Remove policy(do1 : phy2, user, (alice)).
Results
The results are depicted in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Scenario 2 results.
Analysis
The installation team activated SHEE1 without updating the planned configurations, which
do not include Alice’s user in DO1 ((do1: phy2, userNAByPol, alice)), neither in HMI1’s
operating system and application ((hmi1:os1, userNAByPol, alice) and (hmi1:app1, userN-
AByPol, alice)). These were already defined considering an ongoing situation in which
the installation team has no access to HMI1. Therefore, SHEE1 created a recovery plan
in which user Alice is removed from DO1 ((do1:phy2, removeUser, alice)) and from
HMI1 ((hmi1:os1, removeUser, alice) and (hmi1:app1, removeUser, alice)). She has no
authorization to enter the substation or log in to HMI1. Moreover, if she leaves the sub-
station she will not be able to reenter to access IED9 or ES9. SHEE1 detected also that
SC1 is configured to remote mode and this is compliant with the planned configurations
(sc1:app1, scmodeNAPolNConf, local) and (sc1:app1, scmodeLimByPolicy)). Therefore,
even if Alice could log in, she would not be able to switch and maintain SC1 in local
mode until the planned configurations are previously changed. SHEE1 creates two more
recovery plans, one for each possible physical access path to the domain components.
4.3.4 Scenario 3:
Physical Security and SCADA
The installation team updates the planned configurations to restore Alice’s access and
add Albert’s access, which are required to finish HMI1 installation. The SC1 mode
planned configuration is also changed to local to permit the local operation of the sub-
station through HMI1.
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Knowledge
The same as in Scenario 2, with the following changes. In HMI1, we remove Alice’s user
from the current configurations but we add it to the planned configurations, together with
Albert’s user. We do the same in DO1. In SC1, we change the mode from remote to local
in the planned configurations.
• To the HMI1 users:
– Remove currentState(hmi1 : app1, user, (alice)).
– Remove currentState(hmi1 : os1, user, (alice)).
– Add policy(hmi1 : app1, user, (alice)).
– Add policy(hmi1 : app1, user, (albert)).
– Add policy(hmi1 : os1, user, (alice)).
– Add policy(hmi1 : os1, user, (albert)).
• To the SC1 mode:
– Remove policy(sc1 : app1, scmode, (remote)).
– Add policy(sc1 : app1, scmode, (local)).
• To the DO1 users:
– Remove currentState(do1 : phy2, user, (alice)).
– Add policy(do1 : phy2, user, (alice)).
– Add policy(do1 : phy2, user, (albert)).
Results
The results are depicted in Figure 4.6.
Analysis
SHEE1 detects that there are users allowed by the planned configurations that are not
configured, referring to Alice and Albert in DO1 and HMI1’s operating system and ap-
plication ((do1: phy2, userNotConfigured, alice), (hmi1:os1, userNotConfigured, alice),
(hmi1:app1, userNotConfigured, alice), (do1: phy2, userNotConfigured, albert), (hmi1:
os1, userNotConfigured, albert), hmi1:app1, userNotConfigured, albert)). It also detects
that the planned configurations permit the SC1 mode to be set to local, which is required
for local operation. It is simply not configured in the SC1 application ((sc1:app1, sc-
modeNotConfigured, local)). Therefore, it creates a recovery plan that includes the con-
figuration of these users and the change of SC1 Mode to local. In this regard, Alice’s
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Figure 4.6: Scenario 3 results.
and Albert’s users are added to DO1 and HMI1’s operating system and application ((do1:
phy2, addUser, alice), (hmi1:os1, addUser, alice), (hmi1:app1, addUser, alice), (do1:
phy2, addUser, albert), (hmi1:os1, addUser, albert) and hmi1:app1, addUser, albert)).
The SC1 mode is set to local ((sc1:app1, changeScmodeTo, local)).
4.3.5 Scenario 4:
An Electrical Failure in a Compromised Infrastructure
After the events in Scenario 3, Alice’s and Albert’s users are removed from the systems
and SC1 mode is set to remote, with the correct update of the planned configurations. One
month latter, during a stormy night, the operators loose communications to the substation
and ES9 is opened without their intervention.
Knowledge
The same as in Scenario 3, with the following changes. In RT1, we remove the routes
and the firewall rules from both ethernet interfaces (rt1:eth1 and rt1:eth2). In HMI1,
we remove Alice’s and Albert’s users from the current configurations and we add Bob’s
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user. These users are also removed from the planned configurations of DO1. In SC1, we
change the mode from local to remote. In ES9, we change the current configuration of
the mechanism (es9:me1) from closed to open.
• To the RT1 routes and rules:
– Remove currentState(rt1 : eth1, route, (sc1 : app1)).
– Remove currentState(rt1 : eth2, route, (scada1 : app1)).
– Remove currentState(rt1 : eth1, fwRule, (allow, scada1 : app1, sc1 :
app1)).
– Remove currentState(rt1 : eth2, fwRule, (allow, scada1 : app1, sc1 :
app1)).
• To the HMI1 users:
– Remove policy(hmi1 : app1, user, (alice)).
– Remove policy(hmi1 : os1, user, (alice)).
– Remove policy(hmi1 : app1, user, (albert)).
– Remove policy(hmi1 : os1, user, (albert)).
– Add currentState(hmi1 : app1, user, (bob)).
• To the SC1 mode:
– Remove policy(sc1 : app1, scmode, (local)).
– Add policy(sc1 : app1, scmode, (remote)).
• To the ES9 position:
– Remove currentState(es9 : me1, position, (closed)).
– Add currentState(es9 : me1, position, (opened)).
• To the DO1 users:
– Remove policy(do1 : phy2, user, (alice)).
– Remove policy(do1 : phy2, user, (albert)).
Results
The results are depicted in Figure 4.7.
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(a) Scenario 4 results regarding the remote operation.
(b) Scenario 4 results regarding the local operation.
Figure 4.7: Scenario 4 results.
Analysis
In this scenario, SHEE1 detected the opened ES9, which is not in compliance with the
planned configurations ((es9:me1, positionNAByPol, opened, closed)), causing a failure
in the electricity distribution process. It also detects an unknown user in the operating
system of HMI1 - Bob - and faulty firewall and routing configurations in RT1. Bob
is not known in the planned configurations ((hmi1:os1, userNAByPol, bob)). There are
no routes in RT1’s ETH2 and ETH1 to enable communications back to SCADA1 and
forward to SC1, respectively ((rt1:eth2, noRoute, scada1:app1) and (rt1:eth1, noRoute,
sc1:app1)). There are no firewall rules at the same interfaces to allow communications
between SCADA1 and SC1 ((rt1:eth2, noFwRule, allow, scada1:app1, sc1:app1) and
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(rt1:eth1, noFwRule, allow, scada1:app1, sc1:app1)). Therefore, it creates a recovery
plan with the necessary configurations. Bob is removed from HMI1’s operating system
((hmi1:os1, removeUser, bob)). Routes are added to RT1’s ETH2 and ETH1 to enable
the aforementioned communications ((rt1:eth2, addRoute, scada1:app1),, (rt1:eth1, ad-
dRoute, sc1:app1)). The same happens with the firewall rules ((rt1:eth2, addFwRule, al-
low, scada1:app1, sc1:app1) and (rt1:eth1, addFwRule, allow, scada1:app1, sc1:app1)).
ES9 is also closed ((es9:me1, close, closed)). Like in Scenario 1, it would ask for the co-
operation of SHEE2 to supervise the path from SCADA1 that is outside of its self-healing
domain. With just the current knowledge, SHEE1 is not capable to determine the origin of
the intrusion. If it happens again, SHEE1 will create a new recovery plan and reapply the
configurations to the self-healing domain components. Moreover, in the possible event of
an unsuccessful ES9 reconfiguration, it would consider alternative plans, including asking
for the cooperation of other SHEEs supervising substations that are connected to its own.
4.4 Security Validation
A set of security requirements was employed in the design of the SHS. These require-
ments were obtained through a threat and vulnerability assessment and identification of
security and dependability controls. A robust implementation of these controls provides
the required protection to the SHS.
4.5 Robustness Validation
To validate the robustness of the proposed solution, we analyze a set of scenarios in which
the following definitions of liveness and safety are compromised and we provide an ex-
planation regarding how they are prevented.
• Liveness - The SHS should execute continuously from its setup to the end of its life
cycle, between programmed interruptions.
• Safety - The SHS’s actions and/or proposals are based only on up-to-date informa-
tion collected from the smart grid systems and components.
4.5.1 Liveness Validation
The liveness validation focus on the interactions between modules, with the smart grid
systems and components and with other SHEE.
The collectors stop collecting information.
The collectors are triggered by connections from the smart grid information sources and
by scheduled events. By design, they will only stop collecting information if the sources
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stay silent or if there are no scheduled events. Both situations can be prevented by ade-
quate setup and maintenance of the SHS.
The SMR module halts indefinitely.
Assuming that at least n − f replicas are available, the BFT SMR protocol executes
continuously within the SMR module and between the different replicas.
The self-healing process is stopped between cycles.
The monitor is triggered by the knowledge module updates. Therefore, it will not be
triggered if there are no knowledge updates. Assuming that the collectors are working
correctly and with at most f faulty replicas, there being no knowledge updates means that
the smart grid state stays unchanged since the previous update. This is an acceptable sit-
uation. Regarding the diagnosis, recovery and reconfiguration activities, each is triggered
by the ending of the corresponding previous activity.
The reconfiguration halts indefinitely when controlling the smart grid.
At each reconfiguration step, the reconfiguration module asks the controllers to send a
command to a certain smart grid system or component. It then waits during a user con-
figurable time period for a confirmation that the command was successfully delivered. If
it receives a confirmation, it proceeds to confirm the reconfiguration success or failure in
the knowledge base. If the reconfiguration was successful, it resumes to the next recon-
figuration step. If it receives no confirmation, it retries for a user configurable number of
tries. If there is still no delivery confirmation or if the reconfiguration result is different
from what was expected, it resumes with the remaining activities.
A self-healing activity halts indefinitely when asking for cooperation.
A SHEE requires cooperation from other SHEE when its self-healing domain resources
are not sufficient to perform a thorough diagnosis, recovery planning and/or reconfigura-
tion. In this scenario, it requests cooperation from the SHEEs in contiguous self-healing
domains, sending to them information regarding the fault and/or failure. Then, it waits for
diagnosis information or recovery/reconfiguration proposals during a user configurable
time period. Upon receiving a sufficient number of consistent messages from the corre-
sponding replicas for each information or proposal within a user configurable time period,
it uses the information for diagnosis or it chooses a combination of proposals that mini-
mizes the number of reconfigurations and impact in the smart grid. If it does not receive
any information or proposals within a user configurable time period or if they are not suf-
ficient, a warning is posted in the user interface. In recovery, it accepts the proposals that
contribute to restoring the smart grid to a planned configuration or improve its state and,
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consequently, the states of the supported processes. If the acceptance is acknowledged,
requiring again a sufficient number of consistent messages, it proceeds to the reconfigura-
tion. If it is denied, it resumes to a following self-healing cycle, repeating the negotiation.
The cooperation activity halts or reserves requested resources indefinitely.
The cooperation module executes in parallel with the remaining activities. As a SHEE
receives cooperation requests from other SHEEs, it stores each in memory until a suffi-
cient number of consistent messages have been received from the corresponding replicas.
If new requests from the same SHEE are received, requiring again a sufficient number of
consistent messages, the previous are discarded. It processes and replies to the requests
as the number of received consistent messages complies with the previous requirement.
The reply comprises a reconfiguration proposal to which a set of resources might be tem-
porarily allocated in the knowledge model. This reconfiguration will only be applied
upon its acceptance by the other SHEE, requiring again a sufficient number of consistent
messages. If it is not accepted after a user configurable time period, the resources are re-
leased. If the acceptance is received after this period and the resources are still available,
then the knowledge model is updated with the necessary information to trigger the self-
healing process that will provide the required reconfiguration. The requester is notified
of this action. If not, the reconfiguration is denied, requiring the requester to restart the
negotiation.
4.5.2 Safety Validation
The safety validation focus on the contents of the knowledge model, the coordination
between replicas and the command execution in the smart grid systems and components.
A cooperating SHEE or the smart grid systems and components execute replayed,
outdated and/or out-of-sequence requests or commands.
The employment of secure protocols prevents this scenario from happening at commu-
nications level. At application level, the issued commands and cooperation requests are
marked with a time stamp, a reconfiguration plan identification and a sequence number.
If the message is older than a user configurable time period, it is discarded. If it corre-
sponds to a new reconfiguration plan, the messages corresponding to a previous plan are
disregarded. If it arrives out of sequence, it will be stored in memory until the previous
messages have arrived. Moreover, each request or command is only processed after a
sufficient number of consistent messages from the replicas are received.
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The knowledge is outdated.
As we have previously explained, the collectors collect smart grid information continu-
ously, as long as there is activity from the smart grid information sources and/or scheduled
events. Only timely information is processed and in the right sequence. Moreover, the
SMR module executes continuously, as long as n − f replicas are available. The in-
formation batches delivered from the SMR to the knowledge module are updated to the
knowledge model. Therefore, if there are smart grid events, they will be reflected in the
knowledge model. If less then n − f replicas are available, the knowledge model is not
updated. In this scenario, there being no updates means that the monitoring activity is not
triggered. Therefore, it does not work with the outdated knowledge.
The self-healing activities in different replicas consider different smart grid infor-
mation in the same execution cycle.
All the collected smart grid information that is relevant to the knowledge module is sub-
mitted to the SMR module. By using a SMR protocol, the latter coordinates between the
replicas which information will be submitted to the knowledge module in each batch and
by which order. The knowledge module at each replica eventually updates the knowledge
model, creates a copy of it and triggers the monitoring activity. All the activities work
with this copy during the current self-healing cycle. Therefore, the self-healing activities
in different replicas consider the same knowledge in the same execution cycle.
The different replicas decide different reconfiguration plans.
The knowledge model at different replicas contains the same facts and rules in the same
order for the same self-healing cycle. Likewise, the remaining modules at different repli-
cas contain the same goals and queries. Moreover, we have already shown that the self-
healing activities in different replicas consider the same knowledge in the same execution
cycle. Therefore, the monitoring, diagnosis and recovery provide the same results in dif-
ferent replicas, which, consequently, decide the same reconfiguration plan.
A reconfiguration proceeds disregarding the consequences of its middle steps.
During a reconfiguration, the corresponding module compares the resulting smart grid
reconfiguration and consequences with what it expects from issuing a command at each
step. If there is a divergence between both, the current reconfiguration is interrupted and
the self-healing process is resumed to a next cycle. Moreover, during a reconfiguration,
new self-healing cycles are triggered by the knowledge updates. In each cycle, the mon-
itoring, diagnosis and recovery activities create a new recovery plan which is compared
with the ongoing reconfiguration. If it is consistent, the new plan is discarded. If it is in-
consistent, the ongoing reconfiguration is interrupted and a new reconfiguration is started,
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based on the new recovery plan.
The SHEE modules work with inconsistent knowledge.
The monitor validates the knowledge consistency through the comparison of redundant
knowledge. If an inconsistency is detected, a warning is posted in the user interface and
the inconsistent information is disregarded by the self-healing activities. To allow this
comparison, the deployment should enable the SHS connectivity with redundant smart
grid information sources.
The cooperating SHEE or the smart grid systems and components execute illegiti-
mately altered requests and/or commands.
By employing secure communication protocols, the SHEE and the smart grid systems
and components validate the integrity of the received messages. Moreover, each request
or command is only processed after a sufficient number of messages from the replicas
are received, which are compared with each other to validate their consistency. In this
context, if a request or command is considered invalid, it is disregarded.
The cooperating SHEE or the smart grid systems and components execute requests
and commands from anyone, including faulty or malicious replicas.
A SHEE knows the SHEEs in contiguous self-healing domains, from which it might re-
ceive cooperation requests. Likewise, the smart grid systems and components know the
SHEE corresponding to their self-healing domain. When establishing communications
and by using secure protocols, both authenticate the other party. Moreover, each request
or command is only processed after a sufficient number of consistent messages from the
replicas are received. Therefore, only known, authenticated and replica consistent re-
quests and commands are processed.
4.6 Discussion
There are design and implementation issues that depend on each specific smart grid con-
text, namely, the deployed infrastructure, specific risks, company’s policies, financial as-
pects and project deadlines, some of which have already been mentioned in Chapter 3.
To deal with these issues, we created a flexible and agile SHS that achieves these prop-
erties through its modularity and knowledge-based reasoning. In this regard, different
SHEE collectors and controllers can be added to communicate with different information
sources and controlled devices. The knowledge rules, goals and queries can be updated
to reflect the behavior of these components and the supervision of new services. The
level of distribution and replication can also be adapted, depending on specific needs. In
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the following sections, we raise what we consider to be the most relevant issues when
implementing the SHEE, providing guidance for future deployments.
4.6.1 Creating a Self-healing Ecosystem
A smart grid might already have other electrical network self-healing and cyber security
automation solutions deployed. Depending on what the purpose and behavior of each
specific solution, the DSO or manufacturer must decide to separate the scope of these
solutions from the scope of the SHS or to integrate both. If the choice is to separate the
scopes, then the smart grid systems and components of the deployed solutions must be
excluded from any SHEE self-healing domain, to avoid concurrency between the auto-
matic actions of both. If the choice is to integrate both, then the necessary collectors and
controllers must be developed and/or integrated in the SHEEs that will have the afore-
mentioned solutions in their self-healing domain. The knowledge rules, goals and queries
must be adapted to the corresponding facts so that the decisions and actions of the SHS
are coordinated with the actions and state of these solutions.
4.6.2 Using the Existing Infrastructure in the SHS
The SHS can take advantage of an already deployed SCADA infrastructure to have ac-
cess to the smart grid components, information and control capabilities, both at the local
systems and central systems levels, avoiding the deployment of a dedicated self-healing
infrastructure and despite creating an additional dependence. For example, in a smart grid
as a whole self-healing domain, a SHEE hosted at a data center could take advantage of
the neighbor SCADA server and of the network, hosting and security monitors (e.g., a
SIEM or other monitoring platform) to have complete visibility over the smart grid. The
communication protocols required by each SHEE depend on deciding how it will collect
each necessary piece of information and send each reconfiguration command - by itself
versus taking advantage of the deployed information repositories and smart grid con-
trollers - in the context of its self-healing domain. SHEE collectors and controllers must
be developed to support the necessary protocols. A rough comparison between using a
dedicated self-healing communications infrastructure and using a shared communications
infrastructure is presented in Table 4.1.
SHEE Support for Control and Data Acquisition
The monitoring and control of the sensors and actuators and of the SCADA control sys-
tems and components commonly requires the support for standard-based protocols at the
field level and for proprietary protocols at the data center level, which have been identified
in the Section 2.4.9. For the field level, there are currently two main open source imple-
mentations of IEC 61850 and IEC 60870-5-104 communication protocols: libIEC61850
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[82], in Java, and OpenMUC [83], in standard C, which can be used as basis for the SHEE
implementation.
Table 4.1: Self-healing communications infrastructure deployment comparison.
Type Advantages Disadvantages
Dedicated It can be designed for the specific
self-healing use case;
It is necessary to deploy a new com-
munications infrastructure;
It is only exposed to its own risks. It may be necessary to imple-
ment proprietary communication li-
braries;
It is necessary to implement the
necessary safety procedures.
Shared The communications infrastructure
is already deployed;
Possibly, the existing communica-
tions infrastructure needs to be re-
inforced;
Some of the required data has al-
ready been centralized by SCADA,
health, performance and security
monitoring components.
It may be necessary to imple-
ment proprietary communication li-
braries.
The IEC 62351 series (namely, the IEC 62351-3:2014 and IEC TS 62351-4:2007)
and the IEC TS 60870-5-7:2013 define the security extensions for IEC 61850 and IEC
60870-5-104, respectively. Regarding the data center level, as most SCADA servers im-
plementations are proprietary, the manufacturers must be involved in the SHEE imple-
mentation process. Even if the monitoring is accomplished through the direct connection
to the servers’ databases with a read-only profile, while complying to the in-place security
controls and without going through the application, the manufacturer must still provide
information about the data base structure and security.
Network and Security
The network and security systems and components commonly use standard-based proto-
cols for logging and management, as it was explained in the Section 2.7. In this regard,
the SHEE must implement syslog as a log collector, to gather the logs of the systems and
components which cannot send them, and as a log receiver, to get the logs of the systems
and components which have the capability to send them and that are configured to do so.
The domain systems and components must log all the policy related security events. The
SHEE must also implement the SNMP protocol for event receiving and systems and com-
ponents configuration. The domain systems and components must be configured to send
all the policy related health and performance events. If system monitors or log collectors
are already in-place and if they are already concentrating and/or collecting the necessary
logs and events from and within the SHEE domain, they can be configured to forward that
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data to the SHEE. In the latter case, the SHEE could be implemented as only a receiver
for monitoring. It may also be necessary to implement also the SSH and HTTPS pro-
tocols for the systems and components configuration, depending on which protocol they
support. An Internet search for the aforementioned protocols shows that there are a few
open source implementations available, such as: Syslog4j [84], in Java, SNMMP4J [85],
in Java, and JSch [86], also in Java, which claim to be compliant with the corresponding
standards. However, they require further security and robustness testing
4.6.3 Adapting Existing Systems to Create a SHEE
As the SHEE is modular, it can be implemented from scratch or it can be implemented
through the adaption of existing commercial systems. The most suitable systems to adapt
would be those that have a similar purpose and that already implement partially or com-
pletely some of its modules.
Example 1 An example would be to adapt the intelligent self-healing approaches of Sec-
tion 2.6, which have the necessary electrical network monitoring and control capa-
bilities, either centralized or distributed, for a given set of secondary substations.
Regarding the centralized approach, it is similar to a SHEE that has the electri-
cal network layer of a set of secondary substations as its self healing domain. In
the case of the distributed approach, it is similar to a set of SHEEs that have as
self-healing domain the electrical network layer of the corresponding secondary
substations. As these solutions are restricted to a set of components, to the electri-
cal network layer and to a predetermined group of situations, their adaption would
require: support for the easy update and detailed characterization of the monitored
components, the integration of collectors and controllers for other smart grid layers’
components, the evolution to an agile self-healing engine that is able to create plans
based only on the available smart grid information and on the results from past ac-
tions - predefined conditions should not be used -, the ability to cooperate with other
instances and the assessment of their security and dependability implementation.
Example 2 Another example would be to adapt a SIEM system, which has the neces-
sary capabilities to monitor the security of a communications network. Although it
does not control the monitored components, it can trigger the forwarding of report
messages and alarm messages. It is similar to a SHEE that has the communications
network layer of the smart grid as its self-healing domain. Unlike the previous ex-
ample, it can have information from all smart grid layers, if the necessary collectors
are available, and it is not able to control any smart grid components. Like the
previous example, it is restricted to a set of predetermined situations (that are con-
figured by the users as needed). Its adaption would require: support for the detailed
characterization of the smart grid components, the development of controllers for
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all smart grid layers, the eventual development of further collectors, the definition
of generic rules that are based only on the available smart grid information and on
the results from past actions - once again, predefined conditions should not be used
-, the ability to cooperate with other instances and the assessment of their security
and dependability implementation.
4.6.4 Restrictions and Limitations to the Self-healing Process
The decisions and actions taken by the SHS are limited by the available resources dur-
ing a self-healing cycle (e.g., not enough knowledge, none to reduced control capability
and/or no connectivity), which means that it is not a certainty that it will be able to go
through all of its states and, consequently, heal the smart grid in every cycle. However,
the monitoring and diagnosis states will always produce relevant information which can
be used by the human operators to complete the healing process. In regard to the knowl-
edge restrictions, the knowledge model is a limited representation of reality, which is
more accurate as closer it is to the real world. Making the correct decisions and taking
the right actions depends on having the necessary information on time, representing it as
knowledge in the right way and making the right questions. A harmful plan might result
from insufficient, false (as acquired from the smart grid components), outdated and/or
wrong knowledge and not by system malfunctioning, as long as f + 1 replicas are avail-
able and executing correctly. For the same reasons, the SHS may try to prevent or reverse
operator’s legitimate configurations that are not properly reflected in the SHEEs’ knowl-
edge models, considering them as faults. The same issue can affect the human experts and
the way to address it is through strengthening and adapting one’s capabilities, teaching,
training and self-learning. The same approach can be used with the SHS, through the
use of faster and more robust communication channels, improving the self-healing on-
tology and the knowledge representation based on experience and providing the learning
module with improved self-learning capabilities, beyond classifying the effectiveness of
the issued reconfiguration commands. Nevertheless, there might be situations in which
the proposal-only or the priority operator’s actions modes must be used during short time
periods.
4.6.5 Distributing the SHS and Replicating the SHEEs
A highly distributed SHS distribution level and the use of more than four replicas per
SHEE increase the deployment, management, operation and maintenance costs of the
proposed self-healing solution. In regard to the distribution, the Table 4.2 compares the
number of deployed SHEEs in a set of possible scenarios, which range from a small set
in a centralized redundant scenario to the tens of thousands in a highly granular scenario.
Given the threat of communications network partitioning, a DSO must evaluate the dif-
Chapter 4. Implementation 106
ferent risk levels associated with the various network locations and use a more granular
SHEE distribution in locations with higher risk (i.e., with lower communications redun-
dancy and/or higher criticality), thereby reducing the associated costs.
Table 4.2: Distributed deployment comparison.
Type of distribution Numbers
Centralized (1) 1 × SHEE = One
By data center (ndc) ndc × SHEE ≈ A small set
By primary substation (nps > 100) (ndc + nps) × SHEE ≈ A couple of hundreds
By secondary substation (nss > 10k) (ndc + nps + nss) × SHEE ≈ Tens of thousands
The BFT SMR increases the distribution numbers, depending on the number of repli-
cas per SHEE. The minimum number of replicas is four, to tolerate one fault or intrusion
in one of the replicas. However, depending on the risks to which a SHEE is exposed, a
higher number of replicas might be used. The DSO may reduce the deployment costs by
optimizing the resource utilization. In this regard, the Table 4.3 compares a set of replica
deployment scenarios, starting with a single machine to the case where all replicas are
distributed by different facilities.
Table 4.3: Replication deployment comparison (n is the number of SHEE repli-
cas).
Type Deployment resources Unique points of failure
Different threads n × SHEE application OS;
in the same machine + 1 × OS Computer hardware;
+ 1 × Computer hardware LAN;
+ 1 × Facility Facility
Different VMs n × SHEE application Hypervisor;
in the same host + n × OS Computer hardware;
+ 1 × Hypervisor LAN;
+ 1 × Computer hardware Facility
+ 1 × Facility
Different local hosts n × SHEE application LAN;
+ n × OS Facility
+ n × Computer hardware
+ 1 × LAN
+ 1 × Facility
Different geographically n × SHEE application WAN
distributed hosts + n × OS
+ n × Computer hardware
+ n × LAN
+ n × Facility
+ 1 × WAN
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Each scenario creates different unique points of failure, which must also be assessed
for the corresponding risks in the specific context of each SHEE.
A proper SHS distribution granularity, together with a sufficient number of adequately
distributed replicas per SHEE, enable the SHS to avoid communications network parti-
tioning scenarios that can range in size from a single sensor to a set of facilities/locations.
Figure 4.8 depicts a set of substations and DA devices with the expected connections be-
tween one-another. There is a replicated SHEE in each primary and secondary substation.
The SHEEs at primary substations 1 and 2 supervise not only the primary substation but
also the MV electrical network and corresponding DA devices. The green lines represent
the expected connections between the SHEEs having service related self-healing domains.
Figure 4.9 depicts the same set of substations and DA devices in four different partitioning
example scenarios, in comparison with Figure 4.8, affecting a control center, a substation,
a substation group or a data center. At each scenario, the SHEEs maintain supervision
over the corresponding self-healing domain components that stay in their partition, being
capable to prevent and recover from failures by healing the faults affecting these compo-
nents. In this regard, if a partition is caused by faulty configurations, the SHEEs at each
side might be capable of removing the fault, by correcting the configurations, restoring
the smart grid connectivity.
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Figure 4.8: Self-healing system without network partitions.
Chapter 4. Implementation 108
4.6.6 Closing Remarks
Considering that the design assumptions hold and that the DSO and manufacturers follow
the provided guidelines through the implementation, deployment, management, operation
and maintenance stages of the SHS life cycle, the SHS will behave in compliance with the
design requirements, providing a valid solution to the design problem. Moreover, mov-
ing beyond the automatic smart grid self-healing context, the SHS provides information
regarding the cause and impact of failures, considering all the smart grid technical lay-
ers, that might be used as guidance by incident response teams to reduce response and
recovery times and by management teams to prevent incident recurrences.
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(a) An isolated control center.
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(b) An isolated substation.
Figure 4.9: Network partition examples.
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(c) An isolated substation group.
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(d) An isolated data center.
Figure 4.9: Network partition examples.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This chapter concludes the current work by presenting a summary of the results and listing
a set of remaining issues to be handled in future work.
5.1 Results
Performance, privacy, security and dependability are key smart grid concerns, which are
related with the handling of real-time data and sensitive information and with the proven
fact that it is exposed and vulnerable to different threats, ranging from the traditional elec-
trical faults to the more recent cyber-attacks. In the highly connected smart grid environ-
ment, the manual interventions, faults, self-healing configurations or intrusion prevention
actions, observed in one of its layers, may have hindering or harmful consequences in the
systems, components and processes of the other layers. These consequences can only be
timely foreseen, avoided or unveiled by correlating the right knowledge about the smart
grid systems, components, processes, their behavior and their connections with the real-
time electrical, health, performance and security events. This is the role of the operational
planning teams and incident response teams with the appropriate HR capacity, training
and technological support. However, it is uncommon for the afore mentioned systems to
natively support or be configured to share the required information among them. More-
over, a smart grid incident response capability that over-relies on the central systems is
vulnerable to non-malicious faults or successful cyber attacks that can partially or com-
pletely isolate the latter from the field networks, blocking the view over what is happening
in one or more smart grid layers and forcing the dispatch of teams to the affected areas.
The field devices must rely on the local security features, until the field teams arrive or
the communications are reestablished.
We propose a secure and dependable distributed expert system as a way to provide
a more efficient, secure and dependable self-healing capability to the electricity distribu-
tion smart grid. We modeled the smart grid electrical network, communications network,
SCADA systems and processes to understand how they can be described as facts and rules
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of an expert system knowledge model. We perform a threat and vulnerability assessment
on the self-healing process to identify the required security and dependability controls,
focusing on the threats to the self-healing process and on the threat that a faulty or mali-
cious self-healing capability might mean to the smart grid. As a result of the assessment,
we present a system architecture that is comprised of a given number of actively repli-
cated SHEEs, with assigned self-healing domains, that can be geographically distributed
through the smart grid. Each SHEE has a knowledge model with facts and rules that de-
scribe the smart grid systems, components and processes, including their behavior and
connections, that fall within its self-healing domain. The SHEE can connect to them
to collect the real-time electrical, health, performance and security events that are used
to update and reason with the knowledge model and to control and/or reconfigure them.
Reasoning gives to the SHEE the intelligence needed to diagnose failures and create re-
covery plans. It will ask for the cooperation of neighbor SHEEs when the information
or resources within its domain are not sufficient to complete the self-healing process. To
reduce its vulnerability to network partitions, a SHEE must be as connectively close as
possible to its self-healing domain. A SHEE also provides support for user interaction
and user, configuration, logging, backup and cryptography management.
We implemented a simple POC, with focus in the knowledge modeling and reason-
ing, to demonstrate how to describe the smart grid systems and components as facts and
rules in a SHEE knowledge model. We also demonstrate what goals and queries may be
asked to the knowledge model to diagnose smart grid failures and create recovery plans.
The results are simple yet promising, validating the underlying concept and setting the
foundations for further R&D. We provide guidance for the implementation of the remain-
ing modules, which we were unable to implement in the POC due to time constrains, to
test the performance, robustness and security of the complete implementation. We also
discuss a set of relevant implementation and deployment aspects, namely the possibil-
ity to take advantage of an already existing communications network, data concentrators
and SCADA controllers, the number of self-healing domains with a dedicated SHEE and
the number of replicas in a SHEE. The main conclusion is that, although we can play
with these parameters to change the setup, management, operation and maintenance costs
of the proposed solution, this will have consequences in the performance, security and
dependability of the latter. Moreover, the creation of the recovery plans will be always
restricted by the existing visibility, control and redundancy limitations of the smart grid
systems and components.
5.2 Future Work
The following issues must be handled in future work.
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5.2.1 Design
The following issues are specific to the SHS design:
• Intelligent supervision components:
– Evolution of the learning module to include pattern recognition;
– Development of a prognosis module that uses the learned patterns to anticipate
faults and consequent failures;
– Development of a preventive maintenance module to generate the mainte-
nance plans;
• Expert components:
– Development of a database to store the collected smart grid information and
knowledge model snapshots;
• Smart grid modeling:
– Model further systems, components and services belonging to the presented
smart grid layers;
– Model the HR management systems, focusing on the smart grid users;
– Model the service order scheduling systems, focusing on the smart grid inter-
ventions;
• Threat and vulnerability assessment:
– Perform new assessment cycles, updating the list of threats and vulnerabilities
to reflect the smart grid context evolution;
– Perform new assessments from the perspective of other SHS beyond the self-
healing application.
5.2.2 Implementation
The following issues are specific to the SHS implementation:
• Knowledge:
– Formally define and maintain an updated ontology to include the new systems,
components and services;
– Update the facts in compliance with the updated ontology;
– Improve the reasoning rules to reflect the new facts and to narrow the gap
between the modeled behaviors and the real world;
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• Software code development for each SHEE module;
• Validation:
– Validate the security and robustness of the developed code;
• Discussion:
– Extend the distribution and replication guidelines with a set of example de-
ployment scenarios.
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VM Virtual Machine. 32, 60, 64, 106, 127
VPN Virtual Private Network. 33, 61, 130
VRF Virtual Routing and Forwarding. 32, 61, 130
W3C World Wide Web Consortium. 46
WAN Wide Area Network. 19, 74, 106
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Appendix A
Table of Threats, Vulnerabilities and
Controls
Table A.1: Threat and vulnerability assessment.
ID Threat Vulnerability Control
A01 Authentication failure Inadequate last resort
authentication
Local credentials fall-
back
A02 Corrupted data or con-
figurations
Inadequate error detec-
tion or correction
Error detection and cor-
rection mechanisms
A03 Facility destruction Inadequate tolerance ca-
pability
Geographically re-
dundant application
instances
A04 Facility services inter-
ruption
Inadequate tolerance ca-
pability
Geographically re-
dundant application
instances
A05 Faulty OS Inadequate tolerance ca-
pability
Redundant application
instances in different
VMs or physical hosts
A06 Faulty communication
channel
Inadequate data valida-
tion measures
Error detection and cor-
rection mechanisms
A07 Faulty configurations Inadequate massive de-
ployment capability
Configuration deploy-
ment systems
A08 Faulty configurations Inadequate user input
validation
Automatic input and
workflow restriction,
validation and confirma-
tion
A09 Faulty control device Inadequate command
confirmation
Command success con-
firmation
A10 Faulty data source Inadequate data valida-
tion measures
Data comparison be-
tween redundant data
sources
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page
ID Threat Vulnerability Control
A11 Faulty data source or
control device
Inadequate redundancy
measures
Redundant data sources
and control devices
A12 Faulty hardware Inadequate tolerance ca-
pability
Redundant application
instances in different
physical hosts
A13 Faulty hypervisor Inadequate tolerance ca-
pability
Redundant application
instances in different
physical hosts
A14 Faulty user or permis-
sion assignment
Inadequate massive de-
ployment capability
Centralized user ac-
counts
A15 Faulty user or permis-
sion assignment
Inadequate permission
levels or granularity
Fine-grained RBAC
A16 Loss of data or configu-
rations
Inadequate backups Regular backups
A17 Malicious code Inadequate recovery ca-
pability
Proactive and reactive
system recovery
A18 Man-in-the-middle Inadequate authentica-
tion measures
Secure authentication
protocols
A19 Network partitions Inadequate application
distribution
Distributed application
architecture
A20 Outdated smart grid data Inadequate smart grid
data update
Regular proactive data
collection and update
A21 Shared user accounts Inadequate accountabil-
ity capability
Personal accounts
A22 Software errors Inadequate massive de-
ployment capability
Update deployment sys-
tems
A23 Software errors Inadequate requirement
specification
Secure coding practices
specification require-
ment
A24 Unauthorized applica-
tion access
Inadequate authentica-
tion and authorization
User accounts
A25 Unauthorized applica-
tion access
Inadequate security
event monitoring
Security logging and
monitoring
A26 Unauthorized communi-
cation change
Inadequate data valida-
tion measures
Secure hashing al-
gorithms and hash
comparison
A27 Unauthorized data or
configuration change
Inadequate access con-
trol
RBAC
A28 Unauthorized data or
configuration change
Inadequate security
event monitoring
Security logging and
monitoring
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page
ID Threat Vulnerability Control
A29 Unauthorized data or
configuration change
Inadequate user input
validation
Automatic input and
workflow restriction,
validation and confirma-
tion
A30 Unintentional data or
configuration change
Inadequate security
event monitoring
Security logging and
monitoring
A31 Unintentional data or
configuration change
Inadequate user input
validation
Automatic input and
workflow restriction,
validation and confirma-
tion
A32 User account sharing Inadequate idle session
management
Automatic idle user lo-
gout
A33 Weak user account pass-
words
Inadequate password
management
Strong password policy
B01 Faulty OS Inadequate health and
performance monitoring
Health and performance
monitoring
B02 Faulty communication
channel
Inadequate health and
performance monitoring
Health and performance
monitoring systems
B03 Faulty communication
channel
Inadequate redundancy
measures
Redundant communica-
tions channels
B04 Faulty configurations Inadequate change man-
agement
Regular change manage-
ment policy review
B05 Faulty configurations Inadequate configura-
tion procedures
Regular configuration
procedures review
B06 Faulty configurations Inadequate support Manufacturer and/or
vendor contractual
support
B07 Faulty configurations Inadequate testing Regular penetration test-
ing
B08 Faulty configurations Lack of knowledge and
awareness
User training and aware-
ness
B09 Faulty data source or
control device
Inadequate health and
performance monitoring
Health and performance
monitoring
B10 Faulty facility services Inadequate tolerance ca-
pability
Redundant services sup-
ply
B11 Faulty hardware Inadequate health and
performance monitoring
Health and performance
monitoring
B12 Faulty hypervisor Inadequate health and
performance monitoring
Health and performance
monitoring
B13 Faulty user or permis-
sion assignment
Inadequate user manage-
ment policy
Regular user manage-
ment policy review
B14 Faulty user or permis-
sion assignment
Inadequate user or per-
mission review
Regular user account
and permission review
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page
ID Threat Vulnerability Control
B15 Lack of HR resources Inadequate HR manage-
ment
Regular HR capacity re-
view
B16 Lack of logical re-
sources
Inadequate capacity
management
Regular capacity man-
agement policy review
B17 Lack of physical re-
sources
Inadequate capacity
management
Regular capacity man-
agement policy review
B18 Loss of data or configu-
rations
Inadequate storage re-
dundancy
Data store redundancy
B19 Malicious code Inadequate anti-malware
protection
Whitelisting, antivirus,
host-based firewall,
intrusion detection and
prevention
B20 Physical malicious intru-
sion
Inadequate physical se-
curity monitoring
Physical security log-
ging and monitoring
B21 Software errors Inadequate testing Penetration testing and
vulnerability manage-
ment
B22 Software errors Inadequate update pro-
cedures
Regular update proce-
dures review
B23 Unauthorized applica-
tion access
Inadequate intrusion de-
tection and prevention
Host and network-based
firewall, intrusion detec-
tion and prevention
B24 Unauthorized applica-
tion access
Inadequate network seg-
mentation
Physical , VPN, VLAN
and VRF configurations
B25 Unintentional data or
configuration change
Lack of knowledge and
awareness
User training and aware-
ness
B26 User account sharing Lack of security aware-
ness
Security awareness
training
B27 Weak security imple-
mentation
Inadequate robustness
testing
Robustness testing and
evaluation
C01 Communication eaves-
dropping
Inadequate communica-
tions encryption
Application level com-
munications encryption
C02 Communication eaves-
dropping
Inadequate key ex-
change
Secure key exchange
protocols
C03 Faulty application be-
havior
Inadequate recovery ca-
pability
Proactive and reactive
system recovery
C04 Faulty application be-
havior
Inadequate tolerance ca-
pability
Replicated application
instances with active
replication protocol
C05 Hardware theft Inadequate encryption
keys storage
Cryptographic key vault
C06 Hardware theft Inadequate storage en-
cryption
Application or OS level
storage encryption
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page
ID Threat Vulnerability Control
C07 Malicious application
behavior
Inadequate recovery ca-
pability
Proactive and reactive
system recovery
C08 Malicious application
behavior
Inadequate security
event monitoring
Security logging and
monitoring
C09 Malicious application
behavior
Inadequate tolerance ca-
pability
Replicated application
instances with active
replication protocol
C10 Message replay Inadequate message val-
idation measures
Secure message creation
and flow validation
C11 Unauthorized data ac-
cess
Inadequate encryption
keys storage
Cryptographic key vault
C12 Unauthorized data ac-
cess
Inadequate storage en-
cryption
Application or OS level
storage encryption
D01 Application unavailabil-
ity
Inadequate business
continuity capability
Regular business conti-
nuity plan review
D02 Data leakage Inadequate data moni-
toring
DLP systems
D03 Data leakage Inadequate equipment
disposal
Equipment disposal pro-
cedures
D04 Data leakage Inadequate information
classification
Regular information
classification policy
review
D05 Data leakage Lack of knowledge and
awareness
User training and aware-
ness
D06 Information theft Inadequate HR recruit-
ment and selection
HR recruitment and se-
lection criteria
D07 Malicious application
behavior
Inadequate anti-malware
protection
Whitelisting, antivirus,
host-based firewall,
intrusion detection and
prevention
D08 Malicious application
behavior
Inadequate incident re-
sponse capability
Regular incident re-
sponse policy review
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Appendix B
POC Knowledge
This chapter includes the complete content of the knowledge base that was implemented
for the Proof of Concept (POC).
B.1 Facts
Figures B.1 to B.10 depict the knowledge facts.
B.2 Rules
Figures B.11 to B.26 depict the knowledge rules.
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new 1 quinta-feira, 29 de Setembro de 2016 23:37
% component(ComponentID, ComponentType)
component(rt1, com:router).
% interface(ComponentID, InterfaceID, InterfaceType)
interface(rt1, rt1:core, core).
interface(rt1, rt1:eth1, ethernet).
interface(rt1, rt1:eth2, ethernet).
% connected(Service, Interface1ID, Interface2ID,
% Dependencies, Interface1Controls, Interface2Controls)
connected(communications, scada1:app1, rt1:eth2, [], [], []).
connected(communications, rt1:eth2, rt1:core,
[], [firewall, routing], []).
connected(communications, rt1:core, rt1:eth1,
[], [], [routing, firewall]).
connected(communications, rt1:eth1, sc1:eth2, [], [], []).
connected(scada, scada1:app1, sc1:app1, [communications], [], []).
% opposite(ControlType, State, OppositeState)
opposite(fwRule, allow, deny).
opposite(fwRule, deny, allow).
% currentState(InterfaceID, Control, ControlParameters)
currentState(rt1:eth1, route, (sc1:app1)).
currentState(rt1:eth2, route, (scada1:app1)).
currentState(rt1:eth1, fwRule, (allow, scada1:app1, sc1:app1)).
currentState(rt1:eth2, fwRule, (allow, scada1:app1, sc1:app1)).
-1-
Figure B.1: Router 1 facts.
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new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 05:54
component(sc1, scada:sc).
interface(sc1, sc1:eth1, ethernet).
interface(sc1, sc1:eth2, ethernet).
interface(sc1, sc1:app1, application).
connected(communications, sc1:eth2, sc1:app1,
[], [scmode, firewall, routing], []).
connected(communications, sc1:eth1, sc1:app1,
[], [scmode, firewall, routing], []).
connected(communications, sc1:app1, sc1:eth1,
[], [scmode], [routing, firewall]).
connected(communications, sc1:eth1, sw2:eth2,
[], [], []).
connected(scada, sc1:app1, ied9:app1, [communications], [], []).
opposite(scmode, local, remote).
opposite(scmode, remote, local).
currentState(sc1:eth1, route, (hmi1:app1)).
currentState(sc1:eth1, route, (ied9:app1)).
currentState(sc1:eth2, route, (scada1:app1)).
currentState(sc1:eth1, fwRule, (allow, sc1:app1, ied9:app1)).
currentState(sc1:eth1, fwRule, (allow, hmi1:app1, sc1:app1)).
currentState(sc1:eth2, fwRule, (allow, scada1:app1, sc1:app1)).
policy(sc1:app1, scmode, (local)).
currentState(sc1:app1, scmode, (local)).
-1-
Figure B.2: Substation controller 1 facts.
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new 1 quinta-feira, 29 de Setembro de 2016 23:38
component(hmi1, scada:hmi).
interface(hmi1, hmi1:eth1, ethernet).
interface(hmi1, hmi1:os1, os).
interface(hmi1, hmi1:app1, application).
interface(hmi1, hmi1:phy1, physical).
connected(communications, hmi1:phy1, hmi1:os1,
[], [], [authentication]).
connected(communications, hmi1:os1, hmi1:app1,
[], [], [authentication]).
connected(communications, hmi1:app1, hmi1:eth1,
[], [], [routing, firewall]).
connected(communications, hmi1:eth1, sw2:eth3, [], [], []).
connected(scada, hmi1:phy1, hmi1:app1, [communications], [], []).
connected(scada, hmi1:app1, sc1:app1, [communications], [], []).
% policy(InterfaceID, Control, Parameters)
policy(hmi1:os1, user, (alice)).
policy(hmi1:app1, user, (alice)).
currentState(hmi1:eth1, route, (sc1:app1)).
currentState(hmi1:eth1, fwRule, (allow, hmi1:app1, sc1:app1)).
currentState(hmi1:os1, user, (alice)).
currentState(hmi1:app1, user, (alice)).
-1-
Figure B.3: HMI 1 facts.
new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 05:55
component(sw2, com:switch).
interface(sw2, sw2:core, core).
interface(sw2, sw2:eth1, ethernet).
interface(sw2, sw2:eth2, ethernet).
interface(sw2, sw2:eth3, ethernet).
connected(communications, sw2:eth3, sw2:core,
[], [switching], []).
connected(communications, sw2:core, sw2:eth2,
[], [], [switching]).
connected(communications, sw2:eth2, sc1:eth1, [], [], []).
connected(communications, sw2:eth2, sw2:core,
[], [switching], []).
connected(communications, sw2:core, sw2:eth1,
[], [], [switching]).
connected(communications, sw2:eth1, fw1:eth2, [], [], []).
currentState(sw2:eth1, vlan, (sw2:vlan1)).
currentState(sw2:eth2, vlan, (sw2:vlan1)).
currentState(sw2:eth3, vlan, (sw2:vlan1)).
-1-
Figure B.4: Switch 2 facts.
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new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 05:55
component(fw1, com:firewall).
interface(fw1, fw1:core, core).
interface(fw1, fw1:eth1, ethernet).
interface(fw1, fw1:eth2, ethernet).
connected(communications, fw1:eth2, fw1:core,
[], [firewall, routing], []).
connected(communications, fw1:core, fw1:eth1,
[], [], [routing, firewall]).
connected(communications, fw1:eth1, sw1:eth2, [], [], []).
currentState(fw1:eth1, route, (ied9:app1)).
currentState(fw1:eth2, route, (sc1:app1)).
currentState(fw1:eth1, fwRule, (allow, sc1:app1, ied9:app1)).
currentState(fw1:eth2, fwRule, (allow, sc1:app1, ied9:app1)).
-1-
Figure B.5: Firewall 1 facts.
new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 05:56
component(sw1, com:switch).
interface(sw1, sw1:core, core).
interface(sw1, sw1:eth1, ethernet).
interface(sw1, sw1:eth2, ethernet).
connected(communications, sw1:eth2, sw1:core,
[], [switching], []).
connected(communications, sw1:core, sw1:eth1,
[], [], [switching]).
connected(communications, sw1:eth1, ied9:eth1, [], [], []).
currentState(sw1:eth1, vlan, (sw1:vlan1)).
currentState(sw1:eth2, vlan, (sw1:vlan1)).
-1-
Figure B.6: Switch 1 facts.
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new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 05:56
component(ied9, scada:ied).
interface(ied9, ied9:ser1, serial).
interface(ied9, ied9:eth1, ethernet).
interface(ied9, ied9:app1, application).
interface(ied9, ied9:phy1, physical).
connected(communications, ied9:eth1, ied9:app1,
[], [iedmode], []).
connected(communications, ied9:app1, ied9:ser1,
[], [iedmode], []).
connected(communications, ied9:ser1, es9:ser1,
[], [], []).
connected(communications, ied9:phy1, ied9:app1,
[], [iedmode], []).
connected(scada, ied9:phy1, ied9:app1,
[communications], [], []).
connected(scada, ied9:app1, es9:me1,
[communications], [], []).
opposite(iedmode, local, remote).
opposite(iedmode, remote, local).
policy(ied9:app1, iedmode, (remote)).
currentState(ied9:app1, iedmode, (remote)).
-1-
Figure B.7: IED 9 facts.
new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 05:57
component(es9, scada:es).
interface(es9, es9:el1, electrical).
interface(es9, es9:el2, electrical).
interface(es9, es9:me1, mechanism).
interface(es9, es9:ser1, serial).
interface(es9, es9:phy1, physical).
connected(communications, es9:ser1, es9:me1, [], [], []).
connected(mechanical, es9:phy1, es9:me1, [], [], []).
connected(electrical, es9:me1, es9:el2, [], [position], []).
connected(electrical, es9:el1, es9:me1, [], [], []).
connected(scada, es9:phy1, es9:me1, [mechanical], [], []).
connected(scada, es9:me1, es9:el2, [electrical], [], []).
opposite(position, closed, opened).
opposite(position, opened, closed).
% command(Control, CommandID, ExpectedConsequence)
command(position, close, closed).
command(position, open, opened).
policy(es9:me1, position, (closed)).
currentState(es9:me1, position, (closed)).
-1-
Figure B.8: Electrical switch 9 facts.
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new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 05:57
component(do1, physical:door).
interface(do1, do1:phy1, physical).
interface(do1, do1:phy2, physical).
connected(physical, do1:phy2, do1:phy1,
[], [authentication], []).
connected(physical, do1:phy1, hmi1:phy1, [], [], []).
connected(physical, do1:phy1, ied9:phy1, [], [], []).
connected(physical, do1:phy1, es9:phy1, [], [], []).
connected(scada, do1:phy2, hmi1:phy1, [physical], [], []).
connected(scada, do1:phy2, ied9:phy1, [physical], [], []).
connected(scada, do1:phy2, es9:phy1, [physical], [], []).
policy(do1:phy2, user, (alice)).
currentState(do1:phy2, user, (alice)).
component(scada1, shee2:component).
interface(scada1, scada1:app1, application).
-1-
Figure B.9: Door 1 facts.
new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 05:57
component(scada1, shee2:component).
interface(scada1, scada1:app1, application).
% shee(SHEEID)
shee(shee2).
-1-
Figure B.10: SHEE2 facts as seen from SHEE1.
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new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 05:58
% checkControl(Control, FlowDirection, InterfaceID,
% User, FlowInformation, Configuration)
checkControl(switching, _, A, User, FlowInfo, Config) :-
currentState(A, vlan, Parameters),
Config = [(A, vlan, Parameters)].
% monitorConfig(Interface1Configuration, Interface2Configuration)
monitorConfig((A1, vlan, (Vlan1)),(A2, vlan, (Vlan2))) :-
interface(Component, A1, _),
interface(Component, A2, _),
Vlan2 == Vlan1.
% diagnoseConfig(Interface1Configuration, Interface2Configuration,
% DiagnosisResult)
diagnoseConfig((A1, vlan, (Vlan1)),
(A2, vlan, (Vlan2)), Diagnostic) :-
interface(Component, A1, _),
interface(Component, A2, _),
((Vlan2 == Vlan1,
Diagnostic = [(A2, okVlan, (Vlan2))]);
(\+(Vlan2 == Vlan1),
Diagnostic = [(A2, wrongVlan, (Vlan2, Vlan1))])).
% recoverConfig(DiagnosisResult, RecoveryPlan)
recoverConfig((A, okVlan, Parameters), []).
recoverConfig((A, wrongVlan, (Vlan2, Vlan1)),
[(A, changeVlanTo, (Vlan1))]).
-1-
Figure B.11: Switching rules.
new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 05:59
checkControl(routing, FlowDir, A,
User, (Source, Target), Config) :-
(FlowDir == in,
Config = [(A, route, (Source))]);
(FlowDir == out,
Config = [(A, route, (Target))]).
% monitorConfig(Interface1Configuration)
monitorConfig((A, route, Parameters)) :-
currentState(A, route, Parameters).
% diagnoseConfig(Interface1Configuration, DiagnosisResult)
diagnoseConfig((A, route, Parameters), Diagnostic) :-
(currentState(A, route, Parameters),
Diagnostic = [(A, okRoute, Parameters)]);
(\+currentState(A, route, Parameters),
Diagnostic = [(A, noRoute, Parameters)]).
recoverConfig((A, okRoute, Parameters), []).
recoverConfig((A, noRoute, Parameters),
[(A, addRoute, Parameters)]).
-1-
Figure B.12: Routing rules.
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new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 05:59
checkControl(firewall, _, A, User, (Source, Target), Config) :-
Config = [(A, fwRule, (allow, Source, Target))].
monitorConfig((A, fwRule, Parameters)) :-
currentState(A, fwRule, Parameters).
diagnoseConfig((A, fwRule, (Permission, Source, Target)),
Diagnostic) :-
(currentState(A, fwRule, (Permission, Source, Target)),
Diagnostic = [(A, okFwRule, (Permission, Source, Target))]);
(opposite(fwRule, Permission, OP),
currentState(A, fwRule, (OP, Source, Target)),
Diagnostic = [(A, wrongPermission,
(Permission, Source, Target))]);
(\+currentState(A, fwRule, (Permission, Source, Target)),
opposite(fwRule, Permission, OP),
\+currentState(A, fwRule, (OP, Source, Target)),
Diagnostic = [(A, noFwRule, (Permission, Source, Target))]).
recoverConfig((A, okFwRule, Parameters), []).
recoverConfig((A, wrongPermission, Parameters),
[(A, changeFwRule, Parameters)]).
recoverConfig((A, noFwRule, Parameters),
[(A, addFwRule, Parameters)]).
-1-
Figure B.13: Firewall rules.
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new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 06:00
checkControl(authentication, _, A, User, FlowInfo, Config) :-
Config = [(A, user, (User))].
monitorConfig((A, user, Parameters)) :-
policy(A, user, Parameters),
currentState(A, user, Parameters).
diagnoseConfig((A, user, Parameters), Diagnostic) :-
(policy(A, user, Parameters),
currentState(A, user, Parameters),
Diagnostic = [(A, okUser, Parameters)]);
(\+policy(A, user, Parameters),
currentState(A, user, Parameters),
Diagnostic = [(A, userNAByPol, Parameters)]);
(policy(A, user, Parameters),
\+currentState(A, user, Parameters),
Diagnostic = [(A, userNotConfigured, Parameters)]);
(\+policy(A, user, Parameters),
\+currentState(A, user, Parameters),
Diagnostic = [(A, userNAPolNConf, Parameters)]).
recoverConfig((A, okUser, Parameters), []).
recoverConfig((A, userNAByPol, Parameters),
[(A, removeUser, Parameters)]).
recoverConfig((A, userNotConfigured, Parameters),
[(A, addUser, Parameters)]).
recoverConfig((A, userNAPolNConf, Parameters),
[(A, usersLimByPolicy)]).
-1-
Figure B.14: Authentication rules.
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new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 06:00
checkControl(scmode, _, A, User, (Source, Target), Config) :-
(interface(_, A, ethernet),
interface(Component, Source, _),
component(Component, scada:hmi),
Config = [(A, scmode, (local))]);
(interface(_, A, ethernet),
interface(Component, Source, _),
\+component(Component, scada:hmi),
Config = [(A, scmode, (remote))]);
(interface(_, A, application),
currentState(A, scmode, Parameters),
Config = [(A, scmode, Parameters)]).
monitorConfig((A1, scmode, Parameters1),
(A2, scmode, Parameters2)) :-
policy(A2, scmode, Parameters1),
currentState(A2, scmode, Parameters1).
diagnoseConfig((A1, scmode, (Mode1)),
(A2, scmode, (Mode2)), Diagnostic) :-
(policy(A2, scmode, (Mode1)),
currentState(A2, scmode, (Mode1)),
Diagnostic = [(A2, okScmode, (Mode1))]);
(opposite(scmode, Mode1, OM),
policy(A2, scmode, (OM)),
currentState(A2, scmode, (Mode1)),
Diagnostic = [(A2, scmodeNAByPol, (Mode1, OM))]);
(policy(A2, scmode, (Mode1)),
opposite(scmode, Mode1, OM),
currentState(A2, scmode, (OM)),
Diagnostic = [(A2, scmodeNotConfigured, (Mode1, OM))]);
(opposite(scmode, Mode1, OM),
policy(A2, scmode, (OM)),
currentState(A2, scmode, (OM)),
Diagnostic = [(A2, scmodeNAPolNConf, (Mode1))]).
recoverConfig((A, okScmode, Parameters), []).
recoverConfig((A, scmodeNAByPol, (Mode, OM)),
[(A, changeScmodeTo, OM)]).
recoverConfig((A, scmodeNotConfigured, (Mode, OM)),
[(A, changeScmodeTo, Mode)]).
recoverConfig((A, scmodeNAPolNConf, Parameters),
[(A, scmodeLimByPolicy)]).
-1-
Figure B.15: Substation controller operating mode rules.
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new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 06:01
checkControl(iedmode, _, A, User, (Source, Target), Config) :-
(interface(Component, A, physical),
Config = [(A, iedmode, (local))]);
(interface(_, A, ethernet),
Config = [(A, iedmode, (remote))]);
(interface(_, A, application),
currentState(A, iedmode, Parameters),
Config = [(A, iedmode, Parameters)]).
monitorConfig((A1, iedmode, Parameters1),
(A2, iedmode, Parameters2)) :-
policy(A2, iedmode, Parameters1),
currentState(A2, iedmode, Parameters1).
diagnoseConfig((A1, iedmode, (Mode1)), (A2, iedmode, (Mode2)),
Diagnostic) :-
(policy(A2, iedmode, (Mode1)),
currentState(A2, iedmode, (Mode1)),
Diagnostic = [(A2, okIedmode, (Mode1))]);
(opposite(iedmode, Mode1, OM),
policy(A2, iedmode, (OM)),
currentState(A2, iedmode, (Mode1)),
Diagnostic = [(A2, iedmodeNAByPol, (Mode1, OM))]);
(policy(A2, iedmode, (Mode1)),
opposite(iedmode, Mode1, OM),
currentState(A2, iedmode, (OM)),
Diagnostic = [(A2, iedmodeNotConfigured, (Mode1, OM))]);
(opposite(iedmode, Mode1, OM),
policy(A2, iedmode, (OM)),
currentState(A2, iedmode, (OM)),
Diagnostic = [(A2, iedmodeNAPolNConf, (Mode1))]).
recoverConfig((A, okIedmode, Parameters), []).
recoverConfig((A, iedmodeNAByPol, (Mode, OM)),
[(A, changeIedmodeTo, OM)]).
recoverConfig((A, iedmodeNotConfigured, (Mode, OM)),
[(A, changeIedmodeTo, Mode)]).
recoverConfig((A, iedmodeNAPolNConf, Parameters),
[(A, iedmodeLimByPolicy)]).
-1-
Figure B.16: IED operating mode rules.
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new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 06:01
checkControl(position, _, A, User, FlowInfo, Config) :-
currentState(A, position, State),
Config = [(A, position, State)].
monitorConfig((A, position, Parameters)) :-
policy(A, position, Parameters),
currentState(A, position, Parameters).
diagnoseConfig((A, position, (State)), Diagnostic) :-
(policy(A, position, (State)),
currentState(A, position, (State)),
Diagnostic = [(A, positionOk, (State))]);
(opposite(position, State, OS),
policy(A, position, (OS)),
currentState(A, position, (State)),
Diagnostic = [(A, positionNAByPol, (State, OS))]);
(policy(A, position, (State)),
opposite(position, State, OS),
currentState(A, position, (OS)),
Diagnostic = [(A, positionNotConfigured, (State, OS))]);
(opposite(position, State, OS),
policy(A, position, (OS)),
currentState(A, position, (OS)),
Diagnostic = [(A, positionNAPolNConf, (State))]).
recoverConfig((A, positionOk, Parameters), []).
recoverConfig((A, positionNAByPol, (State, OS)),
[(A, Command, OS)]) :-
command(position, Command, OS).
recoverConfig((A, positionNotConfigured, (State, OS)),
[(A, changePositionTo, State)]) :-
command(position, Command, State).
recoverConfig((A, positionNAPolNConf, Parameters),
[(A, positionLimByPolicy)]).
-1-
Figure B.17: Electrical switch rules.
new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 06:01
% checkControls(InterfaceID, FlowDirection, ControlList,
% User, FlowInformation, ConfigurationList)
checkControls(A, FlowDir, ControlList,
User, FlowInfo, ConfigList) :-
(ControlList == [],
ConfigList = []);
([Control|Rest] = ControlList,
checkControl(Control, FlowDir, A, User, FlowInfo, Config),
checkControls(A, FlowDir, Rest, User, FlowInfo, ConfigList1),
myAppend([Config, ConfigList1], ConfigList)).
-1-
Figure B.18: Rule to retrieve the configurations associated with a component interface.
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new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 06:02
% checkSupport(InterfaceA, InterfaceB, ServiceList,
% User, Path, ConfigurationList)
checkSupport(A, B, List, User, Path, ConfigList) :-
(List == [],
Path = [],
ConfigList = []);
([Service|Rest] = List,
checkService(Service, A, B,
User, (A, B), [A], Path1, ConfigList1),
checkSupport(A, B, Rest, User, Path2, ConfigList2),
myAppend([Path2, Path1, [A]], Path),
myAppend([ConfigList2, ConfigList1], ConfigList)).
-1-
Figure B.19: Rule to cycle through the service dependencies associated with a connection.
new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 06:02
% checkService(ServiceID, Interface1ID, Interface2ID,
% User, FlowInformation, VisitedInterfaces,
% Path, ConfigurationList)
checkService(Service, A, B,
User, FlowInfo, Visited, Path, ConfigList) :-
(connected(Service, A, B,
DepList, ControlListA, ControlListB),
checkControls(A, in, ControlListA,
User, FlowInfo, ConfigListA),
checkSupport(A, B, DepList,
User, Path1, ConfigList1),
checkControls(B, out, ControlListB,
User, FlowInfo, ConfigListB),
myAppend([[B], Path1], Path),
myAppend([ConfigListB, ConfigList1, ConfigListA],
ConfigList));
(connected(Service, A, C,
DepList, ControlListA, ControlListB),
checkControls(A, in, ControlListA,
User, FlowInfo, ConfigListA),
checkSupport(A, C,
DepList, User, Path1, ConfigList1),
checkControls(C, out, ControlListB,
User, FlowInfo, ConfigListB),
C \== B,
\+member(C, Visited),
checkService(Service, C, B,
User, FlowInfo, [C|Visited], Path2, ConfigList2),
myAppend([Path2, [C], Path1], Path),
myAppend([ConfigList2, ConfigListB, ConfigList1,
ConfigListA], ConfigList)).
-1-
Figure B.20: Rule to cycle through the connections associated with a service.
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new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 06:03
% check(ServiceID, Interface1ID, Interface2ID,
% User, Path, ConfigurationList)
check(Service, A, B, User, Path, ConfigList) :-
checkService(Service, A, B,
User, (A, B), [A], Path1, ConfigList1),
reverse(Path1, Path2),
myAppend([[A], Path2], Path),
reverse(ConfigList1, ConfigList).
-1-
Figure B.21: Rule to retrieve the configurations associated with a service.
new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 06:04
% monitorConfigs(ConfigurationList)
monitorConfigs(ConfigList) :-
(ConfigList == []);
(ConfigList = [(A1, vlan, Parameter1),
(A2, vlan, Parameter2)|Rest],
monitorConfig((A1, vlan, Parameter1),
(A2, vlan, Parameter2)),
monitorConfigs(Rest));
(ConfigList = [(A1, scmode, Parameter1),
(A2, scmode, Parameter2)|Rest],
monitorConfig((A1, scmode, Parameter1),
(A2, scmode, Parameter2)),
monitorConfigs(Rest));
(ConfigList = [(A1, iedmode, Parameter1),
(A2, iedmode, Parameter2)|Rest],
monitorConfig((A1, iedmode, Parameter1),
(A2, iedmode, Parameter2)),
monitorConfigs(Rest));
(ConfigList = [(A, Control, Parameters)|Rest],
\+(Control == vlan),
\+(Control == scmode),
\+(Control == iedmode),
monitorConfig((A, Control, Parameters)),
monitorConfigs(Rest)).
% monitor(ServiceID, Interface1ID, Interface2ID, User)
monitor(Service, A, B, User) :-
checkService(Service, A, B,
User, (A, B), [A], _, ConfigList1),
reverse(ConfigList1, ConfigList2),
monitorConfigs(ConfigList2).
-1-
Figure B.22: Rules associated with the monitoring activity.
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new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 06:05
% diagnoseConfigs(ConfigurationList, DiagnosisResult)
diagnoseConfigs(ConfigList, Diagnostic) :-
(ConfigList == [],
Diagnostic = []);
(ConfigList = [(A1, vlan, Parameter1),
(A2, vlan, Parameter2)|Rest],
diagnoseConfig((A1, vlan, Parameter1),
(A2, vlan, Parameter2), DiagnosticA),
diagnoseConfigs(Rest, DiagnosticR),
myAppend([DiagnosticA, DiagnosticR], Diagnostic));
(ConfigList = [(A1, scmode, Parameter1),
(A2, scmode, Parameter2)|Rest],
diagnoseConfig((A1, scmode, Parameter1),
(A2, scmode, Parameter2), DiagnosticA),
diagnoseConfigs(Rest, DiagnosticR),
myAppend([DiagnosticA, DiagnosticR], Diagnostic));
(ConfigList = [(A1, iedmode, Parameter1),
(A2, iedmode, Parameter2)|Rest],
diagnoseConfig((A1, iedmode, Parameter1),
(A2, iedmode, Parameter2), DiagnosticA),
diagnoseConfigs(Rest, DiagnosticR),
myAppend([DiagnosticA, DiagnosticR], Diagnostic));
(ConfigList = [(A, Control, Parameter1)|Rest],
\+(Control == vlan),
\+(Control == scmode),
\+(Control == iedmode),
diagnoseConfig((A, Control, Parameter1), DiagnosticA),
diagnoseConfigs(Rest, DiagnosticR),
myAppend([DiagnosticA, DiagnosticR], Diagnostic)).
% diagnose(ServiceID, Interface1ID, Interface2ID,
% User, DiagnosisResult)
diagnose(Service, A, B, User, Diagnostic) :-
checkService(Service, A, B,
User, (A, B), [A], _, ConfigList1),
reverse(ConfigList1, ConfigList2),
diagnoseConfigs(ConfigList2, Diagnostic).
-1-
Figure B.23: Rules associated with the diagnosis activity.
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new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 06:05
% recoverConfigs(DiagnosisList, RecoveryPlan)
recoverConfigs(DiagList, RecoveryPlan) :-
(DiagList == [],
RecoveryPlan = []);
(DiagList = [Diagnostic|Rest],
recoverConfig(Diagnostic, ConfigA),
recoverConfigs(Rest, PlanR),
myAppend([ConfigA, PlanR], RecoveryPlan)).
% recover(ServiceID, Interface1ID, Interface2ID,
% User, RecoveryPlan)
recover(Service, A, B, User, RecoveryPlan) :-
checkService(Service, A, B,
User, (A, B), [A], _, ConfigList1),
reverse(ConfigList1, ConfigList2),
diagnoseConfigs(ConfigList2, Diagnostic),
recoverConfigs(Diagnostic, RecoveryPlan).
-1-
Figure B.24: Rules associated with the recovery activity.
new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 06:06
% myAppend(ListOfLists, ConcatenationResult)
myAppend(ListOfLists, List) :-
(ListOfLists == [],
List = []);
(ListOfLists = [First|Rest],
myAppend(Rest, List1),
append(First, List1, List)).
-1-
Figure B.25: Rule to concatenate a list of lists.
new 1 quarta-feira, 28 de Setembro de 2016 05:53
:- discontiguous
component/2,
interface/3,
connected/6,
opposite/3,
currentState/3,
policy/3,
checkControl/6,
monitorConfig/1,
monitorConfig/2,
diagnoseConfig/2,
diagnoseConfig/3,
recoverConfig/2.
:- style_check(-singleton).
-1-
Figure B.26: Prolog initializations.
